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1. INTRODUCTION
Morten Balling, Ernest Gnan, Frank Lierman and 
Jean-Pierre Schoder
On 11-12 November 2008, SUERF and Banque centrale du Luxembourg organ-
ized a conference on Productivity in the Financial Services Sector on the occasion
of the tenth anniversary of the Banque centrale du Luxembourg. The conference
addressed three main themes: first, stylized facts on banks’ productivity develop-
ments and the measurement of productivity; second, sources of productivity in
banking; and third, the possible repercussions and consequences of the financial
crisis on financial institutions’ future productivity development. These three top-
ics are taken up from various angles in the chapters of the present volume, which
represent a selection of the papers presented at the conference.
Governor Yves Mersch, Banque centrale du Luxembourg, organised his opening
remarks (chapter 2) around three inter-related questions: 1) How should we
measure the level of production in financial services? 2) What do measures of
financial sector productivity tell us about sources of productivity growth? 3)
Which aspects of productivity in financial services have been given new urgency
by recent events?
One measure of output is provided by national accounts methodology. The value
of depositor services is reflected in the difference between a risk-free reference
rate and an average depositor rate while the value of borrower services is reflected
in the difference between the average loan rate and the reference rate. It is, how-
ever, an open question how to determine the appropriate reference rate. Another
open question is how to measure prices in financial services. Turning to produc-
tivity in the financial sector existing measures are related to economies of scale
and economies of scope. In addition it is common to link the efficiency of indi-
vidual banks to environmental variables, the quality of management, wage dis-
persion or information technology investment. The Third question concerns the
priorities in the study of productivity in financial services. Some commentators
have recently observed that while some banks are ‘too big to fail’ others may be
‘too big to save’. It is, however, not clear that there is a trade-off between scale
economies and financial stability. Choice of reference rates should be made with
due regard to both the risk characteristics of a bank’s loan portfolio and the
degree of output diversification. Finally, the Governor raised the question of how
far our productivity measures will be distorted by asset price bubbles and burst-
ing of such bubbles.
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Chapter 3, “Do Mergers Improve Bank Productivity and Performance” is the
keynote speech by Phil Molyneux, Bangor University, Wales. The paper gives an
extensive overview of the empirical literature on the effects of consolidation in the
financial sector. Up to the summer of 2007, the global financial system experi-
enced a strong consolidation trend. Deregulation allowed banks to enter new
geographical markets and product areas, and technological advances revolution-
ized back-office processing, front-office delivery systems and payments systems.
These forces encouraged growth in M&A activity in the financial sector but it is
unclear whether M&A activity as such has improved performance. Studies of
data from before the year 2000 seem to conclude that mergers in the banking
system were not motivated (on average) by performance improvement. Studies
from 2000 onwards show a different picture. In most recent studies bank mergers
seem to have resulted in widespread efficiency gains and value enhancement for
stockholders.
Some researchers have referred to managerial motives behind consolidation
transactions at the expense of shareholders. Roll’s hubris hypothesis, which
argues that over-confident managers systematically overestimate the benefits of
acquisitions and therefore results in them overbidding for targets is also men-
tioned. So is managerial empire building and the observation that there is a pos-
itive correlation between asset size and CEO compensation.
Evidence from studies of European bank mergers generally finds that poor per-
forming banks are typically acquired. Evidence on the impact of consolidation on
small business lending is mixed. By the year 2000, all major financial systems had
removed the major regulatory product barriers in the financial services sector.
The deregulation has resulted in diversification of bank activities. Studies of the
impact of this development on bank performance give, however, a mixed picture.
A limited number of recent studies have examined systemic risk issues in Euro-
pean banking. Some find that banking sector concentration increases systemic
risk. The author concludes his paper by observing that we now know that safety
net subsidies have been huge, and that systemic risks have brought major econo-
mies to a near standstill. He expects that after the crises many banking systems
will be re-organised via forced consolidation of their banks.
Chapter 4, “Sizing up performance measures in the financial services sector” by
Jacob A. Bikker, De Nederlandsche Bank, provides a comprehensive overview
and evaluation of various measures of banking performance. Since efficiency and
competition cannot be observed directly, various indirect measures – be it simple
indicators, combined indicators or indicators based on complex models – are
used by both academia and practitioners. The paper shows that various indica-
tors differ considerably in their results. The author compares 20 methods to
measure banking competition and efficiency for 46 countries, covering 90% of
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world GDP, and explore their mutual relationships. Apart from important meth-
odological and statistical findings, the author also comes up with economically
interesting findings: The received wisdom, that ‘Anglo-Saxon’ banks are rela-
tively more competitive compared to e.g. those in ‘continental and Southern
Europe’ is rejected. Instead, the author finds that German and French banks are
highly efficient in an environment of high competition, at low cost and with low
profits. While banks in some Southern European countries live up to their low-
efficiency image, banks in Italy – and to some extent in Spain – do not fit this
picture. In the USA, UK and Ireland cost inefficiencies, interest margins and prof-
its are found to be exceptionally high despite indications of strong competition.
This may also be due to a higher proportion of products such as investment coun-
selling where competition is less fierce than in deposit-taking and lending. Finally,
as expected, a correlation between bank efficiency and economic development is
confirmed: bank efficiency in developed industrial countries is found to be supe-
rior compared to emerging economies, with Central and Eastern European banks
coming out as least efficient.
In chapter 5, Marc Niederkorn, Co-Leader European Lean Banking Initiative,
McKinsey & Company, noted that a major productivity improvement will be
required from the sector in the coming years. Given scarce capital and liquidity,
banks will need to reduce their cost structure by 25 to 30% (at constant volumes)
to keep generating a reasonable return on equity. Vast productivity improvements
in banks are possible (at current technology) as current productivity is weak
according to standard industrial indicators such as Overall Process Effectiveness
(OPE) is weak. However, banks’ track record of actually improving productivity
is very disappointing. Banks’ productivity improvements have been hampered by
5 fundamental misconceptions: First, the role of IT investment is over-empha-
sized, while most of banks’ inefficiencies are rather low-tech – production flows
are inefficient, customer demand patterns are poorly understood and capacity is
not sufficiently adjusted. Second, it is not true that cutting costs and streamlining
processes must automatically be at the expense of product quality. Third, the role
of economies of scale is vastly exaggerated – many European banks have already
reached a critical size. Fourth, outsourcing and offshoring is not the solution – for
typical European banks, there is very little to gain from such measures. Finally,
cross-border consolidation is no miracle cure – given different cultures, consumer
behaviour and regulatory nuances, the already low potential from economies of
scale is further diminished in such endeavors. If these pitfalls are avoided, emerg-
ing evidence shows that well-established industrial productivity improvement
techniques can be successfully applied also to financial services. This insight
opens a new strategic playing field for early adopters.
Chapter 6, “Integration and efficiency in EU banking markets” by Barbara Casu,
Cass Business School, City University, and Claudia Girardone, University of
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Essex, evaluates the recent dynamics of bank cost efficiency in the euro area by
means of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). It is a commonly held belief among
EU regulators that a well integrated financial system is necessary to increase the
efficiency of the euro area economy. In overall calculations of potential gains
from European integration in the financial services it is often assumed that banks
in different countries will become equally efficient with the removal of cross-
border restrictions. The authors use a sample of commercial and savings banks
operating in the EU-15 area to study the possible convergence of efficiency levels
towards an EU average. DEA measures of efficiency are based on estimates of the
degree to which the unit under analysis could have used less input for its output
levels. They find evidence of convergence of efficiency but at the same time the
potential gains brought about by increased integration seem to have been offset
by a decrease in overall efficiency levels.
Chapter 7 is “Bank output measurement in the euro area – a modified approach”
by Antonio Colangelo, European Central Bank, and Robert Inklaar, University of
Groningen. In the paper, the authors argue that the estimation method currently
used to measuring bank output by comparing bank interest rates to a reference
rate should be changed to take into account the risk characteristics of loans and
deposits. The aim is to improve the estimates of interest margins applied by banks
on loans and deposits to better reflect the services they provide. The authors
introduce adjustments for term premia and default risk premia. They apply their
proposed approach to the euro area, estimating monthly bank output from Jan-
uary 2003 to December 2007.
Compared to the current approach, the proposed method has conceptual advan-
tages and is more appealing since it focuses on the banking services provided. The
proposed method would improve the comparability of national results, as it
removes the structural effects due to different terms and risks.
In chapter 8, “Bank productivity and efficiency in Luxembourg: Malmquist indi-
ces from a parametric output distance function”, Paolo Guarda and Abdelaziz
Rouabah, Banque centrale du Luxembourg, decompose productivity increases
among Luxembourg banks into technical change (shifts in the best-practice fron-
tier) and efficiency gains (changes in the distance of the average bank from the
best-practice frontier). Using quarterly data for the period 1994 to 2007, they
find that productivity among Luxembourg banks grew by about 1% per quarter
on average. Larger banks exhibited above-average productivity growth. Most of
the productivity growth stems from efficiency gains rather than technical
progress. In other words, few individual banks occasionally shift the efficient
frontier outwards, while the bulk of banks merely follow, improving their pro-
ductivity by reducing inefficiency as compared to the top performers.
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Chapter 9 is “Internal wage structure and bank performance” by Charles-Henri
Di Maria, STATEC, and Sandy Metzler, Université Louis Pasteur Strasbourg. The
two authors try to assess to what extent wage dispersion inside banks may affect
their efficiency through a possible wage incentive scheme. They apply data from
the financial statements of Luxembourgish banks and a structure of earnings sur-
vey conducted by the National Statistical Institute. Wage dispersion is measured
by the Gini index. Efficiency is measured by data envelopment analysis. They find
two non linear relationships between efficiency and wage dispersion. Efficiency
seems to increase with some inequality but to decrease when inequality reaches a
certain level. It is not an easy task to determine the optimal level of wage dispar-
ities in a bank.
In chapter 10, “Impact of ICT and Human Skills on the European Financial Inter-
mediation Sector”, Georg Erber,  DIW Berlin and Reinhard Madlener,  E.ON
Energy Research Center, Aachen investigate the impact of ICT- and non-ICT cap-
ital and of labour at different skill levels on productivity and employment in the
financial intermediation sector of twelve EU member countries plus the US and
Japan. Compared to all other industries after 1995, the banking industry exhibits
the highest proportion of IT investment. They find that efficiency and productiv-
ity depend much more on human capital than on physical capital. This implies
that in knowledge-economies driven by rapid technical change the ability to
empower the work force by appropriate investments in training and skill-forma-
tion is much more important than investment in information and communica-
tions technology. Computers or broadband internet terminal devices are general
purpose instruments, but the intelligence of their users determines the real bene-
fits obtained in the end.
Chapter 11 is “Are There Any EU Membership-Related Efficiency Enhancements
in Banking Sectors of the New EU Member States Detectable?” by Marko Košak
and Jelena Zoric, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. The authors study the poten-
tial effects of EU membership for banking efficiency in new EU member coun-
tries. During the process of EU accession, banking sectors in Eastern and Central
Europe have undergone a remarkable transformation. The authors estimate a
translog cost frontier function by using data from eight CEE countries. Different
models lead to similar results with respect to the coefficient estimates. Efficiency
measures for the pre- and post-EU accession periods are compared. Contrary to
their expectations, the authors do not find strong evidence to support the hypoth-
esis that EU-accession would facilitate efficiency improvements.
In chapter 12, “How Output Diversification Affects Bank Efficiency and Risk: an
intra-EU Comparative Study”, Nikolaos Papanikolaou,  Athens University of
Economics and Business, looks at the diversification by banks away from tradi-
tional financial intermediation into non-interest business and how this shift
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affects their efficiency and risk-taking behaviour. He uses data from the EU-27 to
test whether the shift towards new business has affected the Union’s banking sys-
tems uniformly. Comparisons are made by constructing a best-practice efficiency
frontier. The mean cost efficiency scores for the traditional EU-15 countries seem
on average to be better than for the CEE countries plus Cyprus and Malta. It
seems that output diversification does not change the risk-taking behaviour of
banks.
Chapter 13, “The effect of the environment on profit efficiency of bank
branches” by Mohamed E. Chaffai, Université de Sfax and Michel Dietsch, Uni-
versité de Strasbourg deals with the environment effect on profit efficiency at the
branch level. The authors use a methodology with a parametric directional dis-
tance function. Data come from the branch network of a large French banking
group. For each branch, information is available about the average wealth of the
community’s inhabitants, socio-demographical characteristics, unemployment
rate, the housing market etc. The analysis concerns the impact of these environ-
mental variables on branch efficiency and profitability. The results show that, at
the branch level, the environment is an important source of technical inefficiency.
Chapter 14, “Efficiency and productivity of Russian banks: distinguishing heter-
ogeneity and performance” by Karligash Kenjegalieva and Tom Weyman-Jones,
Loughborough University, applies panel data econometrics for efficiency meas-
urement and productivity decomposition to the Russian banking system. The
focus is on comparative analysis of the performance of Russian banks from finan-
cial intermediation, production and profit generating perspectives. The authors
use parametric stochastic frontier techniques on a panel of over 900 commercial
banks. In general, the results suggest that during the period 1997 to 2005 Russian
banks experienced productivity decline in financial intermediation and banking
service production. However, the profit generating activities of the banks were
productive throughout the analysed time span. The main driver of banking pro-
ductivity seems to be the returns to scale profile. Banks engaged in retail banking
are more profit efficient than those which offer only business banking services.
Larger banks seem to lag behind and deposit insurance seems to have a positive
effect on banking system performance.
Chapter 15, “Best practices as a business strategy for improving productivity:
Summary of a panel discussion” is based on contributions by Marco Colagio-
vanni, Dexia Bank Belgium, Martin Czurda, Raiffeisen Zentralbank, Vienna and
Roger H. Hartmann, Luxembourg Bankers’ Association. Mr. Colagiovanni gives
an overview of the so-called ‘lean methodology’ used by Dexia. It is very impor-
tant to focus on what the clients want and what the competitors are able to
deliver. Analysis of waste leads to focus on possible cost reductions. In most cases,
waste occurs mostly between departments, not inside the individual department.
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So, department managers must work together better. The improvement potential
is enormous. Waiting time often represents 70-90% of total processing time. The
follow-up of performance is very important. People’ positive perception of the
importance of process is essential to ensure support. Mr. Czurda presents an over-
view of banking developments in Central and Eastern European countries.
UniCredit, Raiffeisen, Erstebank, Societé Generale, KBC, Intesa, Swedbank and
Commerzbank have all invested in bank entities in the region. They have taken
over existing banks and there have also been greenfield investments. The return
on equity of these investments has in most cases been good. A particularly inter-
esting slide shows the market share increase potential in CEE countries. Mr. Hart-
mann focuses on best practices in wealth management. The dramatic increase in
the complexity of financial products has implications for the cost level. Approx-
imately 70% of costs are salary. Qualified people are expensive. Pooling of
resources is an effective approach. The cost-income ratio is expected to increase.
Something has to be done. Outsourcing of back-office functions has already been
carried out to a considerable extent.

Returning to the three themes mentioned at the outset, the conference yielded
some interesting results and raised many issues for further research.
As regards theme 1, the papers presented overall suggest that financial integration
in Europe has brought some, perhaps limited, convergence of bank efficiency
among countries but on average productivity improvement has been weak. Vari-
ous interesting attempts to capture banks’ output were presented, but the various
performance and efficiency measures yield different results. Linked to the diffi-
culty of measuring the value of financial institutions’ services, it remains far from
clear what the ‘fair value’ of a bank should be. This problem may also in part
explain the very sharp ups and downs of bank stocks recently.
Concerning theme 2, sources of productivity in financial services, several poten-
tially important factors were mentioned: investments in ICT, investments in
human resources, the quality of managers and remuneration policy, process effec-
tiveness, mergers and acquisitions and economies of scale, privatizations, risk
diversification versus regional and/or product specialisation, and risk-taking. Yet,
no unambiguous picture emerged on which of these factors are most important.
Regarding theme 3, the financial crisis may have far-reaching implications on our
view of financial innovation and efficiency, on how to measure productivity
appropriately as well as on the future development of financial institutions’ pro-
ductivity.
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First, the quest for productivity and profitability may under certain circumstances
compromise the quality of banks’ services (such as, e.g. credit assessments and
risk monitoring) and as a consequence put the stability of banks and the financial
system at risk. As the recent crisis and its underlying causes suggest, there may at
times be trade-offs between innovation and financial stability. If financial super-
vision and risk management do not keep up with financial innovation, the social
value of such innovation may not be positive at all times. Financial innovation
may also have blurred signals on banks’ financial and risk positions, and thus
have misled bank shareholders, clients and supervisors in their assessment of
banks’ business models and conduct of business.
Second, the crisis might also affect banks’ future performance: Increased govern-
ment interference and stricter surveillance and capital adequacy rules might curb
banks’ profitability and efficiency, as measured by traditional performance indi-
cators. However, the conventional measures of performance as presented and dis-
cussed at the conference – however varied and multifaceted they may be in trying
to measure efficiency (i.e. the avoidance of unnecessary costs in the production
process) and competition (the avoidance of inappropriately high profits) – basi-
cally seem to have a short-term focus. A longer-term perspective would also con-
sider e.g. the financial institutions’ solvency and the safety of deposits, as well as
their stability and continued performance in periods of severe stress. Such exten-
sions to the concept of ‘performance’ should certainly be explored more deeply
in the light of the current crisis. In particular, bank efficiency should be consid-
ered by supervisors with a view to its influence on risk behaviour.
The current debate on regulatory reform in response to the crisis also addresses
the need for closer international coordination among supervisory regimes.
Tighter regulatory coordination may, on the one hand, close regulatory loop-
holes, thus curbing banks’ profit opportunities, at least in the short run. On the
other hand, international harmonization of regulatory rules may generate consid-
erable cost savings for internationally active financial institutions. By contribut-
ing to financial market integration it could also stiffen competition and in this
way improve efficiency.
A related issue is how the crisis will affect the size of banks in the future. Will
consolidation in the sector ultimately result in fewer and bigger banks? Or will
governments’ and regulators’ bad experience with institutions which are ‘too big
to fail’ create pressure towards more and smaller institutions? The outcome may
in turn have implications for competition and thus, ultimately, on future innova-
tion, efficiency and productivity developments.
Finally, in the coming months and years the issue of exit strategies from state
intervention will have to be solved. In particular, how long should partial or full
nationalisations of troubled banks last? Historical experiences vary, ranging from
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rather rapid re-privatisations in some cases to continued strong government influ-
ence lasting decades. How can banks’ increased reliance on government assist-
ance be scaled back and market-based incentives for productivity-enhancing
strategies be restored, given the massive moral hazard created by the – unavoid-
able – government bailouts of banks?

In conclusion, the conference demonstrated that various disciplines – business
administration, management, organisation and economics – as well as different
professional perspectives – those of academia, practitioners and of policy makers
– need to be combined to do full justice to the complexity of the subject at hand.
SUERF’s triple constituency and multiple-discipline approach again proved par-
ticularly suitable to approaching such a far-reaching topic.
The Editors
June 2009




It is my pleasure to welcome you on behalf of the Banque centrale du Luxem-
bourg. You probably know that ours is a relatively young institution and that we
are hosting this conference as part of the celebrations for our 10th anniversary.
You are here to discuss productivity in financial services, and you are probably
aware that tomorrow evening (following the end of this conference) there will be
a High-Level Panel where three senior central bankers will provide their perspec-
tive on the challenges for monetary policy represented by financial sector growth
and productivity. We hope this will give you a chance to see how some of the
issues raised in your research are implemented in practice and also how new
issues appear in the policy context requiring further study. In any case, you are
warmly invited and I hope at least some of you will be able to stay with us for this
interesting discussion.
The subject today is productivity in the financial sector, and as a central banker,
I do not need to remind you that this sector is going through what are sometimes
called ‘interesting times’. During the recent financial turmoil, central banks
responded to short-term tensions and contributed to stabilising conditions for
borrowers and lenders. The focus until now has been on liquidity and financial
stability issues; however, as light appears at the end of the tunnel, policymakers
are asking themselves how to avoid repeating the same mistakes next time. An
overhaul of the regulatory framework seems inevitable and in this context, it is
crucial to understand the structural issues in the sector behind the short-term
volatility. This is why I believe that careful study of financial sector productivity
is required to improve our understanding of the current situation and to shape
our long-term response to recent events.
I will organise my remarks around three inter-related questions: First, to measure
productivity, how should we measure the level of production in financial services?
Second, what do existing measures of financial sector productivity tell us about
its sources of productivity growth? Finally, I will attempt to identify which
aspects of productivity in financial services have been given new urgency by
recent events.
Let me begin with the measurement of financial services output. Not long ago,
national accounts methodology underwent a significant improvement in evaluat-
ing and allocating financial services indirectly measured (FISIM). The new meth-
odology is based on the observation that depositors are usually paid an interest
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flow that is below the risk-free reference rate. The difference represents the value
of depositor services produced by banks, in the form of safekeeping, bookkeeping
and payment services. On the other hand, borrowers almost always pay an inter-
est flow above the risk-free reference rate. In this case, the difference represents
the value of borrower services provided by banks in the form of credit rating and
monitoring. Using a reference rate to split banks’ interest margin into depositor
and borrower services makes it possible to allocate the consumption of these serv-
ices to households and firms, thus distinguishing between financial services des-
tined for intermediate and for final consumption. For Luxembourg in particular,
this change to national accounts methodology was important because our finan-
cial services industry primarily serves the export market, so the previous practice
of allocating all such production to intermediate consumption by a fictitious sec-
tor was particularly implausible.
While national accounts methodology has been much improved by this change,
some open questions still remain. In particular, what is the appropriate reference
rate? For the average depositor, it may be true that something close to the risk-
free rate could be earned by forgoing the services attached to a bank account and
instead investing in the money market. However, for the average borrower it is
not reasonable to assume that funds would be available at the risk-free rate by
issuing securities instead of approaching a bank for a loan. Term-mismatch
between savers and borrowers and informational asymmetries explain why the
financial intermediation services provided by banks are so important for the oper-
ation of market economies. This suggests that to measure borrower services accu-
rately the appropriate reference rate must take account of the term-structure and
the risk profile of the resulting bank assets. I am glad to see from the program
that several papers presented in this conference will address these issues.
Another open question is how to measure prices in financial services. Value added
in the financial intermediation has grown faster than real GDP in the euro area,
but it has retained a constant share in nominal terms. This suggests that prices
have been rising more slowly in this part of the economy. In Luxembourg we
could be tempted to congratulate ourselves for specialising in an industry with
above average real growth and below average price inflation. But is this really the
case or is it an artefact of how prices are measured in financial intermediation?
When banks double the value of the assets and liabilities on their balance sheet,
this does not necessarily double the number of transactions, or the amount of
labour or physical capital required to produce the necessary services. This obser-
vation seems to undermine the justification for deflating asset values using a gen-
eral price index such as the GDP deflator or the consumer price index.
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Furthermore, the recent fall in asset prices and the de-leveraging process under
way may lead to some surprising results in the breakdown of financial services
into prices and quantities.
Let me turn to my second set of remarks, concerning existing measures of pro-
ductivity in the financial sector and what they tell us about its sources. Perhaps
the most natural starting point is the measurement of scale economies, an issue
on which academic researchers have long provided advice for competition policy.
Empirical evidence on returns to scale in the banking industry has sometimes
suggested that larger institutions benefit from greater cost efficiency. However,
studies of mergers and acquisitions have often failed to find such improvements.
I think it is important to improve methods in this area for at least two reasons.
First, increasing European financial market integration is likely to raise the size
of the average bank. Central banks often repeat that the European financial serv-
ices industry is excessively fragmented. Increasing integration should allow a
more efficient provision of financial services, improving the allocation of capital
to investments with better risk-return profiles and therefore raising the potential
for economic growth. Second, the recent depressed value of financial equity and
public intervention in the banking sector to rescue distressed institutions will
probably accelerate the process of mergers and acquisitions as the outlook recov-
ers. Thus the existence and extent of scale economies remain timely questions for
research and policy.
Scale economies are only one source of productivity growth. What used to be
called scope economies are improvements in efficiency obtained by altering the
mix of outputs or the mix of inputs. In academic research, these have proven even
more difficult to measure than scale economies. However, I would encourage you
to think about these issues in light of recent events. The demise of the investment
bank suggests a return to universal banking, with large groups taking over spe-
cialised financial institutions. Such a development may be motivated by a need to
improve risk management, but it could also bring benefits in terms of an
improved mix of different financial outputs that are jointly produced.
Finally, an additional source of productivity growth is efficiency change, meaning
the extent to which individual banks move towards (or away from) the best prac-
tice frontier. Again, looking at the conference programme, I notice a couple of
papers that ask whether past trends towards deregulation or the creation of a
single market in Europe have encouraged convergence towards a best-practice
frontier. Unfortunately, a common result in the literature is that there is conver-
gence towards average efficiency levels rather than convergence towards the best
efficiency levels. This suggests that some isolated financial institutions may be
pushing the frontier forward while the majority are falling steadily behind (a fail-
ure of the catching-up hypothesis). It is hard to interpret this result: is it good
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news because it means that technology is improving rapidly? Or is it a sign that
even banks with low efficiency can survive, meaning that there is little incentive
to adopt innovations? One may speculate that the answers depend on how one
defines the best-practice frontier and whether it is valid to assume that the same
technology is available to all institutions. It is common to link the efficiency of
individual banks to environmental variables, the quality of management, wage
dispersion, or information technology investment. Such an approach may help to
identify unrealistic assumptions concerning the availability of a common technol-
ogy.
I have come to the third part of my remarks. Following the recent financial tur-
moil, what are the priorities in the study of productivity in financial services? I
have already mentioned that the recent wave of restructuring is likely to increase
the size of the average bank. As I have said, this means we need better tools to
measure not only scale economies but also scope economies, as activities that
were once performed by separate institutions are brought under a single roof. On
the issue of optimal size, public interventions have prompted some recent com-
mentators to observe that while some banks are ‘too big to fail’ others may be
‘too big to save’. It is not clear that there is such a trade-off between scale econ-
omies and financial stability. Rather, the ‘too big to fail’ label stresses the need for
better international co-operation in regulation and supervision, an objective that
should by now be familiar but that has taken on greater urgency as the interna-
tional links in the financial industry become more apparent.
Another aspect of financial productivity that merits closer scrutiny is the treat-
ment of risk. I am not going to add to the discussion of ‘black swans’ and the
impact of rare events on Value-at-Risk models used by traders (and regulators).
Instead, I am referring to the more ‘mundane’ issues raised in my previous
remarks. In terms of measuring bank output, interest flows usually include a risk
premium that will generally be more important when measuring borrower serv-
ices produced by a bank. Therefore, the appropriate reference rates should be
chosen to more closely match the risk characteristics of a bank’s loan portfolio.
Failure to allow for risk will lead to an overstatement of bank output that will
distort productivity measures. It is therefore important to consider banks’ risk
when studying their efficiency or productivity and I am pleased to see that several
papers on the conference programme address these issues.
Closely related to banks’ risk profile is their degree of output diversification,
which is likely to increase as specialised financial institutions seek safety in larger
and more diversified groups. In principle, diversification lowers risk, but it may
also lead to cost savings when jointly producing several outputs. Greater output
diversification is a likely concomitant of the increase in average bank size that will
accompany consolidation in the banking sector. By now, academic research
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generally recognises that banks must be modelled as multi-output firms, but more
work is needed on the measurement of the costs and benefits of joint production.
Finally, on the priorities for research emerging from the financial turmoil, I would
like to leave you with an open question: The bursting of asset price bubbles is
likely to lead to a decline in balance sheet values and a fall in productivity. Is this
a problem of measuring prices or measuring productivity? I realise that this is a
very difficult question as even central bankers have a hard time distinguishing
bubbles from the fundamental level of prices. However, recent events have
focussed our attention on the real consequences of assuming that asset prices are
always at equilibrium. If we are going to discuss productivity in financial services,
we need some indication of how far our measures will be distorted by asset price
bubbles.
In conclusion, I am pleased to see you here in Luxembourg, where the financial
services industry is such an important part of our national economy. It only
remains to me to wish you a fruitful discussion and an enjoyable visit to our
country.
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This paper presents an overview of the recent bank M&A literature. Typically,
the general consensus from the bank M&A literature in the 1990s concluded that
mergers were generally performance destroying and that the motives for such
deals must therefore be motivated by managerial rather than performance objec-
tives. These stylized facts relating to the motives for M&A in banking still prevail
in some of the more recent reviews of the literature. However, a different picture
emerges if we consider the empirical literature from 2000 onwards! In general,
recent studies provides more support to the view that North American bank
mergers are (or can be) efficiency improving although the event-study literature
(as before) presents a mixed picture. However, there is incontrovertible evidence
that European bank deals have resulted in widespread efficiency gains and value
enhancement for stockholders.
3.1. INTRODUCTION
Up until the widespread crises experienced in global banking markets since the
summer of 2007, over the previous twenty years or so one probably the major
features impacting on global financial systems has been the consolidation trend.
This has been a consequence of deregulation and innovation (technological and
financial). Deregulation has allowed banks to enter new geographical markets
and product areas. Technological advances have revolutionized both back-office
processing, front-office delivery systems and payments systems (Berger (2003)).
Financial innovations, characterized by the widespread use of new financial engi-
neering and risk management tools coupled with the significant involvement of
financial institutions in new and broader derivatives and other markets (asset-
backed securities, credit default swaps and so on) have also been another factor
changing the financial landscape (Frame and White (2004) and DeYoung (2007)).
These forces promoting the consolidation trend have been well documented in
previous reviews of the consolidation literature (Berger, Demsetz and Strahan
1 A substantial part of this talk came from an early version of a paper completed by Bob DeYoung (University of
Kansas), Doug Evanoff (Chicago Federal Reserve Bank) and myself that reviews the financial sector M&A
literature. The paper is forthcoming in the Journal of Financial Services Research, December 2009.
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(1999), Group of Ten (2001), Amel, Barnes, Panetta and Salleo (2004) and Jones
and Critchfield, (2005)). However, despite general agreement on the broad forces
that have encouraged growth in M&A activity in the financial sector, the afore-
mentioned reviews provide little consensus as to whether banks and other finan-
cial firms in general benefit from M&A activity in terms of improved perform-
ance. In addition, they also offer a varying picture on other dimensions of the
consolidation process such as the impact of M&As on risk, access to finance, the
features of targets and so on. These generally mixed findings, however, could be
a consequence, not only of the different methodological approaches taken, but
also because the literature under review in the aforementioned studies typically
examines bank (and other financial sector) M&A activity at early stages in the
consolidation process, mainly from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. Most of the
earlier literature does not take into account the record peaks of M&A activity
that occurred in the US and Europe in 1998 and 1999, respectively, as well as
more recent trends as illustrated in figure 1.
The aim of this paper, therefore, is to provide an update of the previous reviews
on financial sector consolidation, focusing primarily on the post-2000 literature.
Figure 1: Bank M&A in Europe and the US 1995-2006
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3.2. CONSOLIDATION AND PERFORMANCE
Gains from mergers emanate from either efficiency improvements or market
power (Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999)) and there is a substantial literature
that has sought to directly or indirectly investigate these relationships. The direct
test seeks to establish whether there are cost or/and profit improvements post-
merger. Studies use either frontier techniques or simple accounting ratios to gauge
efficiency changes comparing pre- and post-merger performance. The consensus
view from studies that (mainly) examined bank M&A during the 1980’s up to the
mid-1990s was that cost and (although less studied) profit efficiency improve-
ments resulting from mergers tended to be elusive (see the reviews of Berger, Dem-
setz and Strahan (1999); Dymski (1999); Group of Ten (2001)). Another major
strand of the literature uses the ‘event-study’ methodology to gauge market reac-
tions to M&A announcements. The event study approach seeks to evaluate stock-
holder reactions to merger announcements. The combined effects of the abnor-
mal returns (measured as the difference between the actual stock price and that
predicted by CAPM or a related market model) to bidders and targets around the
announcement date reflect value creation or destruction for shareholders. This
approach is regarded as an indirect measure because even if positive abnormal
returns are generated it is not clear as to whether the positive shareholder reaction
is due to perceived improvements in performance resulting from greater market
power (higher prices) or improved efficiency. The consensus view that has
emerged from the event studies that examine bank M&A in the 1980s and during
the 1990’s (Houston and Ryngaert (1994); Pilloff (1996); DeLong (2001)) is that
while target shareholders tend to earn strong positive abnormal returns, bidder
stockholders earn marginally negative returns – the combined abnormal returns
being insignificant2. While the majority of this literature found that bank M&As
do not create value for shareholders there were some exceptions (Brewer et al.
(2000); Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000); and Houston, James and Ryngaert
(2001)).
The general finding that mergers in the banking system were not motivated (on
average) by performance improvement (whether efficiency, profits or shareholder
wealth gains) directed researcher’s attentions to various managerial motives
– including objectives geared to such things as maximizing CEO remuneration,
choosing a ‘Quiet Life’, managerial entrenchment and maximizing asset size as
alternative explanations for the consolidation trend.
These stylized facts relating to the motives for M&A in banking still prevail in
some of the more recent reviews of the literature. However, a different picture
2 Although Kane (2000) notes that for bank mega-mergers in the US acquirer stockholders earn positive abnormal
returns the larger the target (and for in-market deals) and he argues that this may be a consequence of access to
greater market power and/or regulatory subsidies. We discuss this in more detail in Section 5 of this paper.
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emerges if we consider studies from 2000 onwards! In general, the recent litera-
ture provides more support to the view that North American bank mergers are
(or can be) efficiency improving although the event-study literature (as before)
presents a mixed picture. However, there is incontrovertible evidence that Euro-
pean bank deals have resulted in widespread efficiency gains and value enhance-
ment for stockholders. Kwan and Wilcox (2002), for instance, in their study of
US bank mergers during the 1990s find evidence of significant cost reductions
once specific merger accounting rules are taken into account. Cornett, McNutt,
Tehranian (2006) find evidence of revenue efficiency improvements for large and
focused (product and geographical) mergers and Knapp, Gart and Chaudhry
(2006) also find that in the case of BHC mergers between 1987 and 1998, sub-
stantial profit gains appear up to five years post-merger (once adjustments are
made for profits mean reversion). Hannan and Pilloff (2006) use a hazard func-
tion approach to examine the features of acquired banks between 1996 and 2003
and this shows that cost efficient banks tend to acquire their inefficient counter-
parts, and this finding is again suggestive of potential performance improve-
ments.
Studies that examine bondholder/shareholder reactions to bank merger
announcements tend to yield more conflicting findings3. Penas and Unal (2004)
find evidence of bondholder gains and a lower cost of debt post merger, and
Olson and Pagano (2005) also identify shareholder gains (related to pre-merger
growth). DeLong and DeYoung (2007) also find positive abnormal returns relat-
ing to bank merger announcements although this effect dissipates quickly, they
also find that the short-run market reactions (as well as long-run merger perform-
ance) tends to be related to the number of mergers that took place in years prior
to the deal announcement. In contrast to the above performance/value enhancing
evidence, Knapp, Gart and Becher’s (2005) study of large bank deals between
1987 and 1998 finds strong evidence of negative returns to shareholders and a
reduction in profits, credit quality and fee income post merger4.
The recent studies on European bank mergers provides more compelling evidence
of performance improvements both via efficiency gains or/and stockholder
returns. Huizinga, Nelissen and Vander Vennet (2001) examined 53 European
bank M&As between 1994 and 1998 and found evidence of cost efficiency
improvements and positive (but relatively small) profit efficiency gains. Other
pan-European studies find either efficiency or/and profit gains post merger (Diaz
and Azorfa (2004); Campa and Hernando (2006); Altunbas and Ibáñez (2007);
3 Hagendorff, Collins and Keasey (2007) suggest that weak governance structures may be the explanation for the
(supposed) negative abnormal returns to bank bidders in the US shareholder wealth studies.
4 Other event studies on US bank M&A include: Henock (2004) who finds that banks subject to takeover spec-
ulation yield significant returns to shareholders, while defensive deals destroy value; Gupta and Lalatendu
(2007) who examine the influence of the relative size of bidders and targets and finding asymmetric effects on
stockholder returns.
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Fritsch (2007)). These studies also generally suggest that focused deals – those
where banks have a similar strategic fit (Altunbas and Ibáñez (2007)) or bank-
bank M&A (Diaz and Azorfa (2004)) tend to perform better in terms of efficiency
and profits performance. Profits improvements can also take a while to appear
(Díaz, García and Sanfilippo (2004); Campa and Hernando (2006)). In addition,
the more general finding of De Guevara, Maudos and Perez’s (2005) study of
market power in EU banking (using the Lerner index) are also suggestive of
increased efficiency resulting from the consolidation process (as market power
has increased as a consequence of marginal costs falling faster than prices). In
addition to the pan-European studies there is also a variety of individual country
evidence that confirms performance improvements resulting from M&A. Positive
profit effects are found by Carbó and Humphrey (2004) who use a variety of
estimation approaches (translog, Fourier, and cubic spline cost functions) to pre-
dict scale-related cost effects from 22 mergers involving Spanish savings banks
between 1986 and 2000. They find that post-merger that unit cost falls by 0.5%
boosting returns by 4%. De Guevara and Maudos (2007) also finds that the cost
efficiency of Spanish banks improved between 1986 and 2002 during a period of
consolidation –  again suggestive of potential efficiency gains from merger  –
although because marginal costs have been driven down faster than prices the
Lerner index measure of market power increased. Koetter’s (2005) study on Ger-
man bank mergers during the 1990’s finds that every second merger is a success
in reducing cost efficiency (although the cost efficiency gains take seven years to
materialize) and Ashton and Pham’s (2007) analysis of 61 UK bank mergers
between 1988 and 2004 also finds that these deals are on average efficiency
improving and they appear to have little adverse pricing effects on retail deposit
rates. In contrast to the above individual country studies that find direct (or are
suggestive of) efficiency improvements resulting from the merger process, others,
such as Carbó, Humphrey and Fernández (2003) find that mergers in the Spanish
savings banks sector had no impact on efficiency, as savings bank costs rose at the
same rate as the industry average over 1986 to 1998.
In addition to the aforementioned studies that examine the efficiency and
accounting ratio performance resulting from consolidation, the more limited
number of studies that examine shareholder wealth effects in European banking
also present a general picture of positive value creation resulting from mergers.
Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) in their study of 54 relatively large European
bank mergers (typically banks with assets in excess of $100 billion) between 1989
and 1997, found evidence of positive abnormal returns for in-country both bank/
bank and diversifying bank/insurance deals (no significant effects for bank / secu-
rities or cross-border deals). Resti and Sciliano’s (2001) event study analysis of
Italian bank mergers between 1992 and 1997 also finds positive shareholder
wealth effects. Beitel, Schiereck and Wahrenburg (2004) use a sample of 98 large
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European bank mergers from between 1985 and 2000 to investigate the drivers
of excess returns. Overall, the results indicate positive cumulative abnormal
returns for combined bidder and target shareholder’s over the study period. They
also note that more than 60% of all transactions were value creating. Positive
wealth effects are found to be greater for non-diversifying transactions, when
acquirers have engaged in fewer M&A transactions and when the target exhibits
a poor past stock performance. Campa and Hernando (2006) examine 244 Euro-
pean bank M&As between 1998 and 2002 and investigate both shareholder
value effects as well as pre-and post merger profits and efficiency. They find evi-
dence of positive abnormal returns to target shareholders with no significant
influence on bidder’s stock prices. (They also found evidence of significant
improvements in target bank’s performance beginning around two years after the
transaction was completed. The return on equity of target banks’ performance
also increased by an average of 7%, and these also experienced efficiency
improvements). Schmautzer (2006) also finds that target shareholders gains out-
weigh bidder losses in the case of cross-border deals involving European, US and
other banks, particularly when relatively cost efficient banks are acquired.
Lepetit, Patry and Rous (2004) and Ekkayokkaya, Holmes and Paudyal (2007)
both use event study approaches to examine bidder returns involving European
bank M&A and they find that bank/non-bank deals result in positive abnormal
returns, the latter finding that value enhancement was greater for pre-Euro
(1999) transactions.
It can be seen that the evidence from the post-2000 literature on the features of
European bank M&A (in contrast to the US literature) point to strong perform-
ance improvements – whether they be measured by efficiency, accounting profits
or stock market return indicators.
3.3. MANAGERIAL MOTIVES FOR M&A
The previous section illustrates that evidence from the literature post-2000 sug-
gests that compared to earlier studies there is stronger evidence (particularly from
Europe) that mergers in the financial sector (mainly banking studies) tend, on
average, to increase performance and shareholder value. The fact that many ear-
lier merger studies found little evidence of performance improvements encour-
aged researchers to investigate alternative explanations for the consolidation phe-
nomenon with a particular attention paid to managerial motives. Here the argu-
ment goes that managers engage in M&A in order to maximize their own utility
at the expense of shareholders. Managers’ utility may relate to growth if their pay
and other benefits are linked to firm size. Similarly, managers’ utility may also be
related to size if they wish for a ‘Quiet Life’. Larger firms may be able to exert
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greater market power and insulate themselves from various competitive pressures
forcing them to improve efficiency/performance (Berger and Hannan (1998)).
Another managerial explanation as to why mergers may destroy value is Roll’s
hubris hypothesis (Roll (1986)) which argues that over-confident managers sys-
tematically overestimate the benefits of an acquisition and therefore results in
them over-bidding for targets leading to value destruction / no performance
improvements.
Bliss and Rosen (2001) find that CEO compensation increases with changes in
asset size due to mergers (or internal growth) for a sample of 32 billion-dollar US
banks from 1986 to 1995. The aforementioned authors interpret the positive
relationship between merger-related changes in firm size and compensation as
evidence of managerial empire building and suggest that the increase in compen-
sation occurs irrespective of value creation or productivity improvements. Ander-
son, Becher and Campbell (2004) examine mergers for a similar sample of banks
and find that CEO compensation post-merger is positively related to the antici-
pated gains from merger (measured at the announcement date). They also note
that other changes to CEO compensation packages are based on managerial pro-
ductivity (as well as incentive restructuring). Rosen (2004) finds that where CEOs
can expect to have large compensation increases from acquisition they tend to
engage in merger programs and Hughes, Lang, Mester, Moon and Pagano (2003)
notes that BHCs that have higher levels of managerial ownership tend to make
performance destroying acquisitions. On perhaps a more positive note, there is
some evidence that managers do not take account of insider information concern-
ing bank M&A as Madison, Roth and Saporoschenko (2004) identify that target
bank insiders significantly decrease both share purchases and share sales before
merger announcements.
Outside the US, there does not appear to be any recent studies that focus on the
managerial motives for bank merger. In the case of Europe this may be because
of the overriding recent evidence that bank mergers are performance enhancing.
The cross-country study by Corvoisier and Gropp (2002) indicates that increased
banking sector concentration between 1993-1999 leads to less competitive pric-
ing on demand deposits (but not on other types of deposits) and this perhaps may
partially suggest evidence of managers seeking a ‘Quiet Life’. Also, others (De
Guevara, Maudos and Perez (2005); De Guevara and Maudos (2007)) who find
evidence of lower competitive pressures could also perhaps be related to manage-
rial motives if CEO pay and market power are positively related – although as far
as we are aware this has never been specifically tested. Focarelli and Panetta
(2003) in a study on merger behaviour and deposit pricing find that in the long-
run deposit rates rise post-merger and more for efficient banks thus indirectly
countering suggestions of managerial motives for consolidation in the Italian
market.
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3.4. FEATURES OF ACQUISITION TARGETS
Another interesting recent strand of the M&A literature seeks to identify the fea-
tures of actual or potential bank acquisition targets. Evidence from studies of
European bank mergers generally finds that poor performing banks are typically
acquired. For instance (Beitel, Schiereck and Wahrenburg (2004); Pasiouras,
Tanna and Constantin (2007)) show that targets are less cost or profit efficient
than acquirers. Focarelli, Panetta and Salleo (2002) find that acquiring banks
tend to be more service orientated and have better credit management. However,
Valkanov and Kleimeier (2007) who examine large bank deals in the US and
Europe between 1997 and 2003 show that there is no difference between the
capital strength of European banks engaged in M&A and US targets tend to be
more highly capitalised. Koetter, Bos, Heid, Kolari, Kool and Porath (2007) in
there study of distressed and nondistressed German bank mergers find that banks
that engage in M&A are poorer performing (in terms of their CAMEL ratings)
and a similar finding is presented by Hosono, Sakai and Tsuru (2006) on Japan
where cost and profit inefficient banks are most likely to engage in M&A activity.
A related literature, although typically not focusing on the features of acquisition
targets, which examines the determinants of cross-border banking also identifies
efficiency (as well as country differences in information costs, regulatory, eco-
nomic and other factors) as being important in influencing overseas expansion.
Generally this literature finds that large efficient banks (from developed financial
systems) are more likely to be engaged in overseas expansion (Berger, DeYoung,
Genay and Udell, (2000); Focarelli and Pozzolo (2001); Buch and DeLong
(2004); Berger (2007)) – for US banks in ‘Old Europe’ and developed European
banks entering ‘New Europe’). The reasons for bank and insurance firm expan-
sion within Europe also appear to be similar (Pozzolo and Focarelli (2007)).
3.5. CONSOLIDATION AND BANK CUSTOMERS
A substantial literature has emerged investigating the impact of consolidation on
bank customers. The early survey literature typically finds that US bank consoli-
dation in the 1980’s resulted in market power effects (lower deposit rates and
higher loan rates in more concentrated markets) although studies that focus on
the 1990’s tended to indicate weaker relationships between local market concen-
tration and deposit rates (Shull and Hanweck (2001)). There was also considera-
ble evidence that large banks allocate a lower proportion of their assets to small
business loans compared to small banks and this effect is more pronounced for
merging banks. These adverse effects, however, appeared to be counteracted by
the increased credit supply to firms by small incumbent banks (Berger, Saunders,
Scalise and Udell (1998); Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999)). Overall, the pre-
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2000 literature suggests that the overall impact of bank mergers on both the price
and availability of banking services are relatively modest.
More recent studies predominantly focus on the influence of bank consolidation
(mainly) on small businesses, focusing on the availability and price of such serv-
ices post merger. This focus has been influenced not only by the desire to examine
possible market power effects resulting from merger but also by the recent inter-
est in relationship lending and the role of soft and hard information processing in
bank’s credit decisions. (Boot (2000); Boot and Thakor (2000))5. Kahn, Pennachi
and Sopranzetti (2000) found that mergers appeared to increase rates on unse-
cured personal loans charged by all banks in the markets in which the merger
took place, although the opposite effect was observed for rates on automobile
loans. Calomiris and Pornrojnangkool (2005) examine the specific case of the
merger between two US banks (Fleet and BankBoston) and find that higher
spreads are charged for medium sized mid-market borrowers post merger
(although spreads for small sized mid market borrowers remain unchanged).
Consolidation is also found to have led to lower credit availability for small bor-
rowers (Craig and Hardee, (2007)) as well as capital constrained firms (Carow,
Kane and Narayanan (2006)). Although decline in lending to small business has
been found in the US to be matched by increased credit from other incumbent
banks (Avery and Samolyk (2004)) as well as increased entry of newly chartered
banks (Berger, Bonime, Goldberg and White (2004)). Others, however, find no
difference in the small business lending behaviour of small and large banks
(Berger, Rosen and Udell (2007)). There are also conflicting market power effects
according to specific products (Park and Pennachi (2007)) – large US multima-
rket banks are found to increase competition in concentrated loan markets
whereas they reduce competition in less concentrated deposit markets. Garmaise
and Moskowitz (2006) examine the influence of US bank mergers and show that
they typically results in higher loan (as well as crime) rates6.
Evidence on the impact of consolidation on small business lending is also mixed.
Sapienza (2002) examines Italian bank mergers between 1989 and 1995 and
finds that rates on loans fall when banks with small shares of local banking mar-
kets merge, although in the case of large bank deals the results are reversed.
Another study of the same banking system covering a slightly later period finds
that mergers have a substantial adverse effect on credit availability that lasts at
least three years after the merger (see Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi (2007)). In
contrast, Marsch, Schmieder and Forester van Aerssen (2007) find that consoli-
dation in German banking has no impact on small firm credit availability. In their
5 For example, Cole, Goldberg and White (2004) found that large banks tended to base their small business
lending decisions more on financial ratios than on prior lender-borrower relationships. Small banks, on the
other hand, rely more on the character of the borrower in making lending decisions.
6 The elasticity of property crime with respect to merger-induced banking concentration is 0.18.
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study of Belgium banking between 1997 and 2003 Degryse, Masschelein and
Mitchell (2006) find that acquiring bank borrowers are less likely to lose lending
relationship compared to target bank borrowers. Karceski, Ongena, and Smith
(2005) find for Norwegian bank merger announcements the equity value of small
publicly traded firms that are target customers falls and the decline increases with
the size of the target bank. This indicates reduced competitive pressure on cus-
tomer bargaining power post merger.
3.6. IMPACT OF DIVERSIFICATION (PRODUCT AND 
GEOGRAPHIC)
As identified above, an important feature of the consolidation trend in the finan-
cial sector has been the strategic focus on both geographical and product diversi-
fication. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley (GLB) Act 1999 (also known as the Financial
Services Modernization Act) effectively repealed the Glass-Steagall Act 1933 and
granted broad-based securities and insurance powers to commercial banking
companies in the US. Japan’s ‘Big-Bang’ reforms (also completed in 1999)
removed the separation of commercial and investment banking and the earlier
1992 EU Single Market Program also legislated for a universal banking system.
By 2000, therefore, all major financial systems had removed the major product
barriers in the financial services sector (although restrictions still remain and vary
relating to financial firms involvement with commerce). This product sector
deregulation followed the earlier removal of national bank branching restrictions
in various countries. The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Effi-
ciency Act, 1994 repealed the McFadden Act of 1927 that inhibited nationwide
branching in the US, and similar restrictions were removed in both Italy and
Spain in 19927. In addition to banks having the freedom to expand nationally and
across product lines the strategic desire to enter new international markets has
also been another key trend. This has led to a substantial literature that has
sought to identify the impact of these various diversification features.
The early literature tended to find that diversification (whether geographical or
product) was likely to lead to reductions in risk, although it was noted that these
positive benefits could be offset by shifts to higher-risk portfolios (income
streams) or/and operational risks (Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999); Group of
Ten (2001)). The more recent literature from the US and elsewhere, as illustrated
below, still appears to confirm this mixed picture.
7 The US branching deregulation resulted in the highest-ever five-year run of bank mergers in the country’s history
in terms of both the number and the value of the banks acquired (Berger, Buch, Delong and DeYoung (2004)).
Brewer, Jackson, Jagtiani, and Nguyen (2000) also find that merger premiums increased by around 35 percent
as a result of geographic deregulation. See also DeYoung (2007b) for a detailed analysis of the recent evolution
of the US banking system. Similarly in Spain and Italy mergers (as well as the number of branch numbers) grew
significantly post-deregulation (ECB (2000)).
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One approach to investigating the possible impact of diversification is to study
the accounting or stock return features of hypothetical bank-non-bank mergers.
The handful of these mainly US studies that use this approach tend to find evi-
dence of risk diversification benefits. (Lown, Osler, Strahan and Sufi
(2000)  –  BHC and life insurance firms; Estrella (2001)  –  banks and insurers;
Emmons, Gilbert, and Yeager (2004) – community banks).
Another strand of the diversification literature uses stock-return event-type stud-
ies and these (again) typically reveal conflicting findings. Hendershott, Lee and
Tompkins (2002) examine the stock price reaction of different types of financial
firms to the passing of Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 1999 and find that insurance
firms and investment banks experienced positive market reactions, whereas com-
mercial bank stockholders returns were statistically unaffected.
In other words, diversification (and other) benefits are more likely to accrue to
non-bank financial service firms. Cornett, Hovakimian, Palia and Tehranian
(2003) focus on US bank bidder returns and find that significantly higher returns
accrue for geographical and product focused deals, a finding also confirmed by
DeLong (2003). Cross-country European bank merger studies also tend to reveal
mixed results. Beitel, Schiereck and Wahrenburg (2004), for example, find that
focused mergers do better than diversifying deals in terms of returns to stockhold-
ers, whereas (as noted earlier) Lepetit, Patry and Rous (2004) and Ekkayokkaya,
Holmes and Paudyal (2007) find the opposite.
The recent literature that focuses on cross-border mergers involving US and Euro-
pean banks tends to find evidence of no cost efficiency improvements (Berger,
DeYoung and Udell (2000); Vander Vennet (2002)) although there is some evi-
dence of profit efficiency or accounting returns improvements (Vander Vennet
(2002); Elsas, Hackethal and Holzhauser (2006)). Again, we get a mixed picture
if we consider European country-specific bank diversification studies. Rime and
Stiroh (2003) find no cost efficiency diversifications in their study of Swiss banks
between 1996 and 1999 (and no evidence of scale or scope economies for large
banks). Hayden, Porath and von Westernhagen (2006) similarly find no gains for
financial sector diversification in their study of German banks (although there
may be some benefits from diversification into non-financial areas/commerce).
3.7. EXPLOITATION OF SAFETY NET SUBSIDIES AND 
SYSTEMIC RISKS
The recent bank bailouts that have occurred as a consequence of the credit crisis
highlight the concerns about the increased size of banking firms, the risk implica-
tions and the implications for systemic stability. As banks become larger, irrespec-
tive of the performance implications, they may have the opportunities to exploit
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safety net subsidies if they are viewed as ‘Too-Big-To-Fail’ (TBTF) or ‘Too-Big-
To-Discipline-Adequately’ (TBTDA) (Kane (2000); Stern and Feldman (2004);
Mishkin, (2005)). While it is generally recognized that TBTF subsidies are diffi-
cult to evaluate (Ennis and Malek (2005)), evidence from the US suggests these
are likely to be substantial. Shull and Hanweck (2001) suggest that because the
top 10 largest banks paid less for funds than smaller banks and operated with
lower capitalization rates this indicated advantages of TBTF implicit guarantees.
Morgan and Stiroh (2005) note that after the naming of eleven US banks as TBTF
in 1984 this increased the ratings on new bond issues of these banks relative to
other (unnamed) banks. In addition they found that the relationship between
bond spreads and ratings for the TBTF banks tended to flatten after that event.
Overall, this suggests that investors were more optimistic than credit raters about
the probability of support for the TBTF banks. (Mishkin (2006) argues that FIDI-
CIA may have reduced the TBTF subsidy although this view is not supported by
Morgan and Stiroh’s (2005) other findings that the spread-rating relationship in
the 1990s remained flatter for TBTF banks (than other unnamed banks) post
FIDICIA). Other studies tend to focus on merger premium paid for mega-banks
as an indicator of the safety net subsidy – the argument being that higher premi-
ums will be paid for banks that have implicit bailout guarantees. Schmid and
Walter (2006) examine large conglomerate deals between 1985 and 2004 and
find that significant premiums are paid in mega-conglomerate ($100 billion+)
deals, as do Brewer and Jagtiani (2007) who note that higher premiums are paid
for targets over a critical size. Jones and Oshinsky (2007) use a Markov (regime)
switching approach to examine the probability of insolvency of the FDIC-admin-
istered bank insurance fund over time. They find that insolvency risk has
increased and that the size of ten largest banks posed an increased insolvency risk
to the bank insurance fund. This body of literature points to growing concerns
about TBTF subsidies resulting from the consolidation process (in the US at least)
As far as we can ascertain no studies have examined safety net subsidy issues
relating to consolidation in Europe or elsewhere.
Closely related to the arguments linking consolidation to safety net subsidies are
those that consider systemic risk – an area of current major concern in global
banking systems. Trends in international consolidation (as well as conglomera-
tion) are also likely to increase risks for large complex financial firms (De Nicolo,
Bartholomew, Jahanara and Zephirin (2003)). It has also been shown that finan-
cial sector consolidation can also influence liquidity in money markets and the
influence depends on divisional capital allocations post-merger (D’Souza and Lai
(2006)). A limited number of recent studies have also examined systemic risk
issues in European banking. Dermine (2006) reviews recent regulatory develop-
ments in European banking and discusses concerns over large banks and the
potential bail-out costs. Uhde and Heimeshoff (2007) examine concentration and
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risk issues using a large sample of EU-25 banks between 1997 and 2005. Using
the z-score indicator of risk they find that that banking sector concentration
increases instability, although it results in greater profitability. Baele, De Jonghe,
and Vander Vennet (2007) use a stock-return model to examine the franchise
values of European banks between 1989 and 2004 and also disentangle system-
atic and idiosyncratic risk. They find that higher level of bank diversification into
non-interest income boosts franchise values although systematic risk increases
suggesting that bank returns become more highly correlated with the market
– perhaps suggesting that the potential for systemic risk is heightened.
3.8. CONCLUSIONS
The various trends that have encouraged consolidation have resulted in a handful
of key institutions dominating their banking systems. The consequence of such a
process has been revealed since the onset of the post mid-2007 financial crisis that
emanated from the meltdown in US asset-backed mortgage securities business.
Policy action since then has clearly indicated a ‘Too-Big-To-Be-Allowed-To Fail’
policy response and indicated the significant safety net subsidies associated with
large bank M&A. Having said this, however, our review of the post-2000 empir-
ical literature reveals stronger evidence of performance improvements resulting
from the consolidation process than that revealed by the mainly 1990s bank
merger literature. Recent studies of European bank M&A virtually all reveal per-
formance improvements (whether measured by returns to stockholders, efficiency
gains or profits improvements). This may be explained by the fact that the Euro-
pean bank merger wave followed that of the US (see figure 1) and the former may
be learning best-practice from the latter. (Alternatively, of course, there may have
been more operational slack in European banking that allowed for greater ration-
alization post-merger). It is also interesting to note that there has only been a
limited attempt by European researchers to estimate safety net subsidies and sys-
temic risk issues. As we now know – safety net subsidies have been huge, and
systemic risks have brought major economies to a near standstill. Areas for fruit-
ful future work should seek to further investigate these issues – especially as post
crises many banking systems will be re-organised via forced consolidation of their
banks.
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4. SIZING UP PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
IN THE FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR
Jacob A. Bikker1
ABSTRACT
The adequate performance of banks, insurers and pension funds is of crucial
importance to their private and business customers. The prices and quality of
financial products sold by such entities are largely determined by operational effi-
ciency and the degree of competition in the markets concerned. Since efficiency
and competition cannot be observed directly, various indirect measures in the
form of simple indicators or more complex models have been devised and used
both in economic theory and in business practice. This paper demonstrates that
measuring the performance of financial institutions is no simple matter and that
indicators differ strongly in quality. It investigates which methods are to be pre-
ferred and how by combining certain indicators stronger measures may be devel-
oped. These measures are then subjected to a predictive validity test.
4.1. INTRODUCTION
This paper addresses the question how well financial institutions are performing
in providing their services to consumers and businesses, and how much we know
about that. Various performance aspects cannot be observed directly whereas
they are economically important. While stockholders will view performance in
terms of the profits made on their behalf, whether or not adjusted for risks taken,
this paper focuses on performance in a broader sense, that is, the contribution
financial institutions make to the common wealth, on behalf of consumers and
businesses. They will be mainly interested in whether financial products are not
too expensive and whether the quality is sufficient. This raises the issue of, on the
one hand, the efficiency of financial institutions (i.e. whether unnecessary costs
are made in bringing a product to market) and, on the other, the level of compe-
tition in the relevant markets (i.e. whether profit margins are not unnecessarily
high). Since efficiency and competition cannot be observed directly, they have to
be measured in an indirect way. If a cut in mortgage rates by one bank, for
instance, is promptly copied by all its competitors, then this is a sign of competi-
tion – even if it does not enable us to distinguish between a little competition and
strong competition. Yet the price and quality of other banking services such as
1 The author is grateful to Laura Spierdijk for valuable comments and suggestions.
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investment consultancy or payment services are much harder to determine, mak-
ing competition far more difficult to measure. Difficulty in determining prices and
quality levels, incidentally, is a widespread phenomenon in financial products
markets. A recent example in the Netherlands is the investment-linked insurance
policy, popularly known as ‘robber policy’ (woekerpolis). The fact that consum-
ers find it hard to pick such a product on the basis of price and quality takes away
the disciplinary influence of the customer and weakens competition. This prob-
lem inhabits many of the products of banks and insurers (Bikker and Spierdijk
(2009a)).
There is another kind of performance that works in the interest of consumers, but
does so in the long run. It is the reliability of a financial institution in terms of
solvency and of whether customers can be sure to get their money back. Now that
the subprime mortgage and liquidity crisis has engulfed us all, the amount of risk
banks take in carrying on their business is a focal point of attention. Although
this long-term performance is also affected by competition and efficiency, this
paper concerns itself solely with the more palpable short-term performance
exhibited in quality services and affordable prices.
Banks of course play a crucially important role in the economy because of their
core products: loans to businesses and for house-purchase. Hence competition
and efficiency in banking are also highly important: high quality at low cost
boosts welfare. Competition is also important for adequate monetary transmis-
sion, which is the speed at which policy interest rates set by central banks pass
through to bank interest rates (see Table 1).
Table 1: Importance of Competition in Banking
Competition also affects financial innovations, banks’ financial health, financial
stability and the accessibility of banking services to customers – with accessibility
meaning the extent to which small and medium-sized businesses have access to
affordable financing. For all these four factors, the relation to competition is rep-
resented by a so-called inverse U-shape (see Figure 1). Promoting competition
enhances these factors up to an optimum, whose position is uncertain. Stronger
competition beyond the optimum has a counterproductive effect on these factors.
Welfare-enhancing for consumers and businesses
Reinforces monetary policy
Inverse U-shape relationship with:
– innovation
–s o l v e n c y
– financial stability
– accessibility of the banking system to customers
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To give an example: when competition is very strong and excess profits dwindle,
banks will find it hard to build extra buffers to protect them from adverse shocks.
Healthy competition, in this sense, is better than fierce competition.
So what do banks, scientists and supervisors actually know about important var-
iables such as competition and efficiency in the banking system? This paper will
establish that, perhaps to our surprise or disappointment, we know far less than
has often been taken for granted.
Figure 1: Positive Effect of Competition on Innovation, Financial Health and 
Accessibility of the Banking Industry and on Financial Stability
In practice, highly simplified approximations have been used to represent compe-
tition or efficiency, such as the concentration index or the cost-to-income ratio.
While some indicators have been used without challenge in even the most highly-
ranked scientific journals, they are in fact too primitive in nearly every case and
not very reliable.
Better than such simplified proxies are theoretically founded models that attempt
to estimate competition and efficiency for a particular country2. How well have
these models been doing? This paper shows that the consensus between even the
best-founded models is surprisingly weak. In other words, different methods lead
to sometimes widely different results for the same country. This brings us to the
central problem addressed by this paper: how far does the sounding rod of our
measuring methods reach? And what can we do to reach just a little deeper?
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4.2. PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS
As a first step toward a closer analysis, about 20 methods were used to measure
banking competition and efficiency for the most important 46 countries3. These
countries comprise the old and new EU countries (in Figure 2 these are darkly
shaded and chequered, respectively), the other OECD countries (light shading)
and emerging markets (polka dotted). Together, they account for 90% of global
GDP.
All 20 simple approximations and model estimates of competition will from now
on be referred to as indicators. Five types of performance indicators are distin-
guished (see Table 2). Apart from competition and efficiency, these are costs,
profit (margin) and market structure.
Figure 2: Countries Examined by Category
3 For the list of these countries, see Bikker and Bos (2008), Table 9.1. Where competition is concerned, one
country, Romania, was left out due to data issues.
 
EU-15 OECD (excl EU-27)
EU-27 (excl. EU-15) Emerging economies
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Table 2: Indirect Performance Indicators for Financial Institutions
4.2.1. Mutual Relationships
Various theoretical relationships exist between the several types of performance.
Figure 3 illustrates this with some examples. The classic structure-conduct-per-
formance (SCP) theory holds that market structure determines competitive con-
duct and hence profits (referred to by the figure ‘1’)4. For instance: high bank
concentration leads to less competition and hence to higher profits. According to
an alternative paradigm, the efficiency hypothesis, more efficient banks increase
their market share by pushing less efficient competitors from the market (Dem-
setz (1973)). More efficient banks will translate lower costs into either increased
profits or price reductions – the latter in order to improve their competitiveness
and increase their market share (indicated by a ‘2’ in Figure 3). Efficiency thus is
not an effect but a determinant of market structure5. It has been generally
assumed that competitive pressure forces banks to become more efficient (indi-
cated by a ‘3’). Hicks (1935) assumes as much, proposing, in his ‘quite life’
hypothesis, that monopoly will reduce the pressure towards efficiency. Finally,
excess profits enable banks to lower their prices and become more competitive in
order to increase their market share (indicated by a ‘4’).
The strong intertwinement between variables in Figure 3 explains why market
structure, costs and profitability are often used as proxies for competition and
efficiency. At the same time, however, the figure underlines the fact that the meas-
ures concerned reflect quite different characteristics of banks and their markets.
Performance indicators Correlation with competition Indicators represented as




Costs Negative Cost-to-income ratio
Cost margin
Total costs/total income









Per capita number of banks
HHI, C3, C5, C10
4 See Bos (2004) for an overview and a critical analysis.
5 Depending on the ambition of efficient firms to expand their market share.
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Figure 3: Relations Between Market Structure, Competition, Profitability and Efficiency
Explanation: Relations according to the SCP paradigm are indicated by the figure 1, those according to the
efficiency hypothesis by the figure 2. Relations according to the ‘quiet life’ hypothesis (and its reversal) are
marked by the figure 3, while the relation following from a general principle is indicated by 4.
4.2.2. Correlation with Competition
Before the indicators can be used, it must be established whether the correlation
(across all countries) with competition is positive or negative6. Figure 3 shows
that efficiency is positively correlated to competition (for stronger competition
leads one to expect higher efficiency) and, for the same reason, that costs are
negatively correlated with competition (in other words, stronger competition
leads to cost cuts; see Table 2). Also, competition is likely to reduce profits. This
argument is not entirely cogent, however, because competition may also affect
profit in a positive sense via cost reduction. Hence the question mark in Table 2.
Where the notion of market structure is represented by the number of banks, a
positive correlation with competition is usually assumed: the presence of more
banks implies more opportunity for competition. Concentration, indicating
mainly the dominant position of a small number of banks, may indicate low com-
petition, because banks may use this to collaborate. A more dynamic interpreta-
tion is that such concentration may, on the contrary, be an indication of compe-
tition because consolidation may have been enforced by circumstances. Therefore
concentration is an ambivalent indicator.
4.2.3. Models and Indicators Used
Initially, five models were used to estimate competition (see Table 3). The Lerner
index uses profit margin as an indicator of market power (De Lange van Bergen
6 Abstracting from causality. In some cases there are more theoretical connections, whereas different empirical
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(2006)). The SCP model measures the influence of market structure on profits via
an assumption of competitive conduct. Market structure, here, is approximated
by the concentration index. The Cournot model is built along analogous lines,
but instead of looking at the structure of the market as a whole, it regards the
conjectural variation of individual banks7. Taking market share of the individual
firm as a measure of market structure, the Cournot model aspires also to capture
part of asymmetrical market structures, differences in cost structures and collu-
sive behaviour. The Boone indicator measures how efficiency, through increased
market shares, is rewarded by higher profits (Bikker and Van Leuvensteijn
(2008); Boone (2004, 2008); Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2007, 2008)). The Panzar-
Rosse model measures to what extent input and output prices move in step (as
they would under perfect competition) or out of step (indicating monopoly or a
perfect cartel)8. Other models in the literature (e.g. Bresnahan, Iwata) require
data sets that for most countries are simply lacking, while estimations also
present high practical barriers (Bikker (2003)). Table 3 shows how the different
models simulate different aspects of competition.
Table 3: Competition Models
For the efficiency indicators, cost and profit X-efficiency as well as scale and
scope economies were estimated through a model (see Table 2). Costs are repre-
sented by the cost-to-income ratio and the cost margin, while profit is proxied by
return on capital or return on assets (RoA) and by net interest margin (NIM). In
the case of market structure, the number of banks, the per capita number of banks
and a number of concentration indices are also incorporated9.
7 Conjectural variation is the degree to which a bank in setting its prices and total production quantity in a
business area is aware of its dependency on other banks’ behaviour in that area.
8 See Panzar and Rosse (1987).
Model Underlying concept
Lerner index Profit margin indicates market power
SCP modela
a. Based on, respectively, the market shares of the largest three banks (C3) and the Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index
(HHI) as measures of market structure.
Effect of market structure (concentration) on profit through competitive 
behaviour
Cournot modelb
b. Based on the market share of the individual bank as a measure of market structure, as an indicator of asymmetrical market
structures, differences in cost structures and collusive behaviour.
Effect of market structure (market share) on profit through competitive 
behaviour
Boone indicator Degree in which efficiency is rewarded in the form of higher profits 
through increased market sharesc
c. Based on the efficiency hypothesis.
Panzar-Rosse model Correlation of input prices and income (revenue)
9 For the exact definitions, see Table 16.1 in Bikker and Bos (2008). Concentration indicators are discussed in
Bikker and Haaf (2002a).
suerf2009.book  Page 51  Tuesday, November 3, 2009  2:42 PM52 PRODUCTIVITY IN THE FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR
larcier
In all cases this analysis was based on the banking market as a whole, without
regard to product differences. It has been argued against this that the situation as
regards competition, for instance, may vary depending on the market segment.
Competition in the mortgage lending market is likely to be much stronger than in
the investment counselling market. This is justified criticism: competition may
vary from product to product or even from one location to another. However, for
most products there are insufficient data available to perform analyses at the pro-
duct or location level, with a few exceptions10. Where approximations for com-
petition and efficiency are used in the economic literature, this is almost invaria-
bly done for banks as a whole, so on the highest level of aggregation.
Since all models were estimated on the basis of a single dataset, different out-
comes may not be attributed to data differences. The dataset covers a ten-year
period (1996-2005) and was obtained from Fitch IBCA’s BankScope and from the
OECD11.
4.3. CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE INDICATORS
This section appraises the indicators presented above against three different cri-
teria: first, two statistical norms – mutual correlations and the principal compo-
nent analysis12 and an economic interpretation. Finally, the variation across
countries is explained from economic theory.
4.3.1. Correlations
How do the different indicators found correlate to each other? Table A.1 in the
appendix shows the correlation coefficients between 14 currently used indicators
for 46 countries13. A correlation between two variables indicates parallel move-
10 Bikker and Haaf (2002b) and Bikker et al. (2006b) use the Panzar-Rosse model to disaggregate by bank size,
thus going some way towards a breakdown by market type (international vs. local), client type (large corpora-
tion vs. medium and small-sized businesses) and product type (wholesale vs. retail). Van Leuvensteijn et al.
(2007) estimate competition in just the lending market.
11 The data on individual banks’ balance sheets and profit and loss accounts that were used by the five competition
measuring models and the models to measure X-efficiency were obtained from BankScope. The dataset contains
data on 13,000 private and public banks publishing more or less standardised annual accounts which permit
comparison between the different accounting systems. The data underlying the profit and cost indicators for the
OECD countries were obtained from the OECD (2000, 2002, 2004). Those data coincide with those used by
Bikker and Bos (2008) and are discussed more fully there. The data on concentration indices for all countries
and those underlying the profit and cost indicators for the sixteen non-OECD countries were calculated on the
basis of the banks from those countries that figure in BankScope. Selection rules were applied to the latter set
in order to eliminate banks in unusual circumstances (e.g. holdings and banks undergoing a start-up or winding
down process). See Bikker et al. (2006a).
12 A third statistical method might have been regression analysis. However, the use of this is doubtful given the
strongly endogenous nature of (almost) all variables used. A counterexample is Koetter et al. (2007).
13 All analyses for 46 countries were made without the Lerner index. Lerner index analyses were performed for
23 countries, but are not discussed here since the index turns out to be significantly correlated only with the
Boone indicator. Table A.1 is part of a larger correlation matrix, because the total number of variables investi-
gated was larger than 14.
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ment, without regard to any original (causal) connection. Figure 4 summarises
these findings as the frequency distribution of the correlations found.
Figure 4: Frequency Distribution of Correlation Coefficients Between Indicators
Explanation: The graph presents the 91 correlations between the 14 indicators used: the Boone, Panzar-
Rosse, SCP and Cournot models, cost and profit X-efficiency, return on assets or on equity, cost-to-income
ratio, total cost to total income ratio, net interest margin, cost margin, the number of banks and the top 5
banks by market share, C5 (see Table A.1). Lighter shading refers to the 22 correlations that are significant at
the 5% significance level.
Evidently, most correlation coefficients are below 0.5: apparently, indicators tend
to be only moderately correlated to each other. This underlines the fact that each
single indicator provides at best a rough indication of competition, which is cer-
tainly not very accurate at the country level. The lighter shading indicates corre-
lations that are significant at the 95% confidence level – the upper fourth part of
all results. The number of significant correlations, at one in four, is not very high.
However, they all have the right – meaning: theoretically expected – sign, except
for five correlations involving ambivalent indicators whose sign depends on
which of the several theoretically possible relationships is dominant. The fact that
all other 17 significant correlations bear the right signs without exception is an
indication that the indicators behave (roughly) in accordance with the theoretical
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4.3.2. Principal Components Analysis
Another statistical technique is principal components analysis or PCA14. To the
extent possible, this method attempts to represent the variation across the coun-
tries within a set of correlated variables using a few variables called principal
components. PCA makes it possible to investigate to what extent the indicators
reviewed might all be explained by just a few factors or, in other words, to what
extent they overlap. The more successful the analysis, the more similar to each
other the indicators would be. Even more important is the possibility to interpret
the principal components (PCs) and to see whether they might represent recog-
nisable elements of our performance measures. It would be nice, for instance, if
one of the PCs represented competition, another one efficiency and the third one
profitability. This way, each PC could, so to speak, filter information from the
indicators and represent it in compact form.
Table 4 shows the outcome of an analysis (after the so-called varimax rotation for
ease of interpretation) with twelve indicators, selected so as to minimise overlap
between the indicators considered. Also, the indicators are spread as equally as
possible across the categories competition, efficiency, profitability, et cetera15.
The shading indicates for each column (i.e. for each principal component) the
highest factor or component loading(s). Thus we may infer that the first principal
component represents mainly cost and profit margins and profit inefficiency16.
The second one has the highest factor loading at cost efficiency, while the third
one has its highest factor loading at (three out of four) model-based competition
measures, and again at the HHI concentration index. Apparently, this third factor
comprises information on competition. Moreover, the signs of each factor load-
ings are correct – that is to say, in accordance with theoretical expectations17 – so
that this PC ought to present a reliable summary of the information content of
these competition indicators.
14 PCA is a multivariate statistical technique that defines, for a large number of observed variables, a smaller
number of underlying series. As a statistical method, PCA is nearly identical to factor analysis. Apart from data
reduction, PCA aims to provide an understanding of the dataset’s structure.
15 If the selected indicators are varied a bit, the outcome of the PCA will change as well. Typically, the first PCs
may usually be interpreted as profit, efficiency and competition – though not always in that order. In some cases,
costs appear in combination with profits, while in others they are coupled with efficiency.
16 Note that competition depresses both costs and profits.
17 As competition grows, the H-values of the Panzar-Rosse model will also rise, whereas the Boone indicator and
the coefficients in the SCP model and the Cournot model decline.
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Table 4: Factor Loadings for the First Five Principal Components (PCs)
Explanation: The shading indicates the highest factor loading for each column (that is, PC).
The last line of Table 4 shows that the first PC explains almost 20% of the vari-
ance in the indicators, falling gradually to 12% for the fifth PC, so that the first
five PCs together explain 76% of the variance. Thus less than half the PCs explain
three-fourths of the variance in the indicators. Apparently, the indicators do con-
tain common elements (especially ‘competition’), but also many specific ones
(profit, efficiency, concentration and further refinements such as RoA and NRM).
4.3.3. Economic Interpretation
What, now, is the economic significance of the indicators, or what are their coun-
tryspecific values? The answers to these questions are found, for the present esti-
mates of country-level competition and efficiency, in comparing the results to
available other sources of a more intuitive or anecdotal nature, or that relate to
specific subsegments or to competition in other sectors. However, there is not
much contrastive material around. In practice, there seems to be a degree of con-
sensus to the effect that Anglo-Saxon countries such as the USA, the UK and
Ireland are highly competitive. Another expert view is that competition in South-
ern Europe, by contrast, is very modest as a result of lagging development, exem-
Factor loadingsa
a. A factor loading may be regarded as the coordinate of an indicator on a PC in a coordinate system. In the case of orthogonal
components (i.e. forming a right angle), the factor loading of a variable vis-à-vis a component equals the correlation between
that variable and that component.
Explanationb
b. Explanation of the variance of the indicators based on the first five PCs (equals the sum of squared factor loadings for each
variable across the five PCs).
PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5
Panzar-Rosse model -0.20 0.18 0.80 0.72
Boone indicator 0.20 0.30 -0.79 0.76
SCP model -0.80 0.18 0.67
Cournot model 0.18 -0.23 -0.63 -0.42 0.66
Cost efficiency -0.13 0.81 0.13 0.11 0.70
Profit efficiency 0.84 -0.24 0.76
Return on Assets 0.79 0.16 -0.27 -0.24 0.79
Cost to income ratio 0.26 -0.60 0.60 0.14 0.81
Net interest margin 0.84 -0.18 0.18 0.77
Number of banks -0.20 0.13 0.12 0.85 -0.12 0.81
Cost margin 0.85 -0.23 0.12 -0.13 0.81
HHI 0.19 0.13 -0.85 -0.14 0.79
Explanation of variance per PC Total
0.19 0.17 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.76
suerf2009.book  Page 55  Tuesday, November 3, 2009  2:42 PM56 PRODUCTIVITY IN THE FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR
larcier
plified by insufficient consolidation and low cost-sensitiveness in bank clients.
France and Germany are also (with Italy) supposed to be less competitive owing
to strong public interference and inadequate consolidation. Very recently, we
have seen strong government interference with banks in many countries, in
response to the financial crisis – good for solvency but bad for competitive con-
ditions and therefore, one hopes, temporary. For Germany, stricter adherence to
supervisory rules, financial conservatism and an extensive branch network are
mentioned. Another universally accepted truth is that competence is stronger in
developed countries than in emerging economies, with the least developed coun-
tries bringing up the rear. Table 5 presents the country ranking according to the
‘expert view’.
Table 5: Competitiveness Ranking of EU Countries: Expert View vs. Empiricism
Various indicators produce diverging results for the same countries, because they
reflect different aspects of competition and also because estimation errors or
faulty data distort the result. But there is something else, which is that the out-
come suggests the above generally accepted country ranking is, in fact – or at least
according to our estimates – simply wrong. Germany, which is deemed by many
to be low on competition, gets good marks for all our criteria: low cost, low
profit, high competition, high efficiency – and as measured by nearly all indica-
tors. And a very similar story applies to France. Some Southern European coun-
tries live up to their underdeveloped image, yet according to many indicators,
Italy – and to some extent Spain – do not. Conversely, the performance measures
for the USA, the UK and Ireland are less than convincing. Although competition
estimates for these countries are favourable, their cost levels (and cost inefficien-
cies), interest margins and profits are exceptionally high, which is hard to recon-
cile with a competitive climate. Table 5 shows that according to the indicators as
measured across 1996-2005, Germany and France take the lead over the Anglo-
Saxon countries.
Whereas the original purpose of the above comparison was to use the ‘generally
accepted truth’ as a benchmark for the indicators, the outcome suggests the
reverse, i.e. the urgent need to adjust the expert view.
Expert View Empiricism (indicators)
1 UK/USA/Ireland 1 Germany/France
2 Western Europe 2 UK/USA/Ireland
3 Germany/France 3 Other EU-15 countries
4 Southern Europe 4 Central & Eastern Europe
5 Central & Eastern Europe
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4.3.4. Causes of Country-level Deviation Among Indicators
What is it that causes various measures to reflect somewhat different phenomena
for each country? There are three main explanations. First, we are dealing with
different concepts: although mutually correlated, the indicators do in fact meas-
ure different things: competition is not the same thing as efficiency, which in turn
differs from profitability et cetera. Secondly, there are definition issues: each def-
inition of (for instance) efficiency reflects a different aspect of the concept. And
finally, imperfections in the data also play a role.
Definition issues also figure in the models that measure competition. Using a
standard model of a profit maximising bank under a regime of oligopolistic com-
petition, one may derive that the theoretical model of competence is as follows
(Bikker and Bos (2005, 2008)).
Profit margin = (1/µ) HHI (1 + λ) (1)
Profit margin is assumed to reflect competitiveness: the more market power, or
the less competition, the higher profits will be. The µ parameter indicates the price
elasticity of demand: the more sensitive consumers are to changes in the prices of
bank products, the stronger competition will be. HHI, the Herfindahl-Hirschman
index of concentration, describes market structure: more banks make for more
competition, while a market with few large banks weakens competition. The con-
jectural (or assumed) variation, λ, indicates how banks will respond to produc-
tion volumes and prices of other banks. This parameter becomes higher as com-
petition gets stronger. Equation (1) may also be derived at the firm level where,
applied to bank i, it reads:
Profit margini = (1/µ) MSi (1 + λi) (2)
where MS represents market share. Bikker and Bos (2005, 2008) have demon-
strated that existing competition models may be derived from these two, except
that they invariably incorporate only one or two of the three components, thereby
neglecting one or two others. The SCP model, for instance, assumes that µ and λ
in equation (1) are constant (or that (1 + λ) may be approximated by HHI). The
same goes for Cournot, albeit at the bank instead of the country level (see equa-
tion (2)). The Boone indicator is estimated as the µ in equation (2) and assumes
λi constant. These differences in a priori assumptions contribute to the variation
in competition estimates. The Lerner index and the Panzar-Rosse model base
themselves on the (full) profit margin at the firm level. In the case of the Lerner
index, there is the problem that marginal costs have to be estimated, while with
Panzar-Rosse the translation from theoretical to empirical model may have a dis-
turbing effect.
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4.4. WHAT INDICATORS CAN DO
In the preceding paragraphs it has been shown that competition indicators should
not be applied indiscriminately. Time to investigate what information value the
indicators do have and whether there is, in fact, a reliable way to gauge competi-
tion. In order to find this out, we will be concentrating on three aspects: economic
interpretation (again), predictive validity and a bundling of all information into
a single index.
4.4.1. Economic Interpretation
To see whether any clear structure lies buried inside the data, Table 6 presents the
estimates of the average cost and profit X-efficiency, costs (averaged across the
three cost indicators) and profitability (averaged across the three profit indica-
tors). The table juxtaposes three types of countries (viz. (i) Western Europe and
other highly industrialised countries, (ii) emerging economies and other OECD
countries, and (iii) Eastern and Central Europe) with efficiency, broken down into
five classes in descending order from high to low efficiency countries. Every cell
in the table contains the number of countries in that bracket. The table shows a
diagonal pattern (see shading). Apparently, the efficiency of banks in the highly
developed industrial countries is clearly better than that of banks in emerging
countries, while banks in the post-transitional economies of Eastern and Central
Europe come out as least efficient. It follows that there is a correlation between
efficiency and degree of economic development.
A similar pattern from high to low is to be found, for the same reason, when
countries are classified by cost levels or profitability, but that the other way
around (from low to high) as high efficiency corresponds to low costs and low
profits (see the shaded diagonal in, respectively, Table 6.B and 6.C). In the devel-
oped countries, where costs are lower, profits are also lower, whereas costs and
profits are higher in the transition countries. It is tempting to ascribe this phenom-
enon to stronger competitive pressure. However, a similar classification does not
show an unequivocal pattern for competition. Other investigations have shown
that competition in industrial countries is, by contrast, slightly weaker, probably
owing to a higher proportion of products such as investment counselling and
services and options, where competition is far less energetic than on deposit tak-
ing and lending (Bikker et al. (2007). In time, the share of advisory and other
services continues to increase, further weakening competition (Bikker and Spier-
dijk (2008)).
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Table 6: Distribution of X-efficiency, Costs and Profitability Across Countries
4.4.2. Average Ranking
In situations where measuring is problematic, a good solution may well be to take
the average of several estimations. This is a well-known and often-used strategy
in forecasting: the combination of several forecasts does better than each forecast
separately. This strategy was also applied to the set of estimates and indicators
discussed above. A per-country average of several competition level indicators
was used. Because the units of expression of these indicators cannot be compared,
instead of values, ranking orders were averaged18. For this exercise, eleven meas-
ures were selected in such a way that there was as little overlap between them as
possible. Wherever the overlap between two measures was substantial, one vari-









Medium 9 3 33
9531
Low 9 2 2 5
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High 10 . 3 7






High 9 . 3 6
46 25 9 12
18 The third principle component ‘competition’ as presented in Table 4 is an alternative index, which may be
viewed as a weighted (by factor loadings) average of the original normalised series.
suerf2009.book  Page 59  Tuesday, November 3, 2009  2:42 PM60 PRODUCTIVITY IN THE FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR
larcier
able was left out19. The eleven eventually selected measures are: Boone indicator,
Panzar-Rosse model, SCP model, Cournot model, cost X-efficiency, return on
assets, cost-to-income ratio (C/I), total cost to total income ratio, net interest mar-
gin (NIM), cost margin (CM) and market share of the top 5 banks (C5).
Table 7: Correlations Between the Indicators and the Index
Note: Two (three) asterisks indicate a confidence level of 95% (99%). Shading indicates expected positive corre-
lation instead of negative. (Only where there is ambivalence there is no a priori expectation.) Amb. stands for
ambiguous.
The first column of Table 7 (i.e. the last column of Table A.1) presents the corre-
lations between the ‘average ranking’, referred to from here on as ‘Index’, and the
underlying variables. Remarkably, 11 of the 14 measures are significantly corre-
lated with the Index, of which 7 at the highest confidence level of 99%20. Figure
5 shows, moreover, that correlations with the Index are far stronger than those
between pairs of indicators.
Reassuringly, all 14 correlations have the correct (theoretically expected) signs21,
which is, of course, especially significant in the case of the nine significant and
non-ambivalent variables: Panzar-Rosse model, Cournot model, cost X-effi-
ciency, return on assets/capital, NIM, CM, number of banks and C5. Apparently
19 Cost-based or profit-based scale economies were also disregarded because they show little variation across the
countries and because of its ambivalent relation to competition.
Indicators Correlations Significance Status Index component
Boone indicator -0.14 Yes
Panzar-Rosse model 0.33 ** Yes
SCP model -0.05 Yes
Cournot model -0.42 *** Yes
Profit efficiency 0.37 ** Amb.
Cost efficiency 0.53 *** Yes
Return on capital -0.30 **
Return on assets (RoA) -0.50 *** Yes
Cost-to-income ratio (C/I) -0.42 *** Amb. Yes
Total cost to total income ratio -0.20 Amb. Yes
Net interest margin (NIM) -0.63 *** Yes
Cost margin (CM) -0.58 *** Yes
Number of banks 0.51 ***
Concentration index C5 -0.37 ** Yes
20 For the indicators included in the Index, a modicum of correlation with the Index is to be expected, of course.
While for some indicators (Boone indicator and SCP model) this does not lead to significance, other indicators
show significant correlation without being included in the Index (e.g. profit efficiency and number of banks).
21 The correct sign is negative (owing to the selection made in constructing the Index, because most indicators
correlate negatively with competition, see Table A.1), except in certain cases (shading).
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there is, after all, an overall concept of ‘competition’, which is present in nearly
every indicator and is reflected reliably and unequivocally in the resulting
Index22.
Figure 5: Frequency Distribution of Correlations Between Indicators and Index
Note: Dark shading: frequency distribution of 91 correlations between indicators; light shading: frequency
distribution of 14 correlations between indicator and Index.
Now that an adequate measure of competition has been found in the Index, it is
possible to tell which of the simple indicators, all things considered, does best.
Table A.1 shows that the net interest margin and its relation, return on assets, are
the most successful (overall) performance measures23. When the focus is entirely
on competition, Panzar-Rosse or Cournot are more satisfactory.
Finally, it should be noted that this ranking-based Index is strongly and signifi-
cantly (and in declining degrees) correlated with the first three principal compo-
nents of Table 4, which are weighted averages of the original indicators. Both the
Index and the principal components aim to present as much of the indicators’
information content as possible in summary form.
22 A corollary result is that the ambivalent variables are now signed, so as to make clear which relation prevails
in practice. In the case of profit efficiency the influence of cost efficiency dominates that of the use of market
power. The cost-to-income ratio and the total cost to total income ratio turn out to do well as indicators of
efficiency, with the enumerator (costs) dominating the denominator (income) in determining the ratio.
23 In earlier analyses across a smaller number of countries, using a differently composed set of indicators (Bikker
and Bos, 2008) or covering other periods (Bikker and Bos, 2005), the net interest margin and the return on
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4.4.3. Predictive Validity Test
There is another way to test the measures considered, which derives from the
psychometric, sociological and marketing literature: the so-called predictive
validity test24. The predictive validity test is based on the idea that a constructed
variable – such as a survey question – must be correlated to the (subsequently)
observed variable if it is to be a useful predictor. With some adjustment the indi-
cators in the present analysis could be subjected to the following ‘informative
validity test’. The test is based on a model in which competition depends on eco-
nomic variables or, conversely, where an economic variable depends on, among
other things, competition. In such a model each of our indicators might be used
as a proxy for competition to see whether it is both significant and (according to
theory) correctly signed. If it is, one may conclude that the indicator’s relevant
information content prevails without its pattern being disfigured by the inherent
noise.
Such tests occur frequently in the literature, if implicitly, because indicators are
usually employed without much ado as competition measures. Examples of this
are the SCP and the efficiency hypothesis literatures where concentration and
market share, respectively, have been blithely cast in the role of competition. But
there are many other fields of study where competition comes into play25. As an
ex-post test the literature is not a reliable source, since less welcome test results
are more likely to be disregarded by authors or else to be rejected by journals.
Below are three examples of such informative validity tests. A model-based meas-
ure of competition is the H-value from the Panzar-Rosse model which has been
estimated for 80 countries. Next, it is explained by means of a large number of
carefully selected possible determinants of competition (Bikker et al. (2007)). The
four (out of nine) determinants that are significant (even at the 99% confidence
level), all turn out to carry the right sign (see Table 8). Apparently, the H statistic
contains a great deal of – competition-related – information, so that it passes the
present test successfully.
24 Predictive validity is the term used if a test is observed before it can be compared to the realisation; ‘concurrent
validity’ is applied in cases where observation is simultaneous. The latter term would be applicable if one
indicator were to be validated against the other. This option is less useful in the present analysis owing to the
endogenous nature of the indicators considered here.
25 Some examples of this are given further below.
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Table 8: Explanation of Bank Competition in 76 Countries (2004)
Source: Bikker et al. (2007).
Our second example concerns monetary transmission. It is assumed that as com-
petition increases, bank interest rates will be lower and more closely aligned with
market rates and the policy rates of the European Central Bank (ECB), so that
competition reinforces monetary policy. Models for four types of lending in eight
EMU countries26 explain the spread between the observed four bank rates and
the corresponding policy and market rates using competition in the lending mar-
ket (Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2007, 2008))27. Competition was in this case meas-
ured by the Boone indicator, because it permits estimating competition in a partial
market (i.e. the lending market). The competition measure carries the correct sign
significantly for three out of the four lending rates (see Table 9). In the fourth
case, the coefficient concerned is not significant. Also, a so-called ‘Error Correc-
tion Model’ shows that the response of all four lending rates to the market and
policy rates is stronger, and hence more closely parallel, as competition increases.
Again, the Boone indicator, with seven hits out of eight, seems to have passed the
test28.
Variables Coefficients t-value Significance
Concentration index C5 -0.001 -0.8
Activity restrictions -0.000 -0.7
Log (Market cap./GDP) -0.016 -0.4
Log (per capita GDP) 0.011 0.3
Real GDP growth -0.023 -2.8 Sign.
Foreign investment index -0.132 -3.2 Sign.
Regulation index 0.128 2.5 Sign.
EU-15 -0.129 -1.4
Former planned economies -0.435 -5.6 Sign.
R2, adjusted 0.82
26 Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain (1992-2004).
27 An alternative model, the Error Correction Model, was unable to confirm decreasing spreads amid stronger
competition. Apparently, this more complicated model is less capable of measuring the targeted alignment
effect.
28 In addition, the spread between two deposit rates and the corresponding market and policy rates is explained
by competition on the lending market. It turns out that deposit rates tend to be lower the more competition
there is on the lending market. Apparently, competition on lending is not a good indicator for competition in
the deposits market. On the contrary: banks compensate for their loss of income as a result of competition on
lending by offering lower deposit rates.
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Table 9: Effect of Competition on Spreads between Bank and Market Lending Rates
Note: Two (three) asterisks indicate a confidence level of 95% (99%).
Source: Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2008).
A third example is that of a model which determines the influence of competition
on a banks capital buffer (Bikker and Spierdijk (2009b)). On the one hand it
seems self-evident that less competition should lead to higher bank profits, so that
banks may add more money to their buffer capital. There is a clear trade-off here
between the short-term interest of bank customers, characterised by high compe-
tition and low prices, and the long-term interest of financial safety, in other
words, the certainty that you will get your money back. An alternative theory
assumes, however, that when fierce competition erodes profit margins, banks will
be inclined to take more risks and hold a smaller buffer. Also, amid strong com-
petition, banks will be less inclined to invest in inquiries regarding their clients in
order to reduce information asymmetry (Marcus (1984)). This, too, increases the
risk for banks. In order to determine which effect is stronger, a model was esti-
mated – on the analogy of work by Schaeck et al. (2006) and Schaeck and Cihak
(2007) – where the capital buffer depends on variables including competition.
Competition was once more measured using the Panzar-Rosse model, so that data
are available for over 100 countries.
Estimations demonstrate that competition erodes banks’ capital buffers, so that
apparently, the theory claiming that ‘weak competition leads to high profits and
hence to large buffers’ wins out in actual practice. The same holds if instead of
the Panzar-Rosse competition measure the third principal component derived
above (which according to the factor loadings indicated competition) has been
applied29. Again it appears that measuring competition in practice yields plausi-
ble results.
Effect of competition on 
spread (t-values)
Effect of competition times market 
rate on bank rates (t-values)
Mortgage loans **-2.12 ***4.29
Consumer credit ***-3.03 ***3.21
Short-term corporate loans ***-6.72 ***3.47
Long-term corporate loans 0.15 ***4.48
29 In fact, the Index turns out not to be significant if replacing the Panzar-Rosse measure.
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4.5. WHAT DO THE VALIDATED MEASURES ACTUALLY 
MEASURE?
So far, this paper has been investigating how bank performance indicators do
themselves perform as measures. Next, the question arises as to the banking
industry’s competition and inefficiency themselves. Earlier studies have tried to
capture those variables. For the sake of comparison, two other financial sectors
are also considered: insurers and pension funds. Little research has been done in
the present area for these types of financial institution, while banking competition
measurement has been underexposed in the literature.
This paper considers only estimates by methods whose results cover the same
0%-100% range, which permits the outcomes to be compared. Disregarding for
now the many (almost insurmountable) problems besetting the business of meas-
urements and comparisons30, Table 10 presents several outcomes for scale econ-
omies, cost X-inefficiency and competition.
Unused scale economies cannot be present under strong or perfect competition.
Estimated unused scale economies increase from banks (5%) via nonlife and life
insurers (10% and 20%, respectively) to 36% for pension funds. Especially insur-
ers and small pension funds could realise hefty cost savings through (further)
consolidation. These outcomes reflect the degree of (overdue) consolidation per
sector, and therefore in a sense a lack of competition. For under fierce competi-
tion, large-scale cost-saving opportunities would not go unexploited31. As has
been observed many times, the inefficiency of banks and insurers is greater than
their scale inefficiency. Bank competition, at 50% (world-wide), hovers halfway
between monopoly and perfect competition32. In recent years bank competition
has weakened somewhat (Bikker and Spierdijk (2008)). Among nonlife insurers,
competition is considerably weaker, at 22%, than among banks (Bikker et al.
(2008)). The conclusion is that there is a good deal of room for improvement in
competition and efficiency within banks and, especially, insurance companies.
30 The measurement of scale economies, for instance, is based on the variable ‘output’, which presents its own
measurement issues for each sector.
31 It should be noted that these scale effects also concern production structures. In all sectors, fixed costs are high
and rising over time, while they are particularly high in pension funds, compared to variable costs.
32 The competence measure H of the Panzar-Rosse model, measured across 100 countries, averages 0.50, exactly
halfway between monopoly (H = 0) and perfect competition (H = 1).
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Table 10: Competition Among Banks, Insurers and Pension Funds (per cent)
4.6. SUMMARY
While many indicators of competition between banks commonly used in eco-
nomic literature and in practice do in fact measure something, they do not con-
tribute much to our knowledge on bank performance. At the same time it has
been established that with the help of appropriate indicators – or, even better, a
combination of appropriate indicators – we could make a good deal of headway
towards a better understanding of competition. The appropriate indicators con-
tain sufficient information on competition to be able to function reliably as
explanatory variables in a model where competition plays a dominant role.
Finally, the analysis also revealed that some existing expert opinions on the rela-
tive competitiveness of (especially European) countries need to be thoroughly
reviewed. Application of several indicators to banks, life & nonlife insurers and
pension funds has consistently shown that there is a good deal of room for
improvement on competition and efficiency in banks and, especially, insurers.
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5. BANKING ON LEAN – A PRACTITIONER’S VIEW 
ON PRODUCTIVITY IN EUROPEAN BANKING
Marc Niederkorn
ABSTRACT
In a world where capital has become very costly (in particular when you need it)
and where the access to liquidity is not ‘free’ any more, most observers agree that
banks will need to fundamentally reduce their cost structure by 25 to 30% (at
constant volumes) to keep generating a reasonable return on equity. In other
terms, a major productivity improvement will be required from the sector in the
coming years.
The trouble for banks is twofold: on the one hand, banking productivity is noto-
riously difficult to define and to measure and on the other hand, the track record
of banks actually improving productivity is very disappointing.
Our experience as practitioners is that vast productivity improvements are possi-
ble (at current technology) as current productivity measured by standard indus-
trial indicators such as Overall Process Effectiveness (OPE) is weak. Banks have
largely failed to capture this potential in the past as their efforts have been flawed
by 5 fundamental misconceptions.
Emerging evidence shows that well established industrial productivity improve-
ment techniques can be successfully applied to financial services and can open up
a new strategic playing field for early adopters.
5.1. A PRACTITIONER’S WAY OF MEASURING 
PRODUCTIVITY IN BANKING
Banking productivity is notoriously difficult to define. There is abundant litera-
ture describing banking productivity indicators originating from aggregate
national accounts data. Unfortunately, these analyses prove hard to use for prac-
titioners due to their well known limitations. It has become common industry
practice (by default) to compare Cost/Income or Efficiency ratios, typically
defined as:
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1 (1)
Px = personnel cost of institution x
Nx = non- personnel cost
Dx = depreciation of physical assets 
Ix = net interest margin
Cx = net commission revenue
Tx = net trading revenue
Unfortunately, C/I ratios are poor indicators to compare performance over time
or between players as the revenue margins and product use patterns vary widely
across geographies. A recent analysis of C/I ratios of a sample of top European
and Russian retail banks suggests that the large Russian retail banks perform
significantly better than banks in most other European countries and that the
worst performer amongst the large Russian institution performs better than the
average of the large French, Dutch or Belgian players2. For the reasons mentioned
above, C/I ratio measures typically favor countries with a comparatively ‘rich’
product mix (e.g. strong reliance on consumer finance such as the UK) and high
fee and/or float revenues (as found in many of the Mediterranean countries).
Figure 1: Cost to Income Ratios Provide a Highly Distorted View of Effective Banking 
Productivity
Source: McKinsey analysis.
1 The cost of risk is not taken into account in our definition of C/I or efficiency ratio.
2 In reality, the labor productivity in Russia’s retail banking sector is extremely low, representing only 11 percent
of US productivity levels in nominal terms and 23 percent when adjusted for the difference in income levels.
Russia’s productivity is low across all the services we examined, ranging from 4 percent in loans to 13 percent
in payment transactions. The detailed analysis in described in McKinsey Global Institute (2009).
C/Ix Px Nx Dx ++ () Ix Cx Tx ++ () ⁄ =
Individual banks
Country average















C/I ratios of the top retail banks, Percent, 2007
suerf2009.book  Page 72  Tuesday, November 3, 2009  2:42 PMBANKING ON LEAN – A PRACTITIONER’S VIEW ON PRODUCTIVITY IN EUROPEAN BANKING 73
larcier
To compensate for these flaws, the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) has devel-
oped and calculated a Retail Banking Productivity Index3, which find useful for
discussion with practitioners.
For a specific country, our Retail Banking Productivity Index compares the pro-
ductivity in a given year to the productivity for the US in the year 2000.
(1)
P(a,t) = Retail Productivity Index for country a in year t
A(a,t) = Absolute productivity for country a in year t 
A(US,2000)= Absolute productivity indicator for the US in 2000 (reference variable)
The absolute productivity indicator is the ratio between the Output Index (trans-
actions or volumes) at standard margins and the Labor Input Index.
(2)
O(a,t) = Output Index (at standard prices)
L(a,t) = Labor Input Index
The units of output are effectively ‘normalized’ whereby volumes (number of
transactions or nominal amounts outstanding, deflated and converted to USD at
PPP) are weighted by revenue margins at US 2000 prices.
(3)
T(a,t) = number of banking transactions executed (withdrawals, cheques, cards, credit
transfers, debit transfers and E-Money transactions) in millions, as per ECB
resp. national Central Bank statistics
D(a,t) = volume of bank deposits (current accounts, savings deposits and term money)
deflated by the average consumer inflation index for the period 1995 to 2002
and converted into USD at 1995 Individual Consumption PPP
L(a,t) = volume of bank loans, whereby consumer loans are deflated by the average
consumer inflation index for the period 1995 to 2002 and converted into USD
at 1995 Individual Consumption PPP and mortgage loans are deflated by the
average construction inflation index over the period 1995 to 2002 and con-
verted into USD at 1995 Construction PPP
Pt = revenue per transaction in the US at 2000 US prices (total US transactions
revenue divided by total US transactions volumes)
Pd = net revenue per million USD deposits (current account, term, and savings
book) at 2000 US prices
Pl = net revenue per million USD loans (consumer loans, mortgages) before write-
offs at 2000 US prices
3 In this paper, we will discuss analyses and results exclusively at the level of individual countries (a discussion at
the level of individual banks could equally make sense).
P(a,t) A(a,t) A US,2000 () ⁄ =
A(a,t) O(a,t) L(a,t) ⁄ ()  * 1000 =
O(a,t) T(a,t) * Pt () D(a,t) * Pd () L(a,t) * Pl () ++ =
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One of the limitations of the approach is that we are not able to take quality of
output into account.
As far as input is concerned, we have focused on ‘normalized’ labor (taking into
account outsourcing and adjusting for differences in hours worked in the differ-
ent countries investigated). This approach does not take into account potentially
different levels of historical and current IT and automation investments.
(4)
with
B(a,t) = total employment in the banking sector in terms of number of employees, as
indicated by national employment statistics
R(a,t) = estimated percentage of employment in retail banking activities including oper-
ations and support functions (McKinsey estimate)
Q(a,t) = percentage of outsourced labor in retail banking (McKinsey estimate)
H(a,t) = conversion factor of employees to normalized full time equivalent (FTE) to
take into account differences in terms of working hours, vacation times and
banking holidays etc.
Figure 2: Productivity Indicator Has Historically Shown Significant Discrepancies 
Between European Countries
Source: National and international statistics; MGI; WMM; GPP McKinsey.
Our historical data series covering the 1995 to 2002 period had shown a number
of interesting trends that the recent (partial) extension to 2006 has confirmed:
– productivity levels amongst European countries differ widely: our 2002 data
had shown productivity in Belgium and the UK at over twice the level of Italy,
L(a,t) B(a,t) * R(a,t) * (1 + Q(a,t)) * H(a,t) =
Example: Retail Banking
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Spain or Ireland4;
– for the high performing countries, productivity improvement appears to be
relatively slow (between 1-4% per annum) with some of the countries seem-
ingly going into reverse (Sweden and US since 2002) potentially caused by
particularly favorable market conditions that have allowed the banks to
‘drop the ball’ on productivity improvements;
– amongst the low performing countries, Portugal, Spain and to a lesser extend
Italy have been catching up at an astonishing speed, whereas Irish productiv-
ity seems to have declined over the observation period. For the fastest improv-
ing countries, the data suggests improvements of about 5-7% per annum.
However interesting the comparison of these indicators collected at the level of
individual institutions or activities may be, they remain much too aggregated to
explore the very large productivity improvement opportunities that subsist, at
current technology and service offering, even within the most productive Euro-
pean banks. To document this potential, it is necessary to turn to Overall Process
Effectiveness (OPE), a methodology developed for understanding and quantify-
ing productivity improvement potential in industrial settings5.
The basic concept is relatively intuitive: OPE is the ratio between the productive
time (roughly the time in which true value added is created and for which a
demanding customer would be ready to pay) and the total time available (i.e. the
time in which the team is available for work) measured at the level of individual
processes. Conceptually, there are three sources of difference between both:
– availability: time spent on non-value added activities between production
cycles. In banking, this corresponds typically to motion6 and transportation7,
set-up and management time, controls or the temporal misalignment between
availability of resources and demand (idle capacity);
– performance/speed: the speed at which individual operators execute tasks
often varies widely so that there is a large gap between ideal and actual cycle
time. This is partially due to lack of training (less experienced operators take
a lot longer to get a task done) and/or to the absence of Standard Operating
Procedures (the correct way of executing a task is insufficiently documented
and shared between operators);
4 A commonly held view is that productivity is positively correlated with the degree of consolidation in banking
in a particular geography. Indeed, in countries such as the Benelux and Scandinavia, the banking sector has
reached a very high degree of concentration, the concentration in Spain, Portugal and particularly Italy is
progressing whereas geographies such as France and Germany have made little progress in that direction over
the recent years.
5 The methodology underlying the ‘Lean banking transformation’ approach is derived from the Toyota Produc-
tion System (TPS) as originally published in Womack et al. (1990). Their application to banking is described in
McKinsey & Company (2008).
6 Motion is the time spent by operators moving around in the working area (from workpost to spare part,
archive, printer, etc.).
7 Transportation is the fact that material is moved around between workposts, departments (physical inventory,
paper or electronic files, etc.).
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–q u a l i t y : the percentage of procedures that are not performed right first time,
leading to significant rework or that are performed to standards above what
the client requests and is ready to pay for.
In optimized industrial settings, it is not exceptional to find OPE measurements
between 60 and 80%8. Our experience in leading financial institutions in high
performing geographies shows that banking OPE measurements are typically in
the high tens or low twenties. So, even if there is a certain degree of methodolog-
ical interpretation and therefore potentially an error margin in this approach, it
is clear that substantial opportunity for improvement still remains untapped.
Figure 3: Significant Improvement Potential even for a Player from a Top Country – 
Example: Mortgage Origination
Source: McKinsey analysis.
The figure above shows an example of a Benelux bank’s mortgage origination
process. Of the 100 units of total available time, only 71% is available for the
process itself, and just 16% is true value-adding time. A third of time is lost due
to inefficiencies linked to other processes, such as communications, while half is
lost due to inefficiencies with the origination process itself.
The ambition is not to eliminate all coordination and control tasks and thereby
increase the risk profile, nor to lower service standards for customers. Indeed, the
8 In automotive assembly, OPE measurements of 70-85% are seen as good practice, whereas Aerospace manu-
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figures in our example are such that, by eliminating only 15% of time loss (say
by improving standardization, eliminating unnecessary motion and ensuring
completeness of files), the physical output of the unit could be doubled using the
current technology.
Figure 4: Variability Can Be Split between Skill and Individual Rigidity Exists because of 
Mismatch of Supply/Demand
Source: McKinsey analysis.
In most service industry settings, variability is the single most important produc-
tivity improvement opportunity. The example above illustrates typical findings,
grouped into skill variability (i.e. the build-up of performance as a function of
time on the job), individual performance variability (i.e. the difference in output
between operators of a similar tenure) or supply/demand variability (loss due to
the inadequate alignment of available labor to service demand).
To summarize, the ‘industrialization’ of banking through the application of lean
approach is the key to significant productivity improvements. Our work over the
last years shows that such potential is available not only in low STP rate9 process-
ing environments, but also in distribution networks, highly automated back-
offices, IT application development, maintenance and infrastructure management
environments as well as in support and overhead functions.
9 Straight-Through Processing rate indicates the percentage of transactions that are executed without human
intervention.
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5.2. REASONS FOR OVERLOOKING LARGE UNTAPPED 
PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENT OPPORTUNITIES
We regularly encounter five misconceptions about productivity improvement in
banking that seriously hinder progress.
5.2.1. Myth #1: Productivity Can only Be Improved 
through Massive IT Investments
For many bankers, significant performance improvement can only be achieved
through the injection of vast amounts of new (IT) technology. Our annual IT Cost
Benchmarking Survey shows that financial services typically spend between 16-
24% of their operating cost on IT. Although wholesale banks clearly are the high-
est spenders, retail and universal banks still remain at a hefty 18-19% of their
operating cost.
One would hope that the cost-benefit analysis of such an enormous investment
(we are talking after all about EUR 75-80 bn p.a. for European banks alone)
would bear its fruits (for example by significantly lowering other operational
expenses). On an aggregate level, the evidence for this being the case is far from
clear.
Figure 5: Many Banks Have Reached a State of Maturity where Performance 
Improvement Is De-correlated from IT Spend
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Our annual IT Cost Benchmarking survey10 conducted amongst top European
banks suggests that if for certain banks (C-Type)with particularly poor operating
performance, there seems to be a positive correlation between IT spend and steep
performance improvement (in our case operating cost/income corrected for IT
spend) for many banks (A and B type), the improvement curve is essentially flat.
One could argue that these banks have already reached a stage of maturity where
any further increase in IT spend will have a limited or no effect on productivity.
Our practical work shows that in fact, most of the inefficiencies in banking are
fairly low-tech: production flow is not understood and ‘production lines’ are
inadequately balanced, customer demand patterns are not taken into account
properly and capacity is not sufficiently adjusted, operational footprint is not
optimized and variability is not managed. More importantly, large-scale IT
investments often fail to address these issues adequately as they largely happen
outside of the strict process perimeter or because the IT platform replacement is
so disruptive that all the energy goes into building, testing and stabilizing the new
environment rather than optimizing the way in which it is embedded into produc-
tion reality. Consequently, the return on IT investment is often disappointing.
The fundamental mistake that is systematically made when discretionary IT
spend is decided is that the alternative route of capturing improvement potential
by addressing the operations fundamentals without significant IT investment is
not explored. In the event that this is done, we systematically observe that oper-
ational improvement initiatives yield superior productivity improvement poten-
tial (often destroying the case for IT investment) and that the combination of
‘lean’ techniques with limited additional IT investments are almost always the
right route for mature institutions.
10 See McKinsey & Company (2006) based on McKinsey’s 2005 survey of IT cost in 37 European banks.
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Figure 6: Understanding the Case for Lean vs. IT Investments
5.2.2. Myth #2: It’s either Cost or Quality
A common belief is that cutting cost and streamlining processes must automati-
cally mean that quality will drop off and that, for sure, risk will increase. The
experience in manufacturing industries proves to be exactly the opposite. The
elimination of waste, variability and inflexibility from a production process will
not only reduce cost but, if correctly undertaken, will also improve quality simul-
taneously. With regard to operational/process risk, the elimination of long lead
times will surface mistakes, errors as well as rogue behavior faster and the reduc-
tion of tolerance for process variability considerably strengthens the hands of
those that control compliance and the respect of procedures.
5.2.3. Myth #3: Big is Beautiful – It’s All About Economies 
of Scale
Harking back to those days of large-scale industrial production lines where size
really mattered is no longer especially helpful. If we break down the cost structure
of a typical European retail bank we see that only 5% of the cost base can be
attributed to ‘scale-sensitive’ processes. The vast majority of cost is due to distri-
bution and support cost (branches, call centers), which in the best case are sensi-
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Figure 7: In Many Instances, Scale Does not Matter All That Much
Source: McKinsey.
So, there is less room for maneuver here than might be thought. In addition, the
leading European retail banks have already reached critical scale.
In mortgages for example, our analyses show that critical scale is reached at a
production of about 30,000 new mortgages per year: at this level, doubling pro-
duction volume would lead to less than 10% unit cost reduction (the same is true
for mortgage servicing contracts above approximately 300,000 outstanding con-
tracts). Banks with 1-2 million retail customers are highly likely to reach these
production levels. In other terms, for most of Europe’s leading banks, focusing on
additional scale to reduce cost misses the point and proves a distraction rather
than a key to success.
In general, scale is not irrelevant, but clinging on to the simple belief that building
scale will be enough to deliver major savings and quality improvements will result
in falling a long way short of the actual improvement potential.
* Asset Management and Consumer Finance
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Figure 8: The European Retail Banking Leaders Have Reached Critical Scale – Example: 
Mortgage Factories
Source: Data requests; McKinsey analysis
5.2.4. Myth #4: Outsourcing & Offshoring Is Essential
By far the largest portion of the European banks’ operating costs are still in-
house. Captive onshore costs in 2006 were estimated to be 96% of operating
costs. It is true that the share of offshore and outsourced costs is rising faster
relatively than the captive onshore costs, but the volumes are still tiny in compar-
ison.
There is a reason for this: for a traditional European retail bank, only a limited
part of the cost base can effectively be considered for offshoring: even if language
concerns can be addressed, our experience shows that typically less than 10% of
the total cost base (mostly centralized operations, IT application development
and maintenance and some parts of infrastructure management) can be off-
shored. Even assuming that banks take a quite aggressive stance, the effective
impact on the cost base would be limited, with a total impact on the C/I ratio of
less than 5%. So although it is certainly a good idea to consider offshoring and
outsourcing where appropriate, under no circumstances should it be seen as the
only route to cost improvements.
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Figure 9: Most of the Banks’ Operating Cost Are Still In-house...
Source: Gartner; NASSCOM; McKinsey.
Figure 10: In European Retail Banking, Offshoring Impact Is Limited to 5-8% of Cost 
Base or 2-4% of C/I Ratio
Source: McKinsey analysis.
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5.2.5. Myth #5: Cross-border Consolidation Is the Key
We have already discussed the limitations of scale as a lever to improve produc-
tivity. Capturing these improvements across borders while dealing with different
cultures, consumer behaviors and regulatory nuances is even more difficult.
Figure 11: Achieving Value From Cross-border M&A Requires that Acquirers Focus on 
Performance Transformation of the Target Banks
Source: Predator Strategies – How to Create Value From Cross-Border M&A in European Banking.
Over the last decade, cross-border acquisitions have typically required a 15-30%
premium above pre-transaction market valuation of the target. Shareholders of
the acquiring company should be ready to pay such an acquisition premium only
if they believe that the transaction and subsequent consolidation can create more
value for them (otherwise they would be better off holding both company stocks
separately).
However, the numbers work typically against them: traditional cross-border (cost
and revenue) synergies rarely justify a premium of more than 5-15% of the value
of the target. Additional financial optimization may in some cases generate an
additional 1-2%, leaving a large gap to justify such transactions. Numbers only
add up if the acquirer believes that significant stand-alone process improvement
can be realized in the target institution (which in theory could have been achieved
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For acquiring banks that have already been through a lean transformation, trans-
ferring their expertise to the acquired entity is a powerful way of maximizing the
value of the acquisition. Staff members who have lived through a lean program
and seen how effective it can be are often the most effusive evangelists when
taking the concept to a newly acquired bank.
The significant gaps in productivity across geographies could lead to the idea that
players from higher performing countries should be well positioned to export
their superior performance to players from lower performing countries. However,
many of the most spectacular recent cross-border moves have been initiated by
leading players from mid- to low performing geographies (Spain, Italy, France)
acquiring groups in higher performing environments (Germany, Benelux or the
UK). In other terms, cross-border consolidation is more often driven by a grand
vision and a cost cutting determination than by the certainty to generate tangible
operational improvement.
5.3. HOW FAST WILL BANKS BE ABLE TO TAP INTO THIS 
LARGE IMPROVEMENT POTENTIAL?
If the awareness of the existence of such a large improvement potential increases
rapidly amongst European financial institutions, capturing it will take the indus-
try a long time. The US car industry11 as a sector had started to realize in the early
1980s that Japanese manufacturers were operating at a very different level of
productivity. Despite intensive study and various forms of partnership, it took the
‘big three’ US manufacturers12 over 15 years until they were able to reach the
efficiency levels of the Japanese transplants in the US. Why is this?
The first difficulty is the granularity of the issue. In-depth operational transfor-
mations require detailed analysis and redesign at the level of individual processes.
Given the complexity of European universal banks, this often means covering
teams of no more than 50 to 80 people, with limited replication potential across
the organization. In other terms, to transform a large European bank, between
1000 and 2000 small (3-4 months) transformation initiatives have to be staffed,
launched, coordinated and steered.
The second difficulty is the availability of skills. To successfully lead an opera-
tional transformation that captures the available potential, it is necessary to rely
on transformation experts who are able to combine a deep understanding of
existing banking processes, mastery of the diagnostic and redesign toolkit, strong
communication, coaching and leadership skills and a hands-on pragmatic
11 See McKinsey & Company (2005).
12 General Motors, Ford and Chrysler.
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approach. While manufacturing has invested heavily in these profiles over the last
15 years, they remain quite rare in banks. Training such experts is possible but
requires approximately 6-8 months, alternating between classroom and field
work. Approximately 0.5 to 1% of employees need to be trained to be able to
sustain the scaling-up of such a transformation, which is equivalent to about 500
to 1,000 experts for a large institution.
Figure 12: It Took the ‘Big Three’ US Automotive Manufacturer 15 Years to Catch Up 
With the Efficiency of Japanese Transplants
Source: Harbour Report; Literature search; MGI.
The third reason is the lack of focus. In many areas of manufacturing, a price-cost
squeeze of 3-5% per year has been the norm for decades. Not so in banking:
periods of heavy profit pressure alternate with periods of rapid profit growth due
to exogenous factors such as interest rate levels and favorable shape of the yield
curve or various types of asset bubbles. Under such favorable circumstances, top
management loses the focus on operational improvement and re-orients efforts
towards growth and expansion, stalling operational transformation programs.
The granularity of the effort and the need to build skills often result in a lead time
of 2-3 years before the impact becomes material at the level of a large organiza-
tion. As the boom-and-bust cycles have been rather short over the last decade,
many interesting initiatives launched in 2002-2003 lost momentum before they
were able to fully blossom and are hard to re-launch at short notice.
As a consequence, it is unlikely that the industry as a whole will be able to capture
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these techniques and capture the benefits will have created a (rare) form of sus-
tainable competitive advantage for themselves and will have ‘earned the right’ to
further growth.
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6. INTEGRATION AND EFFICIENCY IN EU BANKING 
MARKETS
Barbara Casu and Claudia Girardone
ABSTRACT
The creation of the single market for financial services aimed at fostering integra-
tion through the creation of a ‘level playing-field’ in the provision of banking and
financial services across the European Union. Increased integration was in turn
expected to promote both competition and efficiency in EU banking markets. In
this context, evidence of financial integration and convergence are considered of
importance in assessing the outcome of EU deregulation policies. This paper eval-
uates the recent dynamics of bank cost efficiency in the EU-15 banking markets,
prior to the 2004 round of accessions (Fifth Enlargement). Further, to assess the
impact of integration on bank cost efficiency, we apply the concepts of β- and σ-
convergence with dynamic panel data models (GMM). Specifically, we test for
convergence both towards a common EU average efficiency level and towards the
best practice frontier. Results seem to provide supporting evidence of convergence
of efficiency levels towards an EU average. Nevertheless, there is no evidence of
an overall improvement of efficiency levels towards best practice.
6.1. INTRODUCTION
During the past two decades, the deregulation of financial services in the Euro-
pean Union (EU), together with the establishment of the Economic and Monetary
Union and the introduction of the euro, aimed at fostering integration through
the creation of a level-playing-field in the provision of banking services across the
EU. The plan was to remove entry barriers and to promote both competition and
efficiency in national banking markets. Indeed, in the calculation for gains from
European integration in financial services, it was assumed that banks in different
countries would become equally efficient with the removal of cross-border
restrictions (Altunbas and Chakravarty (1998)). It was also expected that dereg-
ulation-induced competition would foster efficiency by providing incentives to
managers to cut costs in order to remain profitable. EU regulators believe that a
well integrated financial system is necessary to increase the efficiency of the euro
area economy by reducing the cost of capital and improving the allocation of
financial resources (see ECB (2005)). As a consequence, it is important to monitor
and understand the process of financial market integration. In addition, as further
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integration is promoted at the EU level, it is also crucial to measure accurately the
state of integration in various segments of the single market.
In this context, an integrated financial market is defined as a market where par-
ticipants with the same relevant characteristics: (a) face a single set of rules; (b)
have equal access to financial instruments and/or services; and (c) are treated
equally when they are active in the market (Baele et al. (2004)). The above defi-
nition of financial integration is closely related to the law of one price, which
states that if assets have identical risks and returns, then they should be priced
identically regardless of where they are traded. Based on the law of one price it is
possible to derive measures of integration. For example, the cross-sectional dis-
persion of relevant variables (such as interest rate spreads or asset return differ-
entials) is often used as an indicator of integration. Recent studies of price con-
vergence include Martín-Oliver et al. (2005, 2007)); De Graeve et al. (2007);
Vajanne (2007); Gropp et al. (2007); Affinito and Farabullini (2006). The con-
cepts of β-convergence and σ-convergence can also be used to assess the speed at
which markets are integrating. In addition, measuring the degree of cross-border
price or yield variation relative to the variability within individual countries may
be informative with respect to the degree of integration in different markets1.
The literature investigating the degree of financial integration in the EU financial
markets (see, among others, Cabral et al. (2002); Hartmann et al. (2003); Baele
et al. (2004)) has employed different indicators of integration and focused on
different sectors of the markets (equity markets, bond markets, wholesale and
retail banking markets, etc.).
This study aims to contribute to the current debate by investigating the impact of
integration on the cost efficiency of EU banking markets. As our definition of
financial integration is closely related to the law of one price, this allows us to
examine the link between the dynamics of efficiency and financial integration.
The concept of price convergence implies that, in case of increased integration,
price differentials for the same financial asset should be either eliminated or
greatly reduced overtime. This should also apply to the factors of production.
Consequently, if factor input prices (i.e. the cost of capital, labour and deposits)
are converging across the European Union, so should banks’ cost structures,
reflected in a convergence of cost efficiency scores. On the other hand, if country
differences in observed cost efficiency levels remain (that is, if there is no evidence
of increased convergence), it would imply that the regulatory removal of cross
border restrictions alone was not sufficient to equalise the overall efficiency of EU
banking systems and that country specific structural differences remain relevant.
1 See Baele et al. (2004) for a review of different measures of financial market integration.
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While measuring convergence towards a European average efficiency level is rel-
evant in the context of the single market for financial services, measuring conver-
gence towards the best practice frontier (that is, the maximum attainable effi-
ciency) is even more interesting from a regulatory point of view. Increased inte-
gration is supposed to bring about improvements in cost efficiency via increased
competition (Guiso et al. (2004)). If the process of EU integration had a positive
impact on bank cost efficiency, this should result in an increased speed of conver-
gence towards best practice (i.e. an overall improvement of efficiency levels over
time).
In this study, we evaluate cost efficiency by means of Data Envelopment Analysis
(DEA) for the EU-15 countries prior to the latest round of accessions in 2004. To
assess the speed at which markets are integrating we employ the concepts of β-
convergence and σ-convergence and we apply a dynamic panel data analysis. We
specifically test for convergence both towards a common EU average efficiency
level and towards the best practice frontier.
Results seem to provide supporting evidence of convergence of efficiency levels
towards an EU average. Nevertheless, the results also indicate a decrease in per-
formance of the best practice banks, evidenced by a decrease in the overall effi-
ciency levels.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly illustrates
the main milestones towards the creation of a single EU market for financial serv-
ices. Section 3 reviews the main literature on integration and efficiency in bank-
ing. Section 4 discusses the results of our empirical analysis and Section 5 con-
cludes.
6.2. INTEGRATION IN THE EU FINANCIAL SERVICES 
SECTOR
Since the 1985 White Paper on the completion of the internal market in Europe2,
much has been done to remove barriers to the integration of financial and bank-
ing markets. Indeed the creation of a single market for financial services has long
been an objective of EU policymakers to achieve a ‘level playing field’ for banks,
insurance, securities and asset management companies. The single market was
expected to bring about enhanced economic and productivity growth across all
sectors, better quality financial products and lower costs for consumers and busi-
nesses.
2 The 1985 White paper set out a timetable for the measures required for the completion of the single market by
31 December 1992 at the latest.
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Despite the regulatory emphasis, the process of integration of financial services
has been slower than in other sectors due to national governments’ reluctance to
open up to foreign competition and to cede control of activities in their own
national markets, particularly in relation to monetary policy. In addition, as
stressed by Gual (2003) ensuring free trade and cross-border investments in a
traditionally heavily regulated industry, as is banking, is especially complex.
Nonetheless, in recent years significant progress has been made towards the lib-
eralisation, integration and harmonisation of laws and practices in the EU mem-
ber states. The developments in the context of the Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU) and the introduction of the single currency in 1999 have undoubtedly
acted as a catalyst for integration. In a recent White Paper on Financial Services
Policy (2005-2010), the European Commission (EC) has re-emphasised the need
to complete the single market in financial services, to achieve a “more dynamic,
innovative and attractive Europe”. Table 1 reports the main steps towards the
creation of a single market for financial services since the First Banking Directive
in 1977.
A significant milestone was the ratification of the 1989 Second Banking Co-ordi-
nation Directive which established EU-wide recognition of single banking ‘pass-
ports’ issued in any Member State as well as the principle of home-country super-
vision with minimum standards (including capital) at the EU level. The two prin-
ciples of single passport and mutual recognition (i.e. a system that allows licensed
banks to set up branches across states while being subject to each state’s rules and
regulations) still constitute the basis of the EC’s policies in the area of financial
services where the integration of banking markets is considered a core compo-
nent.
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Table 1: Main Steps Towards the Creation of a Single Market for Financial Services in 
the EU
Source: Adapted from Casu et al. (2006) and Casu and Girardone (2009).
Among the more recent policies, the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) repre-
sented an important vehicle for working towards the goal of greater integration.
The aims of the FSAP were to promote a more competitive and dynamic financial
services industry by establishing a single market in wholesale financial services;
making retail markets open and secure; and strengthening prudential rules.
Although the FSAP has been successfully completed, in 2005 the Commission
concluded that many barriers to cross-border integration and competition in
Europe remained. While global competition intensified, the EU financial services
industry still had “strong untapped economic and employment growth poten-
tial”. The White Paper on financial services policy that followed (2005-2010)
represents the EC’s current financial services strategy “to effectively deliver fur-
ther benefits of financial integration to industry and consumers alike”.
Although the integration of wholesale financial markets in the EU has progressed
relatively fast, there are still obstacles to the integration of retail financial services.
These remain segmented primarily on national lines thus calling into question the
competitive conditions of EU banking markets (ECB (2008); Casu and Girardone
(2009)).
Year Events and directives
1977 First Banking Directive 
1979 Launch of the European Monetary System (EMS)
1988 Basle Capital Adequacy Regulation
Deregulation of Capital Movements in the European Monetary System (EMS) 
1989 Second Banking Directive
Delors Report 
1993 Investment Services Directive 
1999 Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP)
Launch of the single currency (EURO)
2000 Directive on e-money 
2001 Directive on the Reorganisation and Winding-Up of Credit Institutions
Regulation on the European Company Statute 
2002 Establishment of the central banks’ large- value payment system (TARGET)
European Council decision to extend Lamfalussy procedure to entire financial sector
Establishment of the European Payments Council (EPC)
2004 New EU Takeover Directive
2005 White Paper on Financial Services Policy
2007 Capital Requirement Directive (Basle II)
Markets in Financial Instrument Directive (MiFID)
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The local features of retail markets, compared to money and bond markets, have
also been highlighted in the latest European Financial Integration Report (EC
(2009)). Specifically, the report found that heterogeneity still exists on prices,
available products and distribution channels; and legal and cultural factors still
represent obstacles to full integration. The report highlights the key role of the
successful implementation of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
(MiFID) and the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) to speed up the pace of finan-
cial integration in retail markets.
6.3. LITERATURE REVIEW
Several studies investigate the existence and implications of financial convergence
in Europe, especially in relation with the deregulation process, the creation of the
single market for financial services and the introduction of the euro. Convergence
in banking is often analysed by testing the time trends of a number of aggregate
and micro level indicators. Recent empirical evidence suggests that the sustained
legislative changes at the EU level have contributed towards the integration of
European banking and financial markets (Goddard et al. (2007)). There is some
evidence of integration in money, bond and equity markets (Emiris (2002); Hart-
mann et al. (2003); Baele et al. (2004); Manna (2004); Guiso et al. (2004); Cap-
piello et al. (2006)). There is also some indication of integration in wholesale
banking (Cabral et al. (2002)). However, most empirical evidence suggests that
significant barriers to the integration of retail banking markets still exist (Berger
et al. (2001)).
There is a vast literature on the measurement of cost structure and efficiency in
banking and on the determinants of efficiency (see the reviews by Goddard et al.
(2001, 2007); Berger (2007); Hughes and Mester (2008)). Efficiency is commonly
estimated by employing parametric methods (such as Stochastic Frontier Analy-
sis, SFA) or non-parametric methods, the most popular of which is Data Envel-
opment Analysis (DEA). The early bank efficiency literature shows that before
deregulation EU banking markets were often characterised by the presence of
many institutions operating at a non-optimal scale with relatively high excess
capacity. Inefficient banks could survive mainly because of the lack of competitive
pressures and the fact that, in some cases, the domestic authorities, while acting
as protectors of their banking sectors, were keen on maintaining a large number
of banks in their systems. With deregulation and higher competition, EU bank
efficiency improved, particularly over the late 1990s, as banks were under pres-
sure to cut costs (see, among others, Amel et al. (2004) and Casu et al. (2004)).
However, more recent studies show an overall decrease in bank efficiency (e.g.
Casu and Girardone (2006); Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2007)).
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Only a handful of studies directly address the issue of the relationship between
the integration and efficiency. Tortosa-Ausina (2002) examines the convergence
in efficiency of Spanish banks following deregulation through a model of distri-
bution dynamics and find evidence of decreased dispersion of efficiency scores at
the end of the deregulation period. Murinde et al. (2004) investigate the conver-
gence of the banking systems in Europe following the launch of the single market
programme in 1993. They find weak evidence of convergence and only for spe-
cific products. Finally, Weill (2008) attempts to provide evidence of financial inte-
gration by estimating the convergence of cost efficiency derived from the applica-
tion of SFA methodology. His results indicate an on-going process of convergence
at the EU level.
This study contributes to the existing literature by extending the analysis of finan-
cial sector integration to evaluate the recent dynamics of bank cost efficiency and
their convergence both towards a EU-wide frontier and towards best practice.
6.4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The following sections present the results of the analysis of the dynamics of cost
efficiency in the EU-15 banking sectors in the period 1997-2003. Our data set is
primarily drawn from BankScope and includes annual information for an unbal-
anced panel of 11,000 observations between 1997 and 2003. The choice of an
unbalanced panel is justified mainly to account for mergers and acquisitions dur-
ing the period. We use data from consolidated accounts, where available, to avoid
double-counting. The sample comprises commercial and savings banks operating
in the EU-15 area. We focus on these two banking categories as they comprise the
largest segment of depository institutions in all European banking markets. Fur-
ther, the services they offer are reasonably homogeneous and comparable across
countries. The time period 1997-2003 allows us to include the countries which
joined in the so-called Fourth Enlargement (Austria, Finland and Sweden joined
in 1995) but exclude the effects of the Fifth Enlargement in 20043, as there is not
sufficient data availability as yet. The data were analysed for inconsistencies,
reporting errors, missing values and outliers. The final sample is shown in Table
2, which lists the total and average number of banks in the sample by country and
year. From Table 2 it is possible to notice that Germany is by far the country with
the highest average and total number of banking institutions in our sample;
whereas Finland is the country that presents the lowest number of banks over the
period under study. However, as illustrated in Table 2, the average size of banks
tends to be relatively high for countries where the number of banks is low and
3 The Fifth Enlargement (Part I) occurred in May 2004, when Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia were admitted to the EU. The Fifth Enlargement (Part
II) occurred in January 2007, when Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU.
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vice versa. For example, the Netherlands have a relatively low average number of
banks over the period but the average size of Dutch banks is the highest in the
sample and more than 10 times higher than banks in Germany.
Table 2: Sample Used for the Empirical Analysis
Source: Bankscope.
6.4.1. Efficiency Results
The yearly DEA results for the countries in our sample, as well as the average
efficiency over the period are shown in Table 3.
Countries






Average size of banks 
(EUR m) 2003
Austria 101 706 6.4 4,509.07
Belgium 37 261 2.4 14,831.24
Denmark 84 590 5.4 40,951.35
Finland 8 53 0.5 22,431.03
France 150 1,047 9.5 24,475.70
Germany 686 4,805 43.7 6,092.81
Greece 14 98 0.9 11,675.19
Ireland 21 147 1.3 21,448.58
Italy 145 1017 9.2 10,873.20
Luxembourg 84 587 5.3 7,080.05
Netherlands 22 156 1.4 68,049.62
Portugal 17 121 1.1 16,236.84
Spain 100 703 6.4 15,036.03
Sweden 39 271 2.5 66,513.11
UK 63 438 4.0 42,280.57
EU-15 1,571 11,000 100 16,928.29
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Table 3: DEA Efficiency Scores by Year and Country (%)
The average overall efficiency score for the EU banking industry over the whole
sample period is 76.5%, indicating a 23.5% average potential reduction in inputs
utilisation. The results for the different EU countries in 2003, vary between
59.6% in Sweden and 80% in Portugal, with an average inefficiency score of
about 20%, a result that is in line with the main literature on bank efficiency (see
Berger (2007)). The yearly results seem to indicate, for most countries, an
improvement in input utilisation in the first years of the analysis and an increase
in input wastage from 2000-2001 onwards. This trend could be explained by the
initial effort towards cutting costs fostered by deregulation and increased compe-
tition; the wave of mergers and acquisitions that followed might have imposed
higher costs on banks, thereby decreasing their cost efficiency. However, it is nec-
essary to point out that our results are static estimates obtained from yearly DEA
frontiers, which allow for cross sectional comparisons, rather than considering
the changes over time.
Before empirically investigating the issue of convergence, we analyse the distribu-
tion, dispersion, range and trends of efficiency levels across European countries.
Figure 1 plots the standard deviation of the efficiency scores by year for all EU-
15 countries included in our sample. The figure indicates that the dispersion from
the average values has decreased considerably (p = 0.085) over the period thereby
suggesting a trend towards convergence across countries.
Countries 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Average
1997-2003
Austria 71.30 85.30 81.30 84.40 78.60 73.10 76.30 78.60
Belgium 76.40 74.00 77.10 75.50 74.50 71.20 67.10 73.70
Denmark 76.40 79.40 75.90 70.30 76.90 77.40 70.90 75.30
Finland 97.80 95.30 97.80 69.70 85.40 85.30 68.60 85.70
France 55.70 68.00 55.70 71.20 67.60 78.00 75.70 67.40
Germany 67.20 63.50 67.20 67.00 69.30 68.30 71.80 67.80
Greece 91.60 85.30 91.60 89.30 91.00 88.40 76.70 87.70
Ireland 79.90 91.10 79.90 83.80 79.80 78.50 75.30 81.20
Italy 62.40 66.30 62.40 74.20 79.60 66.50 69.10 68.60
Luxembourg 66.40 66.10 66.40 72.80 54.50 62.30 61.10 64.20
Netherlands 82.40 74.50 82.40 86.30 86.90 84.90 76.20 81.90
Portugal 85.40 85.50 85.40 88.30 90.40 93.50 80.00 86.90
Spain 84.30 75.80 84.30 82.30 80.30 69.80 78.60 79.30
Sweden 91.60 87.40 91.60 57.00 51.20 77.40 59.60 73.70
UK 77.00 79.60 77.00 77.30 66.90 73.20 73.40 74.90
EU-15 77.72 78.47 78.40 76.63 75.53 76.52 72.03 76.46
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Figure 1: Dispersion of Efficiency Scores (All Countries)
Figure 2 analyses EU banks efficiency range and trends over the period 1997-
2003. Panel (a) shows that the average efficiency scores across EU-15 countries
(± standard deviation) decreases over time (p = 0.023). Panel (b) illustrates the
range (highest average efficiency score – lowest average efficiency score across
EU-15 countries). It shows that while the lowest average efficiency scores each
year have remained fairly constant (p = 0.852), the highest average scores have
decreased significantly over time (p = 0.034). This trend is also picked up by the
decline in average efficiency levels towards the end of the period. On the one
hand, the findings illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 indicate that the efficiency scores
for the EU-15 banking sector have tended to converge towards a common aver-
age. On the other hand, this preliminary analysis seems to suggest that the gains
in increased integration have been offset by a worse performance on the part of
the best practice banks as shown by the decrease of the highest average efficiency
levels.
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Figure 2: EU-15 Efficiency Range and Trends over 1997-2003
Panel (a): average efficiency scores across EU-15 countries (± standard deviation).
Panel (b): range of average efficiency scores across EU-15 countries.
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6.4.2. Evaluating Convergence of EU Banking Sector 
Efficiency
Convergence is a widely used concept in economic theory and, despite the fact
that the meaning of the term is rather intuitive, there is neither a universally
accepted definition of convergence nor a single way to model it (see Baumol,
Nelson and Wolff (1994)). To investigate the convergence of bank efficiency lev-
els across the EU-15 countries over the period of analysis, we borrow the con-
cepts of β-convergence and σ-convergence from the growth literature (Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992 and 1995); Quah (1996))4. In our study, we adapt the
growth literature definition and we posit that there is β-convergence in a cross-
section of countries if there is a negative relation between the growth rate in aver-
age efficiency and the initial level of efficiency. On the other hand, there is σ-
convergence when the dispersion of efficiency scores across groups of countries
tends to fall over time.
To examine to what extent the econometric application confirms the preliminary
evidence discussed in Section 4.1, we evaluate therefore β-convergence and σ-
convergence for our cross-section of EU countries for the period 1997-2003. All
estimations are carried out by means of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Gen-
eralised Methods of Moments (GMM)5.
The first two columns in Table 4 report the results of the β-convergence and the
last two columns illustrate the σ-convergence. The β coefficient is always negative
and statistically significant, thus indicating that convergence in efficiency scores
has occurred across countries in the EU-15 area.
4 In the growth literature, there is β-convergence in a cross-section of economies if there is a negative relation
between the growth rate of income per capita and the initial level of income (Sala-i-Martin, 1996). ‘Uncondi-
tional β-convergence’ or ‘mean reversion’ is also often explained as the ‘catch-up’ effect. If poor economies grow
faster than rich ones, then poor countries will catch up with the rich ones over time in terms of per capita
income. ‘Conditional β-convergence’ instead relates to the negative relation between the growth rate of income
per capita and the initial level of income after holding some country-specific variables (for example, human
capital, propensity to save, etc.) constant. In other words, ‘conditional β-convergence’ relates to the negative
partial correlation between growth and income.
5 For methodological details refer to the Appendix and Casu and Girardone (2009).
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Table 4: Beta and Sigma Convergence
Note: OLS= Ordinary Least Squares; SYS-GMM= System GMM. *,**,*** indicates significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% levels. Asymptotic standard error in parentheses. ∆y is the change in the mean efficiency of country
i between t and t-1; ∆E is the difference between mean efficiency of country i at time t and the average efficiency
of the EU-15 countries at time t; β indicates the catch-up effect; σ indicates the speed of convergence and ρ is the
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable.
Two-step estimates are Windmeijeier corrected (Windmeijer (2005)). m1 and m2 are tests for first-order and
second-order serial correlation. Sargan/Hansen is a test of the over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estima-
tors.
Figure 3 shows the broad pattern of convergence of efficiency scores, indicating
a strong negative correlation (-0.883) between the growth rate of efficiency scores
over 1997-2003 to the log of the initial average efficiency in the base year (1997)
for the EU-15 countries. It shows that countries that displayed the lowest effi-
ciency values in 1997 improved faster, thereby providing preliminary evidence of










































m2 p-value 0.227 0.038
Sargan/Hansen 0.298 0.217
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Figure 3: Convergence of Efficiency Levels Across EU Banking Markets: 1997-2003a
a AT = Austria; BE = Belgium; DK  =  Denmark; FI  =  Finland; FR  =  France; DE  =  Germany; GR  =  Greece;
IE = Ireland;  IT = Italy;  LU = Luxembourg;  NL = Netherlands;  PT = Portugal;  ES = Spain;  SE=  Sweden;
UK = United Kingdom.
The last two columns in Table 4 report the results for the sigma convergence. In
our case sigma convergence indicates how quickly each country’s efficiency levels
( ) are converging to the EU average ( ). σ<0 represents the rate of conver-
gence of   towards  ; the larger is σ in absolute value, the faster the rate of
convergence. Results for all the estimations suggest an increase in the speed of
convergence as the σ coefficient is always negative and statistically significant.
The speed of adjustment towards the best practice frontier is evaluated by
employing a partial adjustment model (PAM). The assumption behind such
model is that if bank efficiency scores have improved over the period under obser-
vation, this should be reflected in a convergence towards best practice (efficiency
score equal to 1). Specifically, we regress the natural logarithm of the change in
efficiency levels on its lagged value, and on the interaction of the lagged value
with a dummy variable R, controlling for the introduction of the euro. The esti-
mated parameter on the interaction term (λ) is expected to offer information on
the difference in speed of convergence after the introduction of the single cur-
rency. The partial adjustment model is estimated by pooled OLS and the results
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Table 5: Convergence Towards Best Practice (Dependent variable: ∆y)
Note: *,**,*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Asymptotic standard error in parentheses.
∆y is the change in mean efficiency of country i between t and t-1; κ represents the persistence of inefficiency and
λ indicates the change in the speed of convergence after the introduction of the Euro.
In Table 5, κ represents the persistence of inefficiency and therefore a positive
value of κ indicates lack of convergence towards best practice. λ indicates the
change in the speed of convergence after the introduction of the Euro. A negative
value of λ suggests that the introduction of the Euro failed to foster increased
integration. The estimated coefficient of the one period lag of the change in effi-
ciency is κ for the period 1997-1999 and is κ + λ for the period 2000-2003. The
coefficient κ is positive and significant (at 1% level) therefore indicating a persist-
ence of inefficiency. In other words, there is no evidence of convergence of effi-
ciency levels towards best practice. The coefficient λ, on the other hand, although
positive is not statistically significant, thus indicating that the introduction of the
single currency had no effect towards increasing convergence and improving effi-
ciency levels across EU countries. These findings support the preliminary graphi-
cal evidence reported in Section 4.1.
This latter part of the analysis has highlighted that convergence towards a com-
mon EU-15 average does not necessarily imply improvement of efficiency levels
across Europe. On the contrary, while our results seem to provide supporting
evidence of convergence of efficiency levels towards an EU average, they do not
indicate efficiency gains. Therefore, it appears that the potential gains brought
about by increased integration have been offset by a decrease in the overall effi-
ciency levels. Whereas a well integrated and well functioning financial system is
necessary to increase the integration of the euro area economy, it is important to
monitor and understand the process of financial integration in various segments
of the single market. While it is generally agreed that deepening financial integra-
tion is beneficial on the whole, it might also have negative effects. For example,
integration in a particular market segment might lead to a high degree of consol-
idation which might hinder competition and efficiency.
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6.5. CONCLUSION
It is a commonly held belief among EU regulators that a well integrated financial
system is necessary to increase the efficiency of the euro area economy. In the
overall calculation of potential gains from European integration in the financial
services, it is often assumed that banks in different countries will become equally
efficient with the removal of cross-border restrictions.
This paper provides evidence on the dynamics of cost efficiency in the EU-15
banking sectors in the period 1997-2003, prior to the latest round of accession.
Cost efficiency is evaluated by means of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). The
yearly results seem to indicate, for most countries, an improvement in input uti-
lisation in the first years of the analysis and an increase in input wastage from
2000-2001 onwards. To assess the direction and speed of banking markets’ inte-
gration, we apply dynamic panel data models to the concepts of β-convergence
and σ-convergence. While measuring convergence towards a European average is
important, measuring convergence towards best practice is even more interesting
from a regulatory point of view. Indeed, convergence towards a common EU-15
average does not necessarily imply improvement of efficiency levels across
Europe. Results seem to provide supporting evidence of convergence of efficiency
levels towards an EU average. Nevertheless, the potential gains brought about by
increased integration have been offset by a decrease in the overall efficiency levels.
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6.7. METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX
6.7.1. Evaluating Bank Efficiency Using Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA)
DEA is a mathematical linear programming technique developed by Charnes,
Cooper and Rhodes in 1978 (CCR) which identifies the efficient frontier from the
linear combination of those units/observations that (in a production space) use
comparatively less inputs to produce comparatively more outputs. The CCR
model assumes constant returns to scale (CRS), which is the optimal scale in the
long-run. Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) (or BCC model) include an addi-
tional convexity constraint (λ) to allow for variable returns to scale (VRS). The
BCC model is used in this paper since several factors such as imperfect competi-
tion and regulatory requirements may cause a unit not to be operating at the
optimal scale6.
In particular, if at any time t there are N firms that use a vector of inputs
 to produce a vector of outputs  , the input-
oriented BCC measure of efficiency of a particular firm is calculated as:
s.t.
(A1)
where   is the scalar efficiency score for the i-th unit. If   the i-th firm
is efficient as it lies on the frontier, whereas if  the firm is inefficient and
needs a ( ) reduction in the inputs levels to reach the frontier.
In this study, we measure inefficiency with an input-minimisation orientation.
The measure of input efficiency reflects the extent to which the input levels of the
unit concerned can be lowered through improved performance and no output
reduction, while maintaining its input mix (Thanassoulis (2001)). Loosely fol-
6 For an introduction to DEA methodology see, among others, Thanassoulis (2001); Coelli et al. (2005). See
Thanassoulis et al. (2008) for an extensive review of this literature.
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lowing the intermediation approach (Sealey and Lindley (1977)) the input varia-
ble used in this study is total costs (i.e. the sum of personnel expenses, other
administrative Expenses, interest paid and non-interest expenses) whereas the
output variables capture both the traditional lending activity of banks (total
loans) and the growing non-lending activities (other earning assets).
6.7.2. Modelling Convergence
To investigate the convergence of bank efficiency levels across the EU-15 coun-
tries over the period of analysis, we employ the concepts of β-convergence and σ-
convergence (Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992 and 1995); Quah (1996)).
To estimate unconditional β-convergence or ‘catch-up effect’, we employ the fol-
lowing equation:
(A2)
where i = 1,…15 and t = 1,…7;   = the mean efficiency of the banking sector
of country i at time t;
= the mean efficiency of the banking sector of country i at time t–1 ;
; α, β and ρ are the parameters to be estimated and εi,t =
error term. A negative value for the parameter β implies convergence; the highest
the coefficient in relative terms the greater the tendency for convergence. The β-
convergence equations are estimated by pooled OLS regression and Generalised
Method of Moments (GMM) to introduce dynamic behaviour in the time series
and cross-sectional variation (Blundell and Bond (1998))7.
To estimate cross sectional dispersion or σ-convergence, that is to estimate how
quickly each county’s efficiency levels are converging to the European average, we
adopt the following autoregressive distributed lag model specification8:
(A3)
where  ;  ;   = the mean effi-
ciency of the banking sector of country i at time t;   = the mean efficiency of
the banking sector of country i at time t–1 ;   the mean efficiency of the EU-15
banking sectors at time t;   the mean efficiency of the EU-15 banking sectors
at time t–1 ; α, σ and ρ are parameters to be calculated and εi,t is the error term.
σ < 0 represents the rate of convergence of   towards  ; the larger is σ in
absolute value, the faster the rate of convergence.
7 See for more details Casu and Girardone (2009).
8 Similar specifications have been estimated, among others, by Fung (2006), Parikh and Shibata (2004) and Weill
(2008).
yit , ∆α β ln yit 1 – , () ρ yit 1 – , ∆ε it , ++ + =
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Since the ‘optimal’ or ‘desired’ level of y (i.e. the maximum attainable efficiency
score ymax) is known, we evaluate the convergence of efficiency levels towards
best practice by specifying a partial adjustment model as follows:
(A4)
where:   = the efficiency of country i at time t;   = the efficiency of country
i at time t–1 ;   = maximum attainable efficiency, i.e. unity (and therefore
zero when taking logs).   is the error term and R is a dummy to indicate the
introduction of the Euro as the single currency of 12 of the 15 countries. R takes
value 0 for until 1998 and value 1 after 1999.   = the adjustment parameter. It
measures the speed of adjustment towards the best practice frontier (i.e. towards
an efficiency score of one) with  .   = the interaction term between R
and  . It allows for a change in the speed of adjustment after the
introduction of the Euro ( ). A significant positive   would imply
a faster adjustment towards best practice after 1999, when the exchange rate
between member States’ currencies and the euro was fixed. Rearranging equation
(A4)
(A5)
Let’s substitute   and  ; thus we can re-write equation (A5) as:
(A6)
 measures the persistence of   into  . In other words, it signifies
lack of convergence towards best practice. A significantly negative value for  ,
corresponding to a significantly positive  , would suggest an increase in the speed
of convergence of efficiency levels toward best practice after the introduction of
the euro. Equation (A6) is estimated by pooled OLS.
lnyit , lnyit 1 – , – () γ lnymax lnyit 1 – , – () δ R lnymax lnyit 1 – , – () ε it ++ =
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0 γδ T + 1 << δ T
lnyit , 1 γ – () lnyit 1 – , () δ R lnyit 1 – , () ε it + – =
κ 1 γ – () = λδ – =
lnyit , κ lnyit 1 – , () λ R lnyit 1 – , () ε it + – =
κ 1 γ – () = yit 1 – yit
λ
δ
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7. MEASURING THE OUTPUT OF THE BANKING 
SECTOR: SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CURRENT 
EUROPEAN METHODOLOGY AND NEW 
PERSPECTIVES1
Antonio Colangelo2 and Robert Inklaar3
ABSTRACT
Banks do not charge explicit fees for many of the services they provide. Instead,
the payment for the services is usually bundled with the interest rates charged on
loans and paid on deposits. To derive statistics on this ‘indirectly measurable’
banking sector output, European countries have implemented the methodology
set up in 1995 ESA. This methodology compares bank interest rates to a reference
rate to estimate the associated service flow. In this paper we argue for a modified
approach that is more consistent with economic theory. Rather than using a single
short-term risk-free rate as a reference rate, we propose choosing a reference rate
that more closely matches the risk characteristics of the loans and deposits and its
term structure. We apply this approach to positions of euro area households and
non-financial corporations; the resulting banking sector output is 31 to 47 per-
cent lower than the output derived according to the current methodology. In
terms of deliveries to final demand this implies, on the average, an overestimation
between € 16.1 bn and € 20.4 bn or 0.20 to 0.25 percent of euro area GDP.
7.1. INTRODUCTION
Banks do not charge explicit fees for many of the services they provide. For
instance, the payment for the services provided to the customers on loans and
deposits is usually bundled with the interest rates charged or paid. In other words,
when granting loans banks usually provide services to their customers throughout
the duration of the contract; these services take the form of financial advice,
screening credit worthiness, monitoring the performance of the loan, re-bargain-
ing the contract conditions and are usually charged not by means of fees but
implicitly by setting an interest rate which is higher than a ‘fair’ reference interest
rate. Similarly, on deposits banks’ services taking the form of bookkeeping and
1 The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of
the European Central Bank. The work has benefited from useful comments and suggestions by Henning Ahnert,
Jean-Marc Israël, Steven Keuning, Reimund Mink and Christina Wang.
2 Antonio.Colangelo@ecb.int.
3 R.C.Inklaar@rug.nl.
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payment facilities are charged by offering the depositors interest rates which are
lower than a ‘fair’ reference interest rate.
Any complete measure of bank output should take this into account by estimating
what part of bank interest rates is a payment for services and what part is the cost
of funds, reflected by the appropriate reference rate.
Under the statistical framework set up by the European system of national and
regional accounts (1995 ESA), EU countries have implemented a common meth-
odology to compile imputed banking sector output, which is referred to as finan-
cial intermediation services indirectly measured (FISIM)4. Under this approach,
FISIM are compiled on all loans and deposits vis-à-vis non-financial sectors (and
insurance corporations and pension funds). The estimates are derived by compar-
ing bank interest rates to a single reference rate of interest representing “the pure
cost of borrowing funds – that is a rate from which the risk premium has been
eliminated to the greatest extent possible and which does not include any inter-
mediation service”5. In practice, the inter-bank rate is used for all loans and
deposits, without distinction by type and maturity of the instrument. As a result,
the compensation for bearing credit default risk and the term premium is treated
as a productive service and thus becomes part of financial services6.
In this paper7, we argue against this approach as economic theory suggests that
bank interest rates should be compared to the yield on market securities with the
similar risk and term characteristics to appropriately reflect into bank output the
actual services provided to the customers8. This argument will be spelled out
more fully, but a simple example illustrates the inconsistency of the current
approach. Consider two firms with similar characteristics that need to borrow to
finance their operations. The first firm borrows from the financial markets and
pays the market interest rate. The second firm borrows from a bank and pays the
interest rate charged by the bank. Under the current approach, the second firm is
assumed to pay only the inter-bank rate, while the remainder of the payment,
including the term spread and the default risk premium, is considered bank out-
put. Under our proposed approach, both firms face the same cost of funds, and
only the payments in excess of this market rate by the second firm are bank out-
put.
4 In particular, 1995 ESA includes other monetary financial institutions (oMFIs) and other financial inter-
mediaries (OFIs) among the FISIM producing sectors. The results presented in this paper are limited to oMFIs’
output as a fully consistent and detailed set of statistics on OFIs is currently not available at the ECB for all euro
area countries. For a formal definition of financial corporations and related subclassifications, see Paragraph
2.32 to 2.67 of 1995 ESA.
5 See 1993 SNA, par. 6.128.
6 In general, par. 1.20 of 1993 SNA defines an activity to be part of production when “labour and assets are used
to transform inputs of goods and services into outputs of other goods and services”.
7 This paper concentrates on estimates of output at current prices only. For details on the methodology for FISIM
volume measures, see Eurostat’s Handbook on price and volume measures in national accounts, (2001), and
also Basu and Wang (2006) and Inklaar and Wang (2007).
8 For a formal dynamic general equilibrium model that makes this argument, see Wang et al. (2004).
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Apart from theoretical reasons for a modified approach, there are also practical
concerns about the current methodology. Including the compensation for risk-
bearing as bank output can lead to changes in output that are unrelated to
changes in input and technology: particularly during periods of financial distress,
this leads to undesirable volatility in output estimates. More in general, banking
sector output will be positively correlated with the yield premium: a steeper yield
curve increases the imputed service margin even without any changes to bank
inputs or technology. Euro area FISIM under the current framework has been
fairly stable since 2003 (despite rising loan and deposit balances) mainly because
of a flattening yield curve, less so, if at all, because (risk-adjusted) interest margins
have decreased reflecting improvements in banking productivity, for example. In
contrast, risk-adjusted interest margins have been rather stable over the period
and FISIM has been rising broadly in line with loan and deposit balances9. Over-
all, risk-adjusted margins seem to better reflect the expected developments in
imputed banking sector output for the periods under analysis. Finally, we argue
that comparing current financial market rates to interest rates on outstanding
amounts of loans and deposits is not appropriate. First, rates on outstanding
amounts are weighted averages of rates on current and past loans and if anything,
should be compared with a weighted average of current and past financial market
rates. In addition, rates on outstanding amounts are not categorised according to
periods of rate fixation but if a loan with long original maturity has rates which
are renegotiated on an annual basis it would be more appropriate to compare the
interest rate on this loan to the yield on a bond with a time to maturity of one
year rather than according to the original maturity. Given these considerations,
we rely on interest rates for new business.
We apply our proposed modified approach to the euro area, estimating monthly
banking sector output on deposits and loans vis-à-vis euro area households and
non-financial corporations for the period January 2003 to June 200810. We
choose this period because of the availability of detailed interest rate and balance
sheet data that are consistent for all euro area banks regarding these two sectors.
This allows us to distinguish between several different types of loans and depos-
its, further broken down by maturity and by sector of the borrower and holder
respectively. In our results, we distinguish between two scenarios, one where the
reference rate only takes into account the maturity of the loan and another where
it also takes the default risk premium into account. Under the first scenario, euro
area banking sector output vis-à-vis domestic households and non-financial cor-
porations is on average 31 percent lower than under the current approach, while
the second scenario leads to banking sector output that is 47 percent lower.
9 In particular, margins have been stable even after the financial turmoil in the second half of 2007 and until
March 2008.
10 Similar research has already been done for the United States in Basu et al. (2009).
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It is very important to have an accurate and appropriate measure for FISIM not
only because it is part of overall bank output (in addition to fees and commis-
sions) but also because it contributes to GDP insofar as banks serve households,
government or foreign demand. Additionally, the interest margin is part of the
price of bank output, so how this price is measured will affect producer and con-
sumer prices. In particular, our results imply that GDP, the total value of goods
and services delivered to final demand, is overestimated between € 16.1 bn and
€ 20.4 bn or 0.20 to 0.25 percent of euro area GDP11. Second, the cost of living
according to the current interest margins would have increased at a slower pace
than suggested by our interest margins.
The paper is organised as follows. Section two describes the current treatment of
FISIM in European statistical standards and presents, also by means of numerical
evidence, some of the shortcomings of this approach. Section three deals with the
enhanced methodology on FISIM describing both its conceptual framework and
the underlying empirical set-up; in particular, the data on interest rates and bonds
that we use for the derivation of the various interest margins for households and
non-financial corporations is discussed in detail. The estimates resulting from the
new methodology are presented in section four for the euro area12 as a whole and
compared to FISIM derived according to the current European methodology13.
Finally, we offer some concluding remarks14.
7.2. FISIM AS RECOMMENDED IN EUROPEAN STATISTICAL 
STANDARDS
FISIM are the financial services that financial intermediaries provide to their cus-
tomers but which are not directly invoiced. For depositors, these services gener-
ally include the management of the accounts, the provision of accounts state-
ments and occasional fund transfers between the accounts. Instead of directly
invoicing the services, financial institutions reduce the interest paid to depositors.
Hence, this interest is typically lower than what customers could have obtained
by lending their money directly on the market. For borrowers, these financial
services include financial advice, screening credit worthiness, monitoring the per-
formance of the loan, re-bargaining the contract conditions, smoothing over time
11 As this paper focuses on FISIM estimates for households and non-financial corporations only, the estimates on
GDP correction do not reflect the impact of the new methodology for government and foreign demand. See
Section 7.4.3. for further details.
12 All estimates in the paper refer to the moving composition of the euro area, i.e. data prior to January 2007 do
not include Slovenia and similarly, data prior to January 2008 do not include Cyprus and Malta.
13 The FISIM estimates presented in this paper according to the methodology laid down in the Council Regulation
(EC) No. 2223/93 of 25 June 1996 on the European System of National and Regional Accounts in the Commu-
nity (1995 ESA), amended by Council Regulations (EC) 448/98 and 1889/2002, are not based on national
official statistics but have been derived by the ECB simulating this methodology.
14 The Annex presents detailed results for the new methodology compared to the current framework.
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of repayments and the recording of the repayments for accounting purposes.
They are paid by an increase of the interest rates charged by banks.
Paragraph 3.63.J of 1995 ESA outlines the principles underlying FISIM compila-
tion15. It states that in general financial intermediation services cover two parts:
(a) financial intermediation services directly charged by financial intermediaries
to their clients and measured as the sum of fees and commission charged; and (b)
FISIM.
Financial intermediaries provide FISIM by paying lower rates of interest to those
who lend them money and charge higher rates of interest to those who borrow
from them. Consequently, FISIM output is generated by financial intermediaries
when managing loans and deposits whose rates they control. In contrast, there is
no intermediation service for debt securities: to the extent that a bank was
involved in issuing or placing these securities, they will have received an upfront
fee and to the extent that they bought these in the secondary market, they have
not provided services.
The 1995 ESA identifies oMFIs and OFIs as FISIM-producer sectors16. Their out-
put is valued on the basis of the difference between the actual rates of interest
payable and receivable on loans and deposits vis-à-vis other sectors (including the
rest of the world) and a ‘reference’ rate of interest. For those to whom the inter-
mediaries lend funds, both resident and non-resident, it is measured by the differ-
ence between the effective interest charged on loans and the amount that would
be paid if a reference rate were used. For those from whom the intermediaries
receive funds (under the form of deposits), both resident and non-resident, it is
measured by the difference between the interest they would receive if a reference
rate were used and the effective interest they actually receive.
In turn, the reference rate is defined as the average interest rate at which FISIM-
producer sectors lend money to each other17. In particular, the 1995 ESA distin-
guishes between an internal reference rate, to be used for transactions among
residents, and an external reference rate, to be used for the business between
residents and the rest of the world, with the possibility of compiling different
external reference rates according to currencies of denomination and counterpart
areas.
15 In the context of FISIM measurement 1995 ESA is fully consistent with the general framework set up in 1993
SNA.
16 Hence, under 1995 ESA insurance corporations and pension funds are not identified as producers of FISIM.
While this treatment is not questioned in this paper, it could offer interesting perspectives for future research.
17 The positions vis-à-vis the central banks are excluded from this computation. As financial intermediaries
include banks and OFIs, it can happen that the reference rate may diverge from the average inter-bank rate
depending on the relative size of OFIs. It should also be stressed that when computing reference rates at national
level, the average inter-bank rates may also differ due to the currency and maturity composition of the market.
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The current approach has various shortcomings. Essentially, the method does not
appropriately capture the differences between the various types of loans and
deposits: for instance, whereas the inter-bank business is mainly short term with
low default risk premium, deposits and loans from/to other sectors may have a
completely different maturity structure with sometimes high default risk. In sum-
mary, within the current methodological framework compensation for term pre-
mium and default risk is treated as productive service and leads in many instances
to negative FISIM, both at the sectoral level and in the rest-of-the-world
account18. In the sequel of this paper we will show that the new proposed meth-
odology for FISIM compilation does not suffer of these shortcomings.
To see how these drawbacks of the current methodological framework may affect
FISIM estimates in practice, we now present two examples where negative mar-
gins may arise from mismatches between risk and maturity structure of specific
instruments and the reference rate.
Figure 1: Deposits with an Agreed Maturity above Two Years Placed by Euro Area 
Non-financial Corporations with German oMFIs (p.p.), 2003:1-2008:6
Sources: ECB (MIR interest rates and internal calculations).
Notes: (Internal) reference rate for Germany obtained simulating the 1995 ESA methodology. Implied FISIM
margin derived as the difference between the interest rate on outstanding amounts and the reference rate.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of interest rates19 on outstanding amounts and new
business volumes of deposits with an agreed maturity above two years placed by
euro area non-financial corporations with German oMFIs20 and compares them
18 For a more in depth analysis of the issue of negative FISIM on imports and exports see S. Fonte Santa (2007).
19 Interest rates compiled by the ECB in the context of MFI interest rate statistics. See Section 7.3.2. for a detailed
discussion of the data available in this context.
20 Over the period between January 2003 and June 2008, these deposits have accounted, on the average, for about
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to the estimated (internal) reference rate calculated for Germany in the ECB sim-
ulation of the 1995 ESA methodology. Interest margins implied by the current
official European FISIM methodology are negative for all periods under analysis
mainly reflecting two factors. First, new business rates lay below the interest rates
on outstanding amounts for periods up to mid-2006, as many outstanding depos-
its had more favourable rates than the new ones, perhaps because they were
opened when interest rates were higher and continue to yield fixed earnings. This
seems to explain the big negative margins observed over this period. Second, the
term premium plays a role and its impact is especially visible in the spread
between interest rates on new business over the reference rate, which is much
higher in periods up to end-2005 characterised by a step yield curve and then
decreases to more stable values. We will show that in this case the enhanced meth-
odology will represent a more suitable framework for the derivation of interest
margins and that the resulting estimates will be easier to interpret.
Figure 2 displays the evolution of interest rates on short term loans provided by
Spanish oMFIs to euro area non-financial corporations21 and compares it to the
estimated Spanish internal reference rate.
Figure 2: Loans with Maturity Below One Year Provided by Spanish oMFIs to Euro 
Area Non-financial Corporations (p.p.), 2003:1-2008:6
Sources: ECB (MIR interest rates and internal calculations), Merrill Lynch (Corporate Bonds).
Notes: (Internal) reference rate for Spain obtained simulating the 1995 ESA methodology. Margins derived as
the difference between the interest rate on outstanding amounts and the Spanish reference rate (Interest mar-
gin 1995 ESA) and the Euribor six-month (Interest margin on Euribor six-month) respectively. Bond spread
represents the difference between the Merryl-Lynch bond index for euro area non-financial corporation bonds
with a remaining maturity between 1 and 5 years and the euro area government bond index for residual matu-
rity 3 years.
21 Over the period between January 2003 and June 2008, these loans have accounted, on the average, for about
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FISIM margins obtained in accordance to 1995 ESA show a decreasing path for
period up to end-2005, and then increase steadily for the following periods. Two
observations stand out in this case. First the maturity mismatch between the
instruments in the category and the reference rate (which is mainly affected by
very short term inter-bank rates) does play a role: for periods as from end 2005,
the Euribor six-months started diverging from the reference rate reflecting the
expectation of higher future interest rates thus suggesting that a maturity adjust-
ment for this category of loans might be needed. In addition, it is worth reflecting
on the evolution of the risk premium. In view of the lack of bond indices for
Spanish non-financial corporations, the proxy used is the spread between the cor-
porate bond index for euro area non-financial corporations and the relevant gov-
ernment bond index. The spread shows that the risk premium perceived by the
market for euro are non-financial corporations has varied over time, with a
prominent decrease between 2003 and 2005, followed by a period of stability up
to July 2007 and a sharp increase after the start of the financial turmoil. In sum-
mary, the combination of these two factors explains the evolution of the margins
derived under the 1995 ESA methodology.
7.3. THE NEW METHODOLOGY
7.3.1. The Conceptual Framework
A measure of bank output cannot be estimated without a description of the
financial services that customers buy. This is also the starting point of the model
developed in Wang et al (2004) and this section is based on their arguments. For
a depositor’s overnight account, banks provide ready access to funds and pro-
vide payment services in the form of electronic money transfers or checks, while
on other deposits the transaction services are usually fewer. Bank services to
borrowers mostly consist of screening credit worthiness and monitoring the loan
performance during the duration of the contract. This is a stylized description of
a bank, but it covers the main features from the perspective of bank customers.
We would argue that institutional risk management, ensuring that a bank can
satisfy all its obligations, is part of the production process. Ceteris paribus, how
well a bank manages risk will only be relevant insofar as more extensive risk
management would increase overall costs of bank services and hence prices
charged to clients, with the other side of the equation that inadequate risk
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management could lead to bankruptcy and resulting in losses or disruption to
clients22.
Given this set-up, we can ask the question what a bank would charge for these
services. The argument for the depositor is most straightforward. Given that all
European countries have a system of deposit insurance (see Gropp and Vesala
(2004)), the alternative to hold money in a deposit account is (ideally) buying a
risk-free security, like a (high-rated) government bond23. By holding money in a
deposit account, the depositor foregoes the interest on another risk-free invest-
ment so the value of the services received must equal the foregone interest24.
In an equation, this becomes:
(1)
where YD is the value of output associated with deposit type D, rD is the interest
rate paid on that type of deposit (which could be zero), rF is the short-term risk-
free rate, rT is the term premium, SD is the account balance and mD represents the
corresponding interest margin applied by the bank. In particular, the term pre-
mium rT reflects investors’ assumptions about future interest rates and includes a
(liquidity) premium for holding long-term instruments, compensating investors
for the added risk of having their money tied up for a longer period, including the
greater price and interest rate uncertainty25.
The logic is similar for loans, except that loans are generally risky. As assets in
financial markets require a rate of return that exceeds the risk-free rate, so should
bank loans26. Imagine a firm that has the choice between borrowing from a bank
and issuing bonds in the financial markets. The bank’s interest rate will likely be
22 Default risk management can be viewed as an insurance contract where the lender, acting as a guarantor, charges
a premium (default risk premium) to the borrower in exchange of the risk of his potential default; this premium
can thus be viewed as the expected loss of the loan. See also the section on loan guarantees in chapter 17 of the
2008 SNA. Drawing a parallel with the methodology in use to derive the output of non-life insurance corpora-
tions, or specifically, of credit insurance institutions may be of some interest in this context. In this case, output
is derived as the difference between the collected premiums minus the payments or the calls under the guaran-
tees. This would then argue in favour of the default risk correction, under the recognition that for insurance
corporations the correction is done ex-post (discount of ‘realised’ defaults) while in the context of FISIM compi-
lation it would be performed ex-ante (discount of ‘expected’ defaults). On the other hand, the risk assessment
is clearly a productive activity that should be incorporated in FISIM; see also Keuning (2008).
23 It should be underlined that before the financial turmoil in August 2007 perceived risk on the interbank market,
measured as the difference between unsecured and secured interbank lending rates, was rather minimal. Besides
deposit insurance this may then argue in favour of limited risk premiums on banks’ deposits. Since the start of
the financial market turbulence the spreads between secured and unsecured interbank lending rates have
widened considerably, and they have been passed through on deposits rates to a large extent. While this may
justify the consideration that deposits are less secured than before, the impact on total FISIM calculation should
be minimal as unsecured interbank lending rates are used as reference rates for most deposit categories
(accounting, on the average, for about 90% of total deposits placed with oMFIs by households and non-finan-
cial corporations) thus guaranteeing that risk premiums are adequately reflected even in this case.
24 This is the user cost of money; see Barnett (1978).
25 The financial literature refers to the liquidity premium as the term premium and the sum of the two components
as the term spread; with some abuse of terminology in this paper we will use the two expressions as synony-
mous.
26 Note that the Wang et al. (2004) theory implies that, just as in financial markets, only the systematic risk should
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as high as the expected return on the bond and, in addition, the bank will charge
for the services provided. In other words, to estimate the value of services pro-
vided to a borrower, the interest rate on the loan should be compared to the yield
on a market security with the same risk characteristics:
(2)
where YL is the value of output associated with loan type L, rL is the interest rate
charged on that type of loan and rM is the yield on the corresponding market
security, which is the sum of the risk-free rate, the term premium and the default
risk premium rP, SL is the amount of the loan and mL represents the corresponding
interest margin applied by the bank27. Note that in general there is no theoretical
need to be specific about the factors that make up the market interest rate rM.
Financial asset pricing predicts that all systematic (non-diversifiable) risk will be
reflected in rM. In practice of course, the only way to match bank loans to market
securities is to select a few key characteristics for determining the ‘most compa-
rable’ market security and in this paper we have decided to focus on the default
risk premium and term premium.
To illustrate the differences between the current approach and the proposed
methodology, it is useful to distinguish the term premium and default risk pre-
mium. Currently, a weighted average of inter-bank interest rates is used as the
single reference rate for all deposits and loans. The inter-bank market covers
loans up to one year, so fairly short maturities and (fairly) default risk-free. Loans
and deposits can also be for longer maturities, so the term premium is one factor
we take into account. The default risk premium on loans is the other main factor.
In our application to the euro area, we will propose frameworks to adjust for the
term premium only and for the two factors together.
7.3.2. The Empirical Set Up28
The methodology developed in this paper is confined to the estimation of banking
sector output on positions vis-à-vis households and non-financial corporations29.
27 As a simplification, the expected default rate on loans and the market security is assumed to be equal. Even then,
to be precise, this equation only holds for instantaneous returns under continuous compounding.
28 Although the paper is mainly focused on the derivation of FISIM estimates for the euro area as a whole, the
empirical set-up of the methodology could easily be replicated at national level.
29 Loans and deposits of non-financial corporations and households are the main part of bank business in the euro
area representing over the period under analysis about 80 percent of total loans and deposits positions involving
non financial counterparties. Loans and deposits of other domestic sectors, i.e. the government, insurance
companies and pension funds, represent another 11 percent, while loans and deposits from the rest of the world
make up the remaining 9 percent. Little is known about these loans and deposits except their overall size;
especially data on corresponding interest rates is not available. For this reason we leave those sectors out of the
scope of this paper although some reasonable estimates could be derived on the basis of work assumptions.
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The proposed approach is mainly based on the use of MFI interest rate (MIR)
statistics30. These statistics provide (on a monthly basis and for periods as from
2003) a harmonised and comprehensive coverage of the interest rates applied by
euro area credit institutions to resident households and non-financial corpora-
tions on euro denominated loans and deposits. These data are available and con-
sistent both at national and euro area level, and distinguish between the interest
rate on new business, i.e. newly negotiated interest rates during the period, and
rates on outstanding amounts. In addition, detailed breakdowns on deposits are
provided both by maturity and by instrument, while for loans the data are broken
down by maturity/period of fixation and additionally, in the case of households,
by purpose of the loan, i.e. consumer credit, loans for house purchases and other
credit. While the current approach implicitly relies on MIR rates on outstanding
amounts, the methodology developed in this paper uses statistics on new busi-
ness. Section 7.3.3. below will discuss some methodological aspects underlying
this approach.
As described above, another feature of the current approach is the use of the inter-
bank rate as the reference rate to evaluate interest margins. The first proposed
improvement is to take into account the maturity structure of loans and deposits
based on the general government bond yield curve and, for short maturities, the
Euribor rates; in this paper we use the euro area government bond yield curve
derived by Thomsom Financial Datastream based on AAA government bonds
issued in the euro area31. Appendix Table A1 describes in detail which rate was
applied to each category of loans and deposits for households and non-financial
corporations under this approach32. In particular, some of the maturity and fixa-
tion period categories of these deposits and loans are straightforward to match,
such as approximating the one to five year band with a three-year government
bond33. The open-ended maturity and fixation period categories, such as more
than two years or more than five years require more judgement. Overall though,
the results are not very sensitive to the exact choices we make in this regard.
30 The requirements for MIR statistics are laid down in Regulation ECB/2001/18. Most EU countries non-partic-
ipating to the monetary union are also compiling MIR statistics complying with the standards required by the
MIR Regulation.
31 The choice of this index also overcomes the problems related to the increased sovereign risk component in the
yields of government debt securities which has affected several euro area countries starting from the third
quarter of 2008.
32 An alternative approach would be to rely on the interest swap yield curve. Although this could offer interesting
perspectives as swap rates reflect banks’ refinancing costs, it does not fully respect the theoretical framework
suggested in this paper: while reference rates should include only the term premium, risk components in swap
rates (mainly counterparty risk) are rather high and if historically their spreads on government bonds (the so-
called swap spreads) were about 35 bp up to August 2007, these have increased considerably after the start of
the turmoil.
33 The government bond yields are based on (notional) zero-coupon bonds, so the duration of these bonds is equal
to its maturity. Most bank loans will have regular interest payments, so the duration of those loans will be
smaller than their maturity. For most maturities, this distortion is likely to be small. Assuming annual interest
payments of a 5 percent interest rate, the duration will be on average 10% of a year shorter than the maturity
for the bracket of one to five year maturity.
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Secondly, while deposits can usually be considered as (relatively) risk-free invest-
ments because of deposit insurance schemes, bank loan rates are not only higher
because of longer maturities but also because of higher risk. Data on the yield on
bonds, specifically indices of non-financial corporate bonds and of asset-backed
and residential mortgage-backed securities can be used to take this into
account34. These indices are compiled by Merrill Lynch, which provides informa-
tion on the average yield of the bonds after adjusting for option-like features of
these bonds. Section 7.3.4. describes in detail the use of these data in the context
of FISIM measurement. Appendix Table A2 reviews the reference rates applied to
each type of loans and deposits for households and non-financial corporations
under this more complex approach.
7.3.3. Interest Rates
The main aim of our research is to improve the estimates of interest margins
applied by banks on loans and deposits to reflect the services they provide. A first
question is whether to use the ‘new business’ (NB) or ‘outstanding amounts’ (OA)
rates as the basis for comparison. While the estimated margin should be relevant
for the entire portfolio of bank loans in that category thus arguing for OA rates,
a drawback of this approach is that the correct reference rate is difficult to define
as many such loans have interest rates that were agreed some years before. Ideally,
the reference rate should then be a weighted average of past bond yields, where
the weights reflect the share of loans from each period in the past that are still on
banks’ balance sheets.
In addition, current definitions of NB and OA interest rates are not homogeneous
for different maturities35. NB rates are categorised according to the initial period
of rate fixation while OA rates are categorised according to the original time to
maturity of the loan. Hence, for instance, if a loan has an original maturity of
seven years, but rates are renegotiated annually, it would be more appropriate to
compare the interest rate on this loan to the yield on a bond with a time to matu-
rity of one year rather the seven years.
34 Another way of indirectly performing the correction would be to use data on loan provisions which may be
collected for financial stability purposes by national authorities; in practice this approach may lead to incom-
parable results due to the lack of harmonisation of statistics on loan provisions across countries.
35 In the context of the update of Regulation ECB/2001/18 on the requirements for MIR statistics new data could
become available to overcome this limitation.
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Figure 3: Interest Rate Spread of Government Bonds and Business Loans: Long-term 
minus Short-term (p.p.), 2003:1-2008:6
Sources: ECB (MIR interest rates), Thomson Financial Datastream (Government Bonds).
Notes: All series for the euro area. MIR rates on loans to non-financial corporations: more than 5 years minus
less than 1 year. Government bonds: 7 year minus 1 year yield.
Given these considerations, we will rely on the NB rates to calculate the interest
margins. Figure 3 illustrates the impact of the problems discussed above in the
case of loans to NFCs, thus giving empirical justification to the choice of NB rates
over OA rates. The figure shows the yield spreads of long-term loans to non-
financial corporations (more than five years) over short-term loans (less than one
year). In comparison, a similar spread on government bonds is also shown (seven
years minus one year yield). The spread for OA turns negative at the end of 2005,
while the NB spread stays positive (or very close to zero), just like the government
bond spread. The negative OA spread is caused by a slower rise in the rates of
loans with long original maturity compared to loans with short original maturity.
This could reflect favourable rates on loans that were agreed in earlier years. It
could also reflect a difference between original maturity and the repricing period:
in fact, the volume data on NB suggest that most business loans have interest rates
which are renegotiated within a year, while the volume data on OA suggest a long
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7.3.4. Reference Rates on Loans: Discussion of the Data 
in Case of Full Adjustment
The proposed method requires data on the current market yield of different types
of debt securities with a broad coverage of the euro area market. Therefore, bond
indices are preferred over individual bonds. The bond indices compiled by Merrill
Lynch satisfy these criteria36.
Merrill Lynch publishes a range of bond indices for non-financial corporations,
but only their overall non-financial corporations bond index, which has an aver-
age rating between BBB and A, is available broken down by maturity band.
Although there is no information available on the credit quality of bank loan
portfolios, it may be assumed that most borrowers (by number, but not by vol-
ume) are not investment-grade. However, this may be less of an issue when con-
sidering the bank loan volumes. Besides, using the overall Merrill Lynch bond
index is the most practical approach in view of the availability of maturity break-
downs37.
Figure 4: Interest Rate on Business Loans Compared to Corporate and Government 
Bonds (%), 2003:1-2008:6
Sources: ECB (MIR interest rates), Thomson Financial Datastream (Government bonds), Merrill Lynch (Cor-
porate bonds).
Notes: All series for the euro area. Bank loan rates refers to loans to non-financial corporations with an initial
rate fixation between 1 and 5 years. Corporate bond yield is the yield on the Merill-Lynch bond index for
non-financial corporation bonds with a remaining maturity between 1 and 5 years. Government bond yield is
the 3 year constant maturity bond yield.
36 See www.mlindex.ml.com for these data as well as the bond index rules and definitions. ML does not produce
country-specific bond indices as most national debt markets within the euro area do not have the characteristics
for the derivation of reliable and meaningful bond indices.
37 A sensitivity analysis has shown that the advantages related to the use of bond yield indices broken down by
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Figure 4 compares the interest rate of loans to non-financial corporations with
the corresponding corporate bond and government bond yields38. As expected,
the loan rate is higher than the corporate bond yield, which in turn is higher than
the government bond yield. At the end of 2003 as well as in June 2008, there were
a few instances when the spread was slightly negative, but otherwise the picture
is consistent. As the more complete analysis below will demonstrate, negative
spreads occur in some other instances as well. There we will discuss possible rea-
sons why margins may become negative in theory and in practice. Overall, the
Merrill Lynch bond index for loans to non-financial corporations in the corre-
sponding maturity bands does capture the main developments that also affect
loan rates. This may be seen as the financial market indicator with the most sim-
ilar characteristics. It is also worth noting that from the summer of 2007 to (at
least) end-2008, due to the financial market turmoil the spread of the corporate
yield over the government bond yield has widened39. The spread has peaked at
the end of the first quarter of 2008 when a substantial ‘flight to security’ effect
pushed down government bond yields. Interest rates on bank loans to non-finan-
cial corporations have also risen though the risk-adjusted interest margins have
been broadly stable, although in the course of the second quarter of 2008 the
worsening of the economic outlook and the consequent lack of liquidity on euro
area bond markets resulted in a sharp increase of NFC bond yields which have
converged to interest rates on business loans.
This illustrates the unappealing choice in troubled financial times: one could
either rely on government bond yields and see a sharp widening of interest mar-
gins or use corporate bond yields and see a contracting interest margin. Using
government bonds probably overstates margins by more in the recent period: why
would loans that used to require only about 0.7 percentage points of service mar-
gin now require up to 2.5 percentage points? On the other hand, a disappearing
margin is likewise implausible.
For loans to households, it is more challenging to compute interest-rate margins
since households do not generally raise funds directly from financial markets.
Here the most comparable security is securitized debt. Securitization is a means
for banks to fund further credits as, in its traditional form, it enables to remove
loans from balance sheet and thus frees up capital to make new loans. The main
advantage of securitization is to enable banks to specialize in what they do best,
namely originating and monitoring debt. However, an important reason for
banks to originate a loan for a household in the first place is that the fixed cost
of gathering and processing credit information on households is too burdensome
38 The interest rate for non-financial corporations refers to loans with an initial interest rate fixation period
between one and five years and is the rate on new business. The corporate bond and government bond yields
are defined to match this maturity band.
39 The spreads of bonds of financial corporations have widened even more.
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for decentralized financial markets. To allow these loans to be sold in secondary
markets in form of asset backed securities (ABS) or residential mortgage backed
securities (RMBS), a group of similar loans is pooled and usually divided into
tranches. Defaults in this loan pool will first be borne by the junior tranches and
the senior tranches will be affected last. As a result, the senior tranches commonly
receive an AAA credit rating from rating agencies. The current financial market
turmoil has raised questions about whether these ratings are a good reflection of
risk, in particular in the face of high default rates on mortgages of subprime bor-
rowers in the US. However, for our proposed method, what is relevant in princi-
ple is the perceived risk by banks at the time the loan is originated40,41.
The limited size of the ABS and RMBS market in Europe compared to the corpo-
rate bond market also deserves some considerations. While the overall Merrill
Lynch bond index for non-financial corporations covers around 700 corporate
bonds, their index for ABS and RMBS covers only some 30 bonds42. This means
that for Europe we only have a single index that covers all maturities and credit
ratings, with most securities AAA-rated43. Despite the small number of securities,
the yield spread over government bonds is quite stable, highly correlated with the
yield spread of AAA corporate bonds (0.85) and almost the same size on aver-
age44,45.
40 Recent literature has elaborated on various agency problems raised by securitisation and resulting in misalign-
ments between perceived risks by banks and on the market. For instance asymmetric information may lead to
downward biases in credit ABS/RMBS spreads when the loan quality deterioration is not fully recognised by
investors and rating agencies. In addition, once the default risk is transferred the bank may have a little incentive
to monitor the borrowers and to restructure the underlying loan portfolios. For a comprehensive review of these
and other agency problems related to securitisation, see Franke and Kranen (2008) and references therein.
41 Another way in which RMBS can receive an investment-grade rating is if a government agency guarantees the
underlying mortgages. As a result of either financial engineering or government backing, the default risk on the
most liquid RMBS and ABS is supposed to be minimal and the main reason for the positive spread over risk-
free government bonds is prepayment risk; see e.g. Rothberg et al. (1989). If most loans on bank balance sheets
are government-backed, prepayment risk is all that matters for a correct reference rate, but otherwise, the yield
from these RMBS and ABS will be too low compared to the risk associated with the bank loans. However, if
the risk is higher, banks will presumably also go to greater lengths to gauge the credit worthiness of borrowers,
so the service margin for those types of loans is also likely to be higher. One concern in the current climate is
that the opacity and heterogeneity of RMBS and ABS leads to illiquidity. Also, there is an ongoing reassessment
of the value of credit ratings and the default risk of these securities. As a result, in current periods yields on these
securities are possibly higher than warranted by the underlying default risk or the composition may have
changed to include more lower-rated securities.
42 By comparison, similar indices for the US cover around 3000 corporate bonds and 1500 residential MBS or
collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs).
43 Merrill Lynch only provides occasional snapshots of the composition of the index and these suggest limited
differences between the components. Given the scarcity of information, this is a tentative finding.
44 The average spread for AAA corporate bonds was 0.33 percentage points over the period 2003-2007 and for
the MBS/ABS bonds it was 0.35 points.
45 While sensitivity analysis has shown the overall reliability of the approach described above, further research is
being performed aimed at improving this framework. The development of new statistics on short-term Euro-
pean paper (STEP), which also cover asset-backed commercial paper, might offer some interesting prospects.
For further information on STEP, see www.ecb.eu/stats/money/step/html/index.en.html). More in the medium
to long term horizon, the enhancement of the collection of securities statistics on a security by security basis and
the related development of the so-called Centralised Security Database (CSDB) in the euro area could also allow
the derivation of more refined yield curves to be used in the framework of FISIM measurement as described in
this paper.
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A final issue is how to deal with loans with maturities for which there are no
directly matching bond indices. In Figure 4, we could match loans with an initial
fixation period between one and five years to the yield on corporate bonds with
a remaining maturity of one to five years. However, there is no bond index cov-
ering bonds with a remaining maturity of less than one year, so for loans with an
initial fixation period of less than a year there is no appropriate bond index. In
this example, we use the spread of the corporate bond index over the three-year
government bond index and add this to the one-year government bond index.
Similarly, the Merrill Lynch ABS/RMBS index has a duration of around five years,
so the spread over the five-year government bond index for each fixation period
band is applied for the matching.
Figure 5: Interest Rate on Housing Loans Compared to ABS/MBS and Government 
Bonds (%), 2003:1-2008:6
Sources: ECB (MIR interest rates), Thomson Financial Datastream (Government bonds), Merrill Lynch (ABS/
MBS).
Notes: All series for the euro area. Bank loan rates refers to loans to household for house purchases with an
initial rate fixation between 1 and 5 years. ABS/MBS bonds is the yield on the Merrill Lynch bond index for
asset-back and mortgage backed bonds, adjusted using government bond yields to a 3-year maturity. Govern-
ment bond yield is the 3 year constant maturity bond yield.
Figure 5 shows the interest rate on household loans for housing purposes com-
pared to the ABS/RMBS series and the corresponding government bond yield.
The interest margin for this type of loans varies more than the corporate margins
as the inertia of bank interest rates seems greater. On the other hand, the interest
margin stays positive throughout the period, with the exception of June 2008. As
for NFCs, periods following the financial turmoil are strongly influenced by the
developments on the financial markets. While the implicit risk premium meas-
ured by the government bond spread of ABS/RMBS securities index has widened,
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become almost fully illiquid and cannot, in the context prevailing as from the
second quarter of 2008, represent a good proxy for the household loans on
banks’ balance sheets. For instance, this may be the reason underlying the nega-
tive margin in June 2008.
7.4. ESTIMATES
7.4.1. Interest Margins
So far we have discussed what data we use on loan and deposit rates for house-
holds and non-financial corporations, namely interest rates on new business from
the MIR statistics. We also described our approach to matching these interest
rates to comparable securities traded in the financial markets. We can now move
to a discussion of the interest margins as estimated in our framework. In the case
of loans, the interest margin we calculate is the excess a borrower has to pay
compared to the market rate to compensate the bank for the information services
provided. For deposits, it is the opposite: how much less a depositor is willing to
accept than the market rate in return for the transaction services the bank pro-
vides.
Table 1 gives the broadest set of results on interest margins by comparing the
estimates on the different financial asset categories for the euro area as a whole
in the case of households and non-financial corporations. Our analysis uses
monthly data from January 2003 to June 2008, thus covering 66 months (the
entire span of the MFI survey on interest rates). We compare three sets of interest
margins. The first set is calculated by simulating the current approach where
implicit interest margins can be obtained by comparing MIR rates on outstanding
amounts to the internal reference rate. The second set takes into account that for
longer-term financial assets a term premium is paid, estimated by the yield spread
of long-term over short-term government bonds. For loans, we also calculate a
third set, where the default risk is taken into account by using data on corporate
bonds and asset and mortgage-backed securities. Under the new proposed frame-
work, MIR statistics on new business are used and for all instruments a weighted
average margin is compiled across maturities in the case of deposits and across
bands of initial interest rate fixation periods in the case of loans using the shares
in new business volumes as weights. For each set of margins, we compare three
statistics, namely the average over the period, the standard deviation and the
number of negative margins. For a more complete overview, the interested reader
is referred to the Annex which, for each sector and type of loan and deposits,
presents in form of time series the three sets of estimated margins, together with
the corresponding interest and reference rates.
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In the case of loans, the effect of accounting for the term premium and default
risk on the average margin is as expected: margins decrease. Note that when
comparing columns I to II and III, the reference rates change to reflect the risk of
the loans and the interest rates change from those on outstanding amounts to
interest rates on new business. In general, the changes in methodology have the
largest effect on loans, where margins decrease by up to 2.5 percentage points.
Actually many loans, in particular those for housing purposes, have fixed rates
for longer periods of time and default is an important risk factor as well. In
addition, the standard deviation of the margins also decreases. This is partly
related to lower average margins, but not entirely. Finally, despite the large
reductions in average margins, the margins on loans remain positive in (almost)
all months. The adjustments to the average margins are smaller for deposits than
for loans as most deposits are short-term while loans cover a wide range of
(longer) maturities. The effect on standard deviation is also less pronounced. On
the deposit side, interest margins are negative in many months regardless of
whether using the current approach or our suggested alternative. Margins for the
most sizeable deposit categories (overnight and with agreed maturity) are less
prone to being negative46.
There are both conceptual and practical reasons that may explain temporarily
negative interest margins. First, banks may accept small or even negative margins
if a borrower or depositor brings in income from deposits or fees for other serv-
ices. The analogy with a supermarket is useful here: they often price visible brand-
name products at or below cost to draw in customers, who then spend on other
goods. Second, long-term business relationships may also play a role: in times of
rising market interest rates, banks may not raise their loan interest rates by as
much or ration credit in return for more favourable margins in periods of lower
market rates47. There may be some support for this in the data as many of the
loan interest rates are less volatile than the corresponding reference bonds48. This
is in general indicative of imperfect pass-through of market interest rates to retail
bank interest rates. Our finding of more negative interest margins for deposits
than for loans is also consistent with the pass-through literature, where deposit
rates are generally found to be more inelastic49.
A more practical reason for some of the negative margins may be shortcomings
in the available data, such as mismatches between interest rates and bond indices
in terms of maturities and risk profiles. For example, the two negative values on
loans refer to June 2008 and in both cases the bond indices used as reference rates
show sharp increase which are not matched in the interest rate data (see also the
46 In particular, it should be outlined that most of our negative margins refer to deposits redeemable at notice by
NFCs, which only account for about 3% of the total NFCs deposits.
47 See e.g. Boot (2000) for a review of relationship banking.
48 See Berlin and Mester (1999) on interest smoothing as a feature of relationship banking.
49 See e.g. De Bondt (2005) and De Graeve et al. (2007).
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Annex)50. Similarly, for deposits with an agreed maturity of more than two years
we have selected five-year government bonds as the reference rate. However, in
Germany deposits are on offer with much longer maturities so that a ten-year
government bond might have been a more representative security. In some coun-
tries bank loans to creditworthy firms may also be more prevalent, making a
corporate bond with a high credit rating a better choice. Another reason for the
observed negative margins may be sampling error in the MIR survey. The evi-
dence for this is somewhat circumstantial, but the interest rates of relatively
uncommon loans and deposits tend to be more volatile51.
In short, negative margins for certain instrument and years can be explained and
do not invalidate the basic approach. Negative margins for long periods of time
though, can imply that a different security is needed to reflect country-specific
circumstances.
When comparing margins on the different financial instruments, a few observa-
tions stand out. First, the estimated margins for consumer credit are very high
compared to the other instruments, regardless of the approach taken. This could
reflect high information and processing costs, but could indicate that a more
effective method to account for the higher risk associated with these loans should
be developed. The frequent absence of collateral for such loans can be used to
argue either ways: the lack of collateral makes the loan riskier but might also
induce more screening and monitoring activities by banks. Without further infor-
mation on the risk of bank portfolios, it is hard to make a more definitive assess-
ment. In addition, the average margin on consumer credit is lower under the cur-
rent approach than with the term premium correction; this is due to the different
evolution of the interest rates for consumer credit NB and OA.
50 As described above, the margins shown in Table 1 are compiled as weighted averages across maturities in the
case of deposits and across bands of initial interest rate fixation periods in the case of loans. Hence while Figure
4 shows some negative margins for loans to NFCs with a fixation period between one and five years in the
course of 2003, no negative margins are derived for total NFCs loans over that period.
51 Volatility is measured as the standard deviation of the interest rates and we get an indication of how common
an instrument is in the country by calculating the average volume of new business for the instrument over the
entire period and normalizing by the average across all instruments.
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Figure 6: Euro Area Interest Margins on Loans by Period of Initial Rate Fixation, 
Average 2003:1-2008:6 (%)
Figure 6 shows how the average margin varies by band of initial fixation periods
for the different types of loans for the euro area, calculated using reference rates
that account for both the term premium and default risk, i.e. case III in Table 1
above. In general, margins are lower on loans with a longer period of initial rate
fixation. This holds not only for the euro area as a whole but also for many of the
individual countries. The main exception is consumer credit with a fixed interest
rate for more than five years. The pattern is clearer for housing loans, where the
margin on loans with a fixation period of less than a year is 0.74 percent while
loans with a fixation period of more than ten years have a margin of only 0.25
percent. One possible reason for this pattern is that the screening of new borrow-
ers is an important part of the financial services provided to borrowers. As this
screening process only takes place before the loan is agreed upon, the associated
costs are spread over the life of the loan. Alternatively, it could reflect higher
administration costs for loans with variable interest rates. This is likely to be a
factor for loans to non-financial corporations: only 13 percent of new loans have
a fixed rate for more than one year, but 69 percent on the outstanding loans have
an (original) maturity of more than one year. This implies that most loans to non-
financial corporations have (fairly) flexible rates and a long maturity. Another
possible reason is that only low-risk borrowers receive a fixed rate for longer
periods of time. In contrast, our reference rates are based on bonds with a con-
stant default risk profile across maturities. This would imply that our default risk
adjustment is overdone for loans with long-term fixed rates. We would need












<1yr 1-5yr >5yr <1yr 1-5yr 5-10yr >10yr <1yr 1-5yr >5yr <1yr 1-5yr >5yr
Business loans Housing loans Consumer credit Other household loans
suerf2009.book  Page 132  Tuesday, November 3, 2009  2:42 PMMEASURING THE OUTPUT OF THE BANKING SECTOR 133
larcier
A further observation is that the margins on loans granted to non-financial cor-
porations are noticeably lower than those on (consumption and other purposes)
loans to households; only the margins on loans for housing purposes are close to
the former. An explanation could be that amounts lent to households are gener-
ally smaller so that banks provide more services per euro lent and need to charge
a higher relative price to cover their fixed costs. Also, the risk associated with
corporate loans may be easier to gauge than that of loans to households. This
would be the case if non-financial corporations tended to have standardized
financial reports compared to less standardized or less detailed financial informa-
tion provided by households. Non-financial corporations (in particular large
ones) may also be better informed and have more bargaining power than house-
holds. In addition, large corporate loans are often collateralized. Finally, loans to
non-financial corporations with a fixation period of more than 5 years show
slightly negative average margins (-0.01 percent), but these loans account, on the
average, for about 7 percent only of the total new business volume of loans to
non-financial corporations.
Figure 7: Euro Area Interest Margins on Deposits by Maturity, Average 2003:1-2008:6 
(%)
Figure 7 shows the average interest margin in the euro area in the case of deposits;
this corresponds to case II in Table 1 above. Margins for deposits held by non-
financial corporations tend to be lower than for household deposits, which could
be explained by the same reasons as for loans. Furthermore, overnight deposits
(current accounts) command the highest margins: banks may charge a high inter-
est margin on these deposits because they provide most transaction services to
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that for two categories of deposits, interest margins are negative when averaged
over the entire period.
7.4.2. Two Examples under the Proposed Approach
How does the proposed enhanced methodology deal with the two examples pre-
sented in section 7.2. above? The first example regarded long-term deposits with
agreed maturity placed by euro area non-financial corporations with German
oMFIs; there we concluded that negative margins would be obtained under the
1995 ESA approach as a result of the comparison between rates on outstanding
amounts, which mainly reflect interest rates bargained in past periods, and for-
ward-looking interbank rates, and to a maturity mismatch. Interest margins
obtained under the proposed methodology are obtained in this case comparing
new business interest rates for this category of deposits with the five-year German
government bond.
Figure 8: Deposits with an Agreed Maturity above Two Years Placed by Euro Area 
Non-financial Corporations with German oMFIs (p.p.), 2003:1-2008:6
Sources: ECB (MIR interest rates and internal calculations), Thomson Financial Datastream (Government
Bonds).
Notes: Reference rates obtained simulating the 1995 ESA methodology and considering the 5-year German
government bond yield respectively. Interest margins derived as the difference between the interest rates (out-
standing amounts or new business) and the relevant reference rates.
As it is shown in Figure 8, interest margins obtained under the modified approach
are much more stable (and easy to interpret) than those obtained under the cur-
rent framework. On the other side, they stay negative for most of the periods,
while the jump observed in Q1 2008 seems to be determined by the ‘flight to
quality effect outlined above’. Although there is no theoretical justification argu-
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choice of the five-year government bond may not have been appropriate: in Ger-
many these deposits are also on offer with very long maturities so that a ten-year
government bond might be a more representative security52.
We now turn to the example on loans provided by Spanish oMFIs to euro area
non-financial corporations.
Figure 9: Loans Provided by Spanish oMFIs to Euro Area Non-financial Corporations 
(p.p.), 2003:1-2008-6
Sources: ECB (MIR interest rates and internal calculations), Merrill Lynch (Corporate Bonds).
Notes: MIR rates on loans to non-financial corporations: original maturity below one-year (outstanding
amounts) and fixation period below one-year (new business). Reference rates for Spain obtained simulating
the current framework (1995 ESA) and in accordance to the enhanced methodology, i.e. Euribor six-month
(I) and the Merrill-Lynch corporate bond index for euro area non-financial corporations one to five-years cor-
rected by a maturity spread (II). Margins derived as the difference between the interest rates (outstanding
amounts or new business) and the relevant reference rates.
In this case the two methodologies are not directly comparable as the 1995 ESA
framework is based on interest rates on outstanding amounts broken down by
original maturity of the loan while the new approach is based on new business
rates broken down by periods of fixation. Nonetheless, we compare margins
obtained for the maturity band below one year (1995 ESA) and fixation period
below one year (new approach) respectively, and are able to show that the new
framework would solve the issues related to the maturity mismatch and the rele-
vance of the risk premium. In particular, interest margins according to the pro-
posed methodology are calculated in case of maturity adjustment (Euribor six-
52 Using the German ten-year government bond as a reference rate the interest margins is on the average -16 bp
against an average of -60 bp using the five-year government bond. While there is no information available at
the ECB on the average maturity of the newly offered deposits in this category so to better calibrate reference
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month is used as the reference rate) and in case of full adjustment (the he Merrill-
Lynch corporate bond index for euro area non-financial corporations and for
residual maturities between one and five years corrected by a maturity spread).
The results are shown in Figure 9 above. First adjusting for the maturity mis-
match (method I) allows obtaining more stable interest margins for periods when
the Euribor six-months diverges from the 1995 ESA reference rate, i.e. after the
beginning of 2006. In addition, when adjusting also for the risk premium
(method 2) the overall picture improves even further with interest margins rather
stable around 50bp. It should be underlined that under this approach interest
margins are negative on this type of loans in June 2008, reflecting what was
already discussed above at euro area level in section 7.4.1.
7.4.3. FISIM Results for the Euro Area
With a complete set of interest margins, the implications for FISIM (imputed
bank output) can be shown. For each institutional sector, imputed bank output
can be calculated as:
(3)
where Yi is the output associated with financial asset i (loan or deposit), mi is the
interest margin and Si is the outstanding amount of the corresponding financial
asset or liability on the bank balance sheet53. As discussed above, our margins are
calculated using interest rates on new business for each maturity band in the case
of deposits and for each band of initial interest rate fixation periods in the case of
loans, and then averaged according to the shares of new business volumes, but
these are then applied to outstanding amounts.
The top panel of Table 2 below shows three estimates of FISIM by sector: (i) as
required in the current FISIM regulation, (ii) when the term premium is removed
from the interest margins and (iii) when the default risk premium for loans is
additionally removed. The bottom panel shows the weighted average interest
margin for each sector, based on the underlying margins for deposits and loans.
Note that the differences between FISIM under current framework and the two
alternatives is not only due to different references rates, but also due to the use of
53 A critical point has been recently raised that only on-balance sheet activities of oMFIs are taken into account.
Once a bank loan is securitised, the bank is assumed to be no longer providing services to the borrower. Calcu-
lations of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York have shown that treating off-balance sheet lending originated
by banks in the same manner as on-balance sheet loans would boost bank output by more than 10% for the
US. This should be taken into account to avoid implausible growth rates: the subprime crisis has resulted in a
substantive enlargement of bank balance sheets as the sponsors of many structured vehicles have returned back
to bank financing. This shift will have, ceteris paribus, the effect of artificially boosting financial sector output.
See e.g. Ashcraft and Steindel (2008). No detailed simulations have been carried out in the case of the euro area,
but a very preliminary assessment has led to the conclusion that the impact would be much lower in this case.
Yi m
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interest rates on new business as compared to interest rates on outstanding
amounts under the current FISIM methodology.
Table 2: Imputed Banking Sector Output (FISIM) and Interest Margins in the Euro Area 
by Sector, Current Regulation and Modified Approaches (Average Q1 2003 – Q2 2008)
Notes: FISIM is calculated as the interest margin of each type of loan and deposit times the outstanding balance.
The interest margins in the bottom panel are weighted averages of loan and deposit margins. Current regulation
FISIM uses interest rates on outstanding amounts and reference rates which mainly represent weighted averages
of inter-bank interest rates. The two alternatives use interest rates on new business. When adjusting for the term
premium, the government bond yield with the most closely matching maturity is used as reference rate. When
also adjusting for the default risk premium, yields on corporate bonds and mortgage- and asset-backed securi-
ties are used. See Appendix Tables A1 and A2 for details.
Overall, the differences are substantial. Both alternatives show lower FISIM than
the current approach: under the two approaches described above the average
annual banking sector output on positions vis-à-vis households and non-financial
corporations is € 149.6 bn and € 115.2 bn respectively. The adjustments yield fig-
ures that are 31 and 47 percent lower, respectively, than the data on FISIM under
the current framework. While the current regulation implies estimated average
interest margins of 1.5 percent for non-financial corporations and 1.7 percent for
households, these fall to 1 and 1.2 percent in case of term premium adjustment
and to 0.5 and 1 percent when adjusting both for therm spread and for the risk
premium. Table 1 illustrates why the impact of the two alternatives is larger for
non-financial corporations than households. For nearly all types of loans and
deposits the margins paid by corporations are lower than for households, even
when a short-term interest rate is used. Any downward adjustment will therefore
represent a relatively larger part of the margin. A more complete overview on
sectoral FISIM results and time series is given in the Annex54.
Current regulation
Adjusted for term 
premium
























54 In particular, the Annex presents detailed results for the new methodology in its two variants compared to the
framework of 1995 ESA. The different approaches are referred to using the syntax of Table 1, i.e. method I
refers to the current approach, method II performs a term premium correction on the reference rate(s) and
method III also takes into account the default risk premium in case of loans; in addition, methods II and III use
interest rates on new business.
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Figure 10 provides a summary overview on aggregated euro area FISIM for
households and non-financial corporations. The bottom area shows FISIM calcu-
lated using interest margins from which both the term premium and default risk
have been eliminated. The middle area can be interpreted as the default risk pre-
mium adjustment. The three areas together correspond to the current statistical
practice of measuring FISIM, and therefore the top area shows the (bias resulting
from the inclusion of the) term premium. As might be expected based on the data
in Table 1, the impact of removing risk from the banking sector output is substan-
tial. Risk-adjusted FISIM is on average only 53 percent of current-practice FISIM,
with default risk accounting on the average for 16 percent of the current measure
and the term premium for 31 percent. In terms of deliveries to final demand this
implies, on the average, an overestimation between € 16.1 bn and € 20.4 bn or
0.20 to 0.25 of euro area GDP55.
Figure 10: Euro Area Imputed Banking Sector Output (FISIM) and the Value of the Risk 
Premiums (billions of euros), Q1 2003 – Q2 2008
55 Assessing the impact on GDP (at current prices) of the new methodology is not straightforward as it would
require FISIM calculation for all domestic sectors as well as FISIM exports and imports. In addition, FISIM
affects both intermediate and final consumption and requires their bridging with the different types of loans
recorded in the context of MFI balance sheet statistics. Services provided to corporations (as non-FISIM
producers) are intermediate consumption, and do not affect GDP. However, services provided to households (as
well as to general government and to non-residents) are final consumption and add to GDP. An important
exception, though, is lending to households for housing purposes, which is an intermediate consumption input
into the production of these services. Preliminary simplified estimates show that for the period January 2003 to
June 2008 the total value of bank services to households delivered to final demand would be reduced, on the
average, by € 20.4 bn in case of default risk and term premium adjustment, and by € 16.1 bn in case of adjust-
ment for the term premium only. The adjustments respectively represent 0.25 and 0.20 percent of euro area
GDP. It should be outlined that this estimate depends on the specific implementation of both current-regulation
FISIM and our adjusted FISIM. Current FISIM statistics as compiled by statistical agencies will in general be
different leading to different estimates of this overstatement, although it seems plausible that the order of the
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The impact of removing the remuneration for credit default risk and term pre-
mium from the banking sector output is substantial. A first important remark
regards the sizeable impact of the term premium correction over the period from
Q3 2003 to Q2 2006 which was characterized by a steep yield curve; conversely,
this adjustment drops in the course of 2007 because of a flattening yield curve.
Secondly, while over this period the total default risk correction seems to be
broadly stable, in an environment with high growth rates on outstanding loans
and deposits this mainly reflects a decreasing (average) risk premium; see also
section 7.3.4. In addition, the default risk premium correction also appears to
decrease in the last two quarters of 2007 and to then increase rather sharply in
the course of 2008. This phenomenon is related to the peculiarity of the financial
turmoil observed over this period, which led to an increase of the general finan-
cial market risks while the borrowers’ credit default risk remained broadly
unchanged at first to then increase considerably in 200856.
Risk-adjusted FISIM is more volatile than current-practice FISIM57; this mainly
reflects the evolution of the outstanding amounts on loans and deposits which
have shown sharp growth rates over the period under analysis. In turn, all interest
margins are less volatile than under the current framework (see the Annex for
further details); the reason is that most of the volatility of the current margins
originates from the volatility of the term premium and the default risk premium
components. By removing these common drivers of the interest margins, idiosyn-
cratic movements make up a more substantial part.
7.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Banks do not charge explicit fees for much of the services they provide, so that
the value of those services needs to be imputed by comparing bank loan and
deposit rates to reference rates that serve as a measure of opportunity costs of
funds. This paper has shown how the euro area banking sector output (FISIM)
would change if the compensation for bearing risk would be removed from out-
put. Recent theoretic work has demonstrated that bearing risk is in general not a
productive service as such. Instead, determining credit-worthiness of borrowers
and pricing the risk is production as it requires labour, capital and intermediate
inputs. If banks bear risk by holding corporate bonds or equity, this is not con-
sidered a productive service and, likewise, the systematic risk on bank loans (and
deposits) should also be excluded from the banking sector output.
56 In other words, while market interest rates on loans increased reflecting the sharp increase in inter-bank rates
with a maturity between one month and one year, the bond yields did not completely mirror this change at the
beginning of the turmoil to then increase in the course of 2008 reflecting the deterioration of the general
economic situation.
57 The coefficient of variation of FISIM under the current framework is 0.03, compared to 0.16 and 0.24 under
the two proposed alternatives.
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Our empirical application of the risk-adjusted bank output model covers deposits
and loans vis-à-vis euro area households and non-financial corporations from the
first quarter of 2003 to the second quarter of 2008. The results show that if we
only remove the term premium, the banking sector output is on average 31 per-
cent lower than under the current methodology. If we also remove the default risk
premium, this output is on average 47 percent lower. In other words, the choice
of reference rate is crucial and the empirical impact of this choice is substantial.
This also has an effect on GDP, the size of the economy, to the extent that bank
services are part of final demand. For example, banking sector output to house-
holds falls from an average over the period of € 145 bn to € 89 bn, implying a fall
in services delivered to final demand of about € 20.4 bn. Comparable work for
the United States by Basu et al. (2009) has shown an adjustment to banking sector
output of a similar magnitude, so our findings for the euro area do not depend on
specific data or assumptions.
Beneath these headline results, a number of data issues remain. The current finan-
cial crisis in particular illustrates problems of matching bank loans and financial
market securities. Risk premiums have widened since the summer of 2007, but
bank loans rates have changed by much less. Does this mean bank loan rates are
slow to adjust? Have service margins decreased? Is there a mismatch between the
type of bank loans and the debt included in these securities? These questions
would need further research to be answered, but these questions also arise under
the old methodology. There excessive service margins lead to avoid negative inter-
est margins in these times but the changes in margins are as hard or harder to
gauge. Since our service margins are closer to what economic theory requires for
all periods under study, and also because they are less volatile we would argue for
our modified, risk-adjusted bank output measure.
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7.7. APPENDIX 1




EONIA: Euro overnight index average.
EURIBOR: Euro interbank offered rate.
Reference rate
Loans
(breakdowns by periods of initial interest rate fixation)
Non-financial corporations
Up to 1 year 6-month EURIBOR
Over 1 year and up to 5 years 3Y government bond yield
Over 5 years 7Y government bond yield
Households
For house purchases
Up to 1 year 6-month EURIBOR
Over 1 year and up to 5 years 3Y government bond yield
Over 5 years and up to 10 years 7Y government bond yield
Over 10 years 10Y government bond yield
Consumer credit
Up to 1 year 6-month EURIBOR
Over 1 year and up to 5 years 3Y government bond yield
Over 5 years 7Y government bond yield
Other purposes
Up to 1 year 6-month EURIBOR
Over 1 year and up to 5 years 3Y government bond yield
Over 5 years 7Y government bond yield
Deposits
(breakdowns by maturity; same treatment for households and non-financial corporations)
Overnight deposits EONIA
Deposits with agreed maturity
Up to 1 year 6-month EURIBOR
Over 1 year and up to 2 years 2Y government bond yield
Over 2 years 5Y government bond yield
Deposits redeemable at notice
Up to 3 months 1-month EURIBOR
Over 3 months 2Y government bond yield
Repurchase agreements EONIA
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ABS/MBS: Asset-backed security/Mortgage-backed security
EURIBOR: Euro interbank offered rate




Up to 1 year ML NFC bond index, 1-5Y minus 3Y government bond yield plus 1Y 
government bond yield
Over 1 year and up to 5 years ML NFC bond index, 1-5Y
Over 5 years ML NFC bond index, 5-10Y
Households
For house purchases
Up to 1 year ML ABS/MBS index minus 5Y government bond yield plus 1Y 
government bond yield
Over 1 year and up to 5 years ML ABS/MBS index minus 5Y government bond yield plus 3Y 
government bond yield
Over 5 years and up to 10 years ML ABS/MBS index minus 5Y government bond yield plus 7Y 
government bond yield
Over 10 years ML ABS/MBS index minus 5Y government bond yield plus 10Y 
government bond yield
Consumer credit
Up to 1 year ML ABS/MBS index minus 5Y government bond yield plus 1Y 
government bond yield
Over 1 year and up to 5 years ML ABS/MBS index minus 5Y government bond yield plus 3Y 
government bond yield
Over 5 years ML ABS/MBS index minus 5Y government bond yield plus 7Y 
government bond yield
Other purposes
Up to 1 year ML ABS/MBS index minus 5Y government bond yield plus 1Y 
government bond yield
Over 1 year and up to 5 years ML ABS/MBS index minus 5Y government bond yield plus 3Y 
government bond yield
Over 5 years ML ABS/MBS index minus 5Y government bond yield plus 7Y 
government bond yield
Deposits (same treatment for households and non-financial corporations)
Overnight deposits EONIA
Deposits with agreed maturity
Up to 1 year 6-month EURIBOR
Over 1 year and up to 2 years 2Y government bond yield
Over 2 years 5Y government bond yield
Deposits redeemable at notice
Up to 3 months 1-month EURIBOR
Over 3 months 2Y government bond yield
Repurchase agreements EONIA
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7.8. APPENDIX 2
Annex: banking sector output with domestic residents
1995 ESA approach vs enhanced methodology - Deposits for the euro area
(Quarterly output; EUR billion)
European Central Bank / Monetary and Financial Statistics Division 5-Jan-9   14:51










1995 ESA (I) Term premium adjustment (II)
Non-financial corporations







1995 ESA (I) Term premium adjustment (II)
Households
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Annex: banking sector output with domestic residents
1995 ESA approach vs enhanced methodology - Loans for the euro area
(Quarterly output; EUR billion)
European Central Bank / Monetary and Financial Statistics Division 5-Jan-9   14:51














Term premium adjustment (II)
Non-financial corporations










Term premium adjustment (II)
Households
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Annex: banking sector output with domestic residents
1995 ESA approach vs enhanced methodology - Deposits and loans for the euro area
(Quarterly output; EUR billion)
European Central Bank / Monetary and Financial Statistics Division 5-Jan-9   14:51













Full adjustment (II for deposits and III for loans)
Term premium adjustment (II)
Non-financial corporations








Full adjustment (II for deposits and III for loans)
Term premium adjustment (II)
Households
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Annex: banking sector output with domestic residents
1995 ESA approach vs enhanced methodology - Loans to households for the euro area
(percentage points for interest rates and margins; EUR billion for stocks)
European Central Bank / Monetary and Financial Statistics Division 5-Jan-9   14:51














Consumer credit: interest rates








Credit default and term premium adjustment (III)
Term premium adjustment (II)
1995 ESA (I)
Consumer credit: margins







Credit default and term premium adjustment (III)
Term premium adjustment (II)
1995 ESA (I)
Consumer credit: output











Housing loans: interest rates







Credit default and term premium adjustment (III)
Term premium adjustment (II)
1995 ESA (I)
Housing loans: margins







Credit default and term premium adjustment (III)
Term premium adjustment (II)
1995 ESA (I)
Housing loans: output













Other loans: interest rates







Credit default and term premium adjustment (III)
Term premium adjustment (II)
1995 ESA (I)
Other loans: margins






Credit default and term premium adjustment (III)
Term premium adjustment (II)
1995 ESA (I)
Other loans: output
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Annex: banking sector output with domestic residents
1995 ESA approach vs enhanced methodology - Loans to non-financial corporations for the euro area
(percentage points for interest rates and margins; EUR billion for stocks)
European Central Bank / Monetary and Financial Statistics Division 5-Jan-9   14:51
























Credit default and term premium adjustment (III)
Term premium adjustment (II)
1995 ESA (I)
Margins












Credit default and term premium adjustment (III)
Term premium adjustment (II)
1995 ESA (I)
Output
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Annex: banking sector output with domestic residents
1995 ESA approach vs enhanced methodology - Deposits by non-financial corporations in the euro area
(percentage points for interest rates and margins; EUR billion for stocks)
European Central Bank / Monetary and Financial Statistics Division 5-Jan-9   14:51






Overnight deposits: interest rates





Term premium adjustment (II) 1995 ESA (I)
Overnight deposits: margins









Deposits with agreed maturity: interest rates





Term premium adjustment (II) 1995 ESA (I)
Deposits with agreed maturity: margins








Deposits redeemable at notice: interest rates






Term premium adjustment (II) 1995 ESA (I)
Deposits redeemable at notice: margins









Repurchase agreements: interest rates






Term premium adjustment (II) 1995 ESA (I)
Repurchase agreements: margins
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Annex: banking sector output with domestic residents
1995 ESA approach vs enhanced methodology - Deposits by households in the euro area
(percentage points for interest rates and margins; EUR billion for stocks)
European Central Bank / Monetary and Financial Statistics Division 5-Jan-9   14:51






Overnight deposits: interest rates







Term premium adjustment (II) 1995 ESA (I)
Overnight deposits: margins









Deposits with agreed maturity: interest rates






Term premium adjustment (II) 1995 ESA (I)
Deposits with agreed maturity: margins









Deposits redeemable at notice: interest rates






Term premium adjustment (II) 1995 ESA (I)
Deposits redeemable at notice: margins
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8. BANK PRODUCTIVITY AND EFFICIENCY 
IN LUXEMBOURG: MALMQUIST INDICES FROM 
A PARAMETRIC OUTPUT DISTANCE FUNCTION
Paolo Guarda and Abdelaziz Rouabah1
ABSTRACT
Productivity change reflects both technical change (shift in the best-practice fron-
tier) and efficiency change (how far the average firm is from the best practice
frontier). This article analyses these two sources of productivity change using
quarterly reporting data from Luxembourg’s banking sector. Bank output is
defined using the user cost approach as already applied to this dataset in Guarda
and Rouabah (2006, 2007). Malmquist productivity indices are calculated from
an output distance function estimated parametrically using a translog system of
equations. Results suggest that productivity in Luxembourg’s banks grew by
about 1% per quarter over the sample 1994Q1-2007Q4. Productivity growth
was somewhat higher when averaged only over larger banks (in terms of total
assets). The standard decomposition of the Malmquist productivity index sug-
gests that most of the productivity growth is from efficiency change rather than
technical change. This means that few individual banks occasionally shift the effi-
cient frontier and that most of the other banks in the sample are catching up,
improving their productivity by reducing their inefficiency.
8.1. INTRODUCTION
Conceptually, productivity change is broadly understood as the change in the
level of output produced for a given change in the level of input. Measuring this
ratio becomes more challenging in a setting with multiple outputs and multiple
inputs (such as the banking industry). Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982)
introduced Malmquist indices for productivity analysis and showed that they cor-
respond to the ratio of two distance functions. The advantages of the Malmquist
productivity index are that it is appropriate for production technologies with
arbitrary returns to scale, substitution possibilities and biases in productivity
change. However, Caves and al. noted that the Malmquist cannot be computed
without knowledge of the underlying technology. Instead, these authors showed
that Törnqvist productivity indices can be expressed as the mean of two
1 The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the BCL or the
Eurosystem. Correspondence to paolo.guarda@bcl.lu or abdelaziz.rouabah@bcl.lu.
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Malmquist productivity indices if the production technology is translogarithmic.
Törnqvist indices have the advantage that they can be calculated even without
knowledge of the parameters of the underlying technology.
Färe, Grosskopf, Norris and Zhang (1994) showed how Malmquist indices can
be calculated using nonparametric techniques which do not require specifying the
functional form of the production technology. These authors also provided a
decomposition of productivity change (PC) into technical change (TC) (shifts in
the best-practice frontier) and efficiency change (EC) (individual observations
shifting relative to the best-practice frontier). This decomposition into two sepa-
rate sources of productivity change proved very popular and encouraged the
widespread application of non-parametric techniques such as Data Envelopment
Analysis (DEA). Prominent studies of productivity change in banking using non-
parametric methods include Berg, Førsund and Jansen (1992), Grifell-Tatjé and
Lovell (1997), Wheelock and Wilson (1999), and Alam (2001).
Parametric techniques continued to be applied, but usually in the context of sto-
chastic cost frontiers (see Altunbas, Goddard, Molyneux (1999); Altunbas, Gar-
dener, Molyneux and Moore (2001), as well as Casu, Girardone and Molyneux
(2004)) or stochastic profit frontiers (see Kumbhakar, Lozano-Vivas, Knox Lovell
and Hasan (2001)). These models generally included a deterministic time trend in
the stochastic frontier to capture the impact of technical change. This involves the
strong assumption that (on average across banks) technical progress occurs at a
constant rate. The Malmquist index, instead, involves a series of period-to-period
comparisons, which allows technical progress to speed up, slow down and even
reverse within the sample period. Fuentes, Grifell-Tatjé and Perelman (2001)
showed that Malmquist indexes could be obtained within the parametric
approach by estimating output distance functions directly. They included a deter-
ministic time trend in their translog output distance function and used its esti-
mated coefficients to isolate the technical change component. Instead of a deter-
ministic time trend, Atkinson, Cornwell and Honerkamp (2003) used period-spe-
cific dummies in their translog input distance function to obtain Malmquist indi-
ces. In this paper, we choose yet another method to capture technological change
by estimating period-by-period parametric frontiers as proposed by Coelli, Rao
and Battese (1998, pp. 233-234). Previous parametric studies of productivity
avoid this alternative because of its high cost in terms of degrees of freedom. We
solve this problem by estimating the distance function within a simultaneous sys-
tem of cost share equations (increasing the number of degrees of freedom each
period) and imposing the necessary cross-equation restrictions (reducing the
number of parameters to estimate). Since we are in a system of equations context,
it is difficult to maximise the highly nonlinear log-likelihood of a composed error
model, so we prefer estimation by ‘corrected’ ordinary least squares (COLS) as
implemented in Coelli and Perelman (2000). For the translog functional form,
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Coelli (2000) established the consistency of this simple method for directly esti-
mating the output distance function under the assumption of revenue maximising
behaviour.
Section 8.2 outlines the methods used in more detail, describing the Malmquist
index and its standard decomposition, as well as the particular form of the output
distance function estimated and its associated system of equations. Section 8.3
describes the data and discusses some trend behaviour. Section 8.4 presents the
resulting productivity indices and their decomposition. The final section presents
some conclusions.
8.2. METHODS
To introduce the Malmquist index, we must first define the production technol-
ogy and its associated distance function. Let xt = (x1
t, …., xK
t) ∈RK and yt = (y1
t,
…., yM
t) ∈RM represent the input and output vectors at time t = 1,…, T. Then the
feasible production technology can be represented as a correspondence between
the output set Pt(xt) which can be produced and the input vector xt:
(1)
The output set   is assumed to be consistent with a set of axioms including
convexity and strong disposability of outputs. Following Shephard (1970), the
output distance functions can be defined as follows:
(2)
By assumption,  , with the distance function taking the value unity
 only if yt is located on the outer limit of the feasible production
set. Thus the value of the output distance function indicates the potential radial
expansion of production (increase of all outputs yt in the same proportion  ) that
is feasible for a given vector of inputs xt. By definition, the distance function is
linearly homogenous in outputs.
The Malmquist index is defined as the ratio between two distance functions cor-
responding to the input and output vectors of the ith firm at two different periods
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Note that the distance function in the numerator and the denominator are both
defined with respect to the technology in period t. However, the input and output
vectors in the numerator are those of period t + 1, so the numerator may take a
value greater or equal to one. The Malmquist index will be greater than one if
productivity grows between period t and t + 1 and will be less than one if produc-
tivity falls. However, these changes in productivity can be further decomposed by
introducing the output distance function   based on the tech-
nology in period t + 1. This makes it possible to write the Malmquist index as the
product of two ratios:
(4)
Where the first ratio represents Efficiency Change (EC) and the second ratio rep-
resents Technical Change (TC). Efficiency change above unity means that the ith
firm has moved closer to the efficient (best-practice) frontier and thus measures
‘catching up’ (or ‘falling behind’ if it is less than unity). Technical change above
unity indicates technological progress, meaning that the efficient frontier has
shifted out compared to the previous period, and a value below unity suggests
technical regress. Note that the decomposition in (4) requires evaluating the dis-
tance function from period t with the input and output vectors of period t+1   and
vice versa.
Fixler and Zieschang (1992) econometrically estimate an output distance func-
tion for banks with a system of simultaneous share equations. They note that
Shephard’s classic duality result demonstrates that if   is convex and increasing
in   then it is dual to the revenue function   that can be defined
(5)
where pt is a vector of known nonzero, nonnegative output prices. If one of the
outputs in the vector y is actually an input (meaning that the functions D and π
have negative derivatives with respect to this element of the vector y) then the
profit function π can be re-interpreted as the general restricted profit function.
McFadden (1978, p.66) proposed the latter as a unified approach encompassing
the cost-minimising, revenue-maximising and profit-maximising solutions. In
fact, the general restricted profit function can represent (as special cases) the rev-
enue, profit or cost functions (the latter with a negative sign).
In the context of the general restricted profit function, McFadden distinguished
the fixed from the variable outputs and/or (negative) inputs. Fixler and Zieschang
(1992) took the level of deposits as the fixed variable on which the function is
conditioned. The Shephard-Hotelling lemma is generally used to yield the vector
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of revenue-maximising outputs as  . Instead, Fixler and
Zieschange appealed to its obverse to estimate the vector of shadow prices
. To do this, they estimated the conditional distance function
, which is conditioned on the level of deposits. This is appropriate in the bank-
ing context as deposits and other liabilities represent accounting inputs (a use of
funds) even though they may be a source of financial services output. Since the
output distance function is conditional on deposits and liabilities, it generates a
system of gross revenue share equations, relating asset receipts to total asset
income. Instead, an unconditional distance function would generate a system of
net revenue share equations, relating (positive) asset income and (negative)
deposit payments to net asset income. From an econometric point of view, this
would be problematic because net asset income shares would not be bounded
between zero and one, so the results would be more sensitive to random variation
in the interest rates that are effectively endogenous variables in the system.
For each asset class, the gross revenue shares can be calculated as follows
(6)
Where hi = the holding revenue rate on the ith asset;   = the opportunity cost of
funds (rate); RA total income (asset holding revenue plus income from directly
charged services not associated with asset/liability products);  = total
assets; and  . Fixler and Zieschang (1992, p. 230) assume
that the opportunity cost rate ρ is a constant fraction φ of the total return on assets
rTA such that φ = ρ/rTA and restate these equations with a change of variables as
(7)
Where ωi = hiyi/RA = the holding revenue share of the ith product in overall asset
income; si = yi/A = the asset portfolio share of the ith product; rTA = RA/A = the
total rate of return on assets including service charge income.
Assuming the conditional distance function is translog, the economic shares wi
can be written:
(8)
The familiar restrictions  ,  , j =1 , … , M; and
, k =1 , … , K follow from homogeneity of the distance function.





















t , () =
ωi φ si 1 φ – () ω i ⋅ + ⋅ =
ωi αi γyy ij , lnyj
δ 1 =
M



















where  ;  ;   and the ear-
lier homogeneity restrictions can be restated using this new parameterization.
Equation (10) is the share equation for income from directly charged services,
which are not associated with any particular balance sheet items.
Note that since the shares must add up to unity, there is a restriction on the sto-
chastic error terms added to equations (9) and (10):  . The covari-
ance matrix of the disturbance terms across the equations is singular because
these error terms are restricted to add up to zero. Therefore one of the share
equations in the system can be dropped arbitrarily and its parameters recovered
via the homogeneity restrictions. Below we estimate a system of simultaneous
equations including the translog output distance function as well as the share
equations of form (9) and (10).
8.3. DATA
The dataset includes observations from all banks reporting over the sample
1994Q1-2007Q4. On average, 176 banks reported each quarter; however the
exact number of banks per period varies as some banks enter, leave or merge each
quarter. Unfortunately, many of the banks reporting do not provide all the data
required for our analysis. This is often because branches of banks established in
other EU member states are subject to lower reporting requirements. In addition,
some banks are specialised in some very restricted line of business so they report
zeros in many asset/liability positions, which is problematic for our assumed
translog functional form. To ensure a more homogenous sample, we restricted
our analysis to banks that reported all four of the asset categories and both of the
liability categories presented in Table 1 below. This reduces the number of banks
to only 78 per quarter on average. However, the banks that were removed from
the sample were predominantly smaller banks, often both in terms of balance
sheet and in terms of the number of employees. In fact, the sub-sample of banks
considered covered 52% to 71% of the aggregate balance sheet for the sector,
with the coverage rate for total assets averaging 62%. In terms of employment,
the sub-sample of banks considered represented 68% to 85% of all jobs in the
banking sector, averaging 79% over the whole sample period.
ωi φsi µi ψyy ij , lnyj
j 1 =
M
∑ ψyx ik , lnxk
k 1 =
K
∑ εi ++ + + =
ωs µs ψyy sj , lnyj
j 1 =
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k 1 =
K
∑ εs ++ + =
µi 1 φ – () α i = ψyy ij , 1 φ – () γ yy ij , = ψyx ik , 1 φ – () γ yx ik , =
εs Σiεi + 0 =
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Figure 1: Number of Banks and Coverage Rates
Source: BCL.
The observable decline in the number of banks from over 200 to about 140
reflects the move towards consolidation in the European banking sector, as merg-
ers between parent banks in Germany, France, Belgium or other EU countries lead
to mergers in their Luxembourg subsidiaries. In fact, despite this decline in the
number of banks, the Luxembourg financial sector has continued to grow both
in terms of total assets and in terms of employment. This is confirmed by the
following figure plotting the evolution of total assets and employees summed over
all banks for each individual quarter in the sample. Both employment and total
assets grew strongly until the beginning of 2001Q4, when the financial sector
started to contract. Both series have recovered since, with the expansion begin-
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Figure 2: Employment and Total Assets in Luxembourg’s Banks
Source: BCL.
There is no generally accepted definition of bank outputs and inputs and many
studies select them on the basis of the detail available from banks’ balance sheets,
along with an occasional reference to a conceptual framework (see Berger and
Humphrey (1992)). In previous work (Guarda and Rouabah (2006, 2007)), we
followed Fixler and Zieschang (1992) in implementing the user cost approach.
This involved aggregating assets and liabilities drawn from the balance sheet into
different product classes, with each class potentially either an input or an output.
The input/output status of these different financial product classes was then
determined by the sign of their associated user cost. This was calculated as the
difference between a reference rate (the ‘opportunity cost of funds’ denoted ρ
above) and the holding revenue rate for assets or the holding cost rate for liabili-
ties. Therefore, the definition of the different classes of assets and liabilities has
to be chosen as a function of the available detail in the profit-and-loss account,
since the corresponding holding revenues or costs for the given asset or liability
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Table 1: Components of Financial Product Aggregates
Source: BCL.
For asset classes Y1, Y2, Y3 and Y4, the holding revenue rate was constructed
from respective interest or other income but was also adjusted for any write-
downs in value and any transfers to/from provisions to reflect foreign exchange
or credit risk. The holding revenue rate for each asset was constructed for each
bank in each quarter.
Financial product Y5, directly charged services, was classified as an output on an
a priori basis. In fact, Y5 represents the sum of several series in the profit-and-loss
account that cannot be associated with any particular asset or liability class in the
balance sheet. For liability classes Y6 and Y7, the holding cost rate was con-
structed from interest and other costs. Here also, the holding cost rate of each
liability class was calculated for each bank in every quarter. In our data set, some
implausible rates (in excess of 100%) were observed for the holding costs/revenue
rates on some assets/liabilities. To avoid the influence of these outliers, we
dropped the observations associated with the top 0.5% of the distribution (across
all periods) of each holding cost/revenue rate for which implausible values
appeared.
We follow Fixler and Zieschang (1992) in identifying three additional inputs on
an a priori basis: labour (X1), capital (X2, including both tangible and intangible
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fixed assets) and purchased materials and services (X3, including non-wage
administrative costs and commissions paid). Note that ‘commissions paid’ repre-
sents the counterpart of ‘commissions received’, which was integrated in financial
product Y5, directly charged services. In our sample of Luxembourg banks, net
commission income generated by these two flows is of the same order of magni-
tude as income from the interest rate margin. It is therefore crucial to integrate
these commission flows correctly into the analysis to measure productivity in our
sample.
On the basis of bank-specific user costs, Guarda and Rouabah (2007) found that
all asset classes Y1 to Y4 were outputs and that ‘deposits by banks’ Y6 was an
input, consistent with the intermediation approach. However, ‘deposits by cus-
tomers’ Y5 was an output, which is more consistent with the production view of
the banking firm. We maintain this data-driven classification of inputs and out-
puts in the analysis below.
8.4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The simultaneous system of equations described in section 3 was estimated sepa-
rately by SUR (Seemingly Unrelated Regression) for each of the quarters in the
sample. Following Coelli (2000) and Coelli and Perelman (2000), the intercept of
the output distance function was ‘corrected’ by adding the largest negative resid-
ual to impose the constraint that the most efficient firms lay directly on the fron-
tier (the distance function is bounded by unity). Since the Malquist index decom-
position requires evaluating the distance function representing the technology in
period t at input and output vectors observed in period t + 1, this actually
required estimating the system of equations twice for each period. Once it was
estimated over the set of banks that were present both in period t and in the
preceding period, and the other time it was estimated over the set of banks that
were present both in period t and in the following period. This allowed a com-
parison of period t-1 with period t and a comparison of period t with period t +1 .
Note that this comparison was possible for every individual firm present in two
contiguous periods. Thus we constructed Malmquist indices (and their decompo-
sition) for every individual bank and then aggregated them as described in the
following paragraph to obtain an indication of productivity developments for the
industry as a whole.
Figure 3 plots the Malmquist productivity index aggregated across banks and
averaged across quarters for each year in the sample. Individual banks’
Malmquist indices were aggregated using a weighted geometric mean with
weights equal to each bank’s share in total assets summed across all banks in that
particular period. Separate Malmquist indices were also constructed for large and
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small banks, with these defined as those above and below the median value of
total assets for each period. Note that large and small banks were assumed to
share the same technology, as the distance function was estimated over all banks
in the given period; however, since we calculated the Malmquist index for each
individual bank, these sub-aggregates allow us to analyse productivity develop-
ments separately according to size classes.
Figure 3: Malmquist Productivity Growth in Luxembourg’s Banks
Source: BCL.
The first observation one can draw is that productivity developments in large
banks dominate the ‘all banks’ index. For example, in 1994 and 1997 productiv-
ity developments in small and large banks had opposite signs but the index for all
banks has the same sign as the index for large banks. This is a logical result given
that the ‘all banks’ index is a weighted average with weights equal to individual
banks’ share in total assets of the industry as a whole.
A second observation one can draw from Figure 3 is that productivity develop-
ments were generally different for large and small banks. Only in 1995 were they
similar. On average, productivity increased by 1% per quarter over all banks.
Over large banks only, the average increase was nearly 1.2% per quarter and for
small banks it was only 0.7% per quarter. Large banks saw especially strong
productivity growth in 2000, 2003 and 2004. Small banks experienced strong
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Figure 4: Efficiency Change in Luxembourg’s Banks
Source: BCL.
The discrepancies between productivity growth in large and small banks presum-
ably reflect different developments in the underlying Malmquist index compo-
nents (efficiency change and technical change). This conjecture is confirmed in the
following two figures. Figure 4 plots efficiency change calculated from the esti-
mated output distance functions. It is interesting to note that the relative perform-
ance of large and small banks is more similar at level of Efficiency Change com-
ponent than at level of overall Malmquist productivity index. In contrast to the
preceding figure, the average direction of efficiency change was the same for large
and small banks in every year in our sample. This means that the overall index of
efficiency change is not dominated by developments in large banks, which receive
a greater weighting in the aggregation.
According to Figure 4, efficiency change had a substantial positive contribution
in 1996. This could either be indicative of a general ‘catching up’ or of an inward
shift in the efficient frontier, improving the relative position of poor performers.
In fact, the following figure will show this was a year of technical regress so
improved efficiency comes from the frontier moving closer to poor performers
rather than individual banks moving closer to the efficient frontier. In 1997 and
1998 efficiency change was negative. This could be explained by evidence in the
following figure that small banks made strong technical progress in 1997 and that
both large and small banks made progress in 1998. Thus as some banks moved
the efficient frontier outwards, the other banks’ efficiency deteriorated and this
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Figure 5: Technical Change in Luxembourg’s Banks
Source: BCL.
Overall, one can observe a gradual increase in efficiency over 2001-2003 and a
slower increase in 2004-2005. At the end of the sample, efficiency change is mar-
ginally negative in 2007. On average, efficiency change was 3.1% for all banks,
3.1% for large banks and 3.3% for small banks. This suggests rather rapid move-
ment towards the frontier (which may itself be moving). The differences between
the average for large and small banks may not be statistically significant, but it
does suggest that small banks have been better at eliminating waste.
Figure 5 reports the technical change component of the Malmquist productivity
index, measuring shifts in the (best-practice) efficient frontier. This reveals some-
what more disparity between large and small banks than there was in efficiency
change. In particular, average technical change of large and small banks was in
opposite directions in the years 1999, 2001, 2003 and 2005. However, there is
more concordance than was observed in Figure 3 for the aggregate Malmquist
productivity index. Technical regress is observed in 1995 and 1996 (for both large
and small banks). After that, small banks saw technical progress in 1997 through
2001 and then regress until 2007. Instead, large banks saw more irregular devel-
opment, with technical progress only in the years 2000, 2003 and 2005.
On average, technical change was marginally negative (-0.22% for all banks,
-0.05% for large banks and -0.59% for small banks), however, this masks some
significant positive developments in isolated periods. Apparently technical
change is more often positive for small banks, suggesting they have a significant
role in expanding the efficient frontier. In addition, technical change in large
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seems to be less decisive than efficiency change in determining the evolution of
the Malmquist productivity index.
8.5. CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH
This paper uses parametric estimates of an output distance function to calculate
the Malmquist productivity index and its standard decomposition into efficiency
change and technical change. Bank outputs and inputs are defined using the user
cost approach and the technology is modelled using a translog specification for
the output distance function. The distance function is estimated separately each
quarter, avoiding the use of a deterministic time trend or period-specific dummies
to capture technical change.
Results suggest that productivity in Luxembourg’s bank grew by about 1% per
quarter on average over the sample 1994Q1-2007Q4. Productivity growth was
somewhat higher when averaged only over larger banks (in terms of total assets).
The standard decomposition of the Malmquist productivity index suggests that
most of the productivity growth came from efficiency change rather than techni-
cal change. This means that few individual banks occasionally shift the efficient
frontier and that most of the other banks in the sample are catching up, improv-
ing their productivity by reducing their inefficiency.
A major issue that we have not addressed here is the nature of returns to scale.
With estimated translog functions, it is common to check the plausibility of the
constant returns to scale hypothesis by simply summing the first-order parame-
ters on the outputs and comparing to unity. However, this is not an appropriate
test as it only refers to the average observation. The translog function is non-
homothetic so it actually displays variable returns to scale across the sample
space. For a given set of parameter values, returns to scale may be increasing,
constant or decreasing at different observations. Therefore the returns to scale
should be calculated for each bank-period observation and then aggregated
across the sample. The Malmquist index decomposition used here is only valid
where the constant returns to scale hypothesis is approximately satisfied. In the
presence of increasing or decreasing returns to scale the technical change compo-
nent needs to be further decomposed to isolate the effect of changing scale. Färe,
Grifell-Tatjé, Grosskopf and Lovell (1997) propose an alternative decomposition
of the technical change component into the product of an output bias index and
an input bias index. This alternative decomposition, which is implemented in
Fuentes, Grifell-Tatjé and Perelman (2001), could help shed light on the volatility
of the technical change component found in this paper.
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9. INTERNAL WAGE STRUCTURE AND 
BANK PERFORMANCE
Charles-Henri Di Maria1 and Sandy Metzler2
ABSTRACT
The aim of this document is to assess to what extent wage dispersion inside banks
may affect their efficiency through a possible wage incentive scheme. Efficiency is
measured by data envelopment analysis considering multiple inputs and outputs.
At a second stage efficiency scores are regressed on various measures of wage
dispersion and on a set of contextual variables. A Gini index will measure hierar-
chical differential and standard errors of wage equations will proxy wage com-
pression. The main results indicate that some wage dispersion is needed to
increase efficiency among workers who have similar characteristics and a strong
unequal wage structure between workers having different job positions will
adversely affect efficiency in the bank.
9.1. INTRODUCTION
What impact does intra-bank wage dispersion has on bank performance? The the-
oretical and empirical literature on this issue can be split into two contradictory
answers to this question. According to Lazear and Rosen (1981) granting people
with different level of wages provides an incentive to work harder and more effi-
ciently. The worker will then see an opportunity to increase his wage whenever his
effort will be noticed by the human resources. Moreover a relatively dispersed
wage structure will attract more talented employees. This is the so called tourna-
ment model. Similarly for Jirjahn and Kraft (2007), wage dispersion can be seen
as the reflection of an underlying firm policy to highly reward ability and effort.
Therefore it is assumed that individual efforts will aggregate up to enhance organ-
izational performance (Bloom (1999)). Since the seminal work of Lazear and
Rosen (1981) several authors have found a positive link between firm performance
(often measured as labor productivity) and wage dispersion. Among them: Finkel-
stein and Hambrick (1989), Fisher and Govindarajan (1992), Galbraith and Mer-
rill (1991), Gomez-Mejia (1992) and Conyon, Peck, and Sadler (2001).
1 Corresponding author: Charles-henri.dimaria@statec.etat.lu, STATEC, 13 rue Erasme B.P. 304, L-2013 Luxem-
bourg.
2 Authors thank Anna-Leena Asikainen, Jean Ries and Bastien Larue for helpful comments on previous drafts of
this document.
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However, some authors quote several adverse effects that lead to losses due to
wage dispersion. Lazear (1989) explains that wage inequality provides an incen-
tive for counterproductive sabotage activities. It will damage co-operation and
any sense of common purpose across the work force as a whole (Beaumont and
Harris (2003)). Hicks (1963) states that “there should not be strong feelings of
injustice about the relative treatment of different employees, since these would
diminish the efficiency of the team”. For Levine (1991) narrowing the wage dis-
persion can increase cohesiveness and increase productivity. This is also the case
in Akerlof and Yallen (1990). For Beaumont and Harris (2003), the theoretical
foundation for these perspectives lie in the role of relative deprivation theory, and
to a lesser extent in equity theory, in shaping the notion of distributive justice as
found in Cowherd and Levine (1999).
The aim of this document is to examine the link between wage dispersion and
bank performance in Luxembourg. Departing from previous studies the perform-
ance of firms is not measured by labor productivity whose concept is hardly trac-
table in studies relating to banks but by efficiency. Basically efficiency can be
thought as the ability to maximize production for a given bundle of inputs. In
order to compute efficiency of banks, data envelopment analysis (DEA) will be
used. DEA is now a popular framework to assess efficiency of banks. Among the
many advantages of the DEA method is the possibility to deal with multiple
inputs and outputs. Few studies have tried to define what the outputs and inputs
for banks in Luxembourg are (DiMaria (2001) and Guarda and Rouabah
(2007)). For the sake of simplicity the choice of outputs have been decided a
priori given previous studies on the subject. Then inputs are mainly labor and
borrowed funds. Outputs are customer loans and deposits. This choice gives a
mixed approach combining the production and the intermediation approaches.
To measure wage dispersion two proxies will be used. The Gini coefficient will
proxy the hierarchical structure of wage considering the wage dispersion among
employees regardless of their job duty and personal characteristics. And, follow-
ing Lallemand et al. (2007), wages equations are estimated bank by bank, stand-
ard errors will proxy compression of wages. The first section presents the data,
the second section introduces the framework and results while the last section
concludes.
9.2. DATA SOURCES
The data are taken from two main sources. Inputs and outputs come from the
financial statements of Luxemburgish banks for 2002, compiled by the Luxem-
burgish Financial Supervisory Service (Conseil de Surveillance du Secteur Finan-
cier) while data regarding wages are derived from the Structure of Earnings Sur-
vey (2002) conducted by the Luxemburgish National Statistical Institute
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STATEC. See Frising and Haag (2004) for a presentation of the survey. The sam-
ple includes 69 banks and covers in 2002 about 77 percent of total assets of the
banking sector.
9.2.1. Inputs and Outputs
Despite numerous studies in various countries there is no agreement on the defi-
nition of outputs and inputs in the banking sector. Basically for Berger and Hum-
phrey (1992, 1997) most studies can be divided into two main approaches. The
asset approach defines loans and other assets as outputs, while deposits, other
liabilities, labor, and physical capital are treated as inputs. On the other hand, the
value-added approach defines outputs as those assets and liabilities that add sub-
stantial value to the bank and includes labor, the value of premises and fixed
assets (physical capital) as inputs. DiMaria (2001) and Guarda and Rouabah
(2007), have tried to define outputs and inputs for banks in Luxembourg follow-
ing the user cost approach defined by Fixler and Zieschang (1992). However
given the lack of consensus concerning the appropriate production model to be
employed for banks, this study proposes an agnostic – mixed approach.
Table 1: Outputs and Inputs
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Inputs and Outputs
Units million of Euros.



























Mean 1249.53 1775.31 186.40 4512.77 869.26 245.88 306.20
Maximum 13953.98 13518.72 2631.49 34274.69 12114.89 2904.94 2846.00
Minimum 0.89 0.00 0.00 3.28 0.00 1.82 12.00
Std. Dev. 2313.58 3172.17 453.65 6893.20 2098.01 441.50 529.48
Sum 86217.43 122496.50 12861.54 311380.90 59978.82 16965.39 21128
N. Obs. 69 69 69 69 69 69 69
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One drawback in this study but shared by most studies is the difficulty to measure
fixed/tangible capital. It is likely that capital is under estimated.
9.2.2. Wages and Wage Dispersion
Conducting surveys at establishment level is difficult regarding representative-
ness. Guidelines were given by STATEC and the sample of workers inside banks
is supposed to be representative then no weights are used. In addition results
concern the sample of banks and do not aim at representing the banking sector
as a whole then again no weights are used. In this sample of banks the average
gross hourly wage is of about 30 euros with a minimum value of 3.7 euros (note
that the sample includes some trainees) and a maximum of 270 euros. In this
study wage also includes yearly performance bonuses3. The distribution of wages
is likely to be log-normal:
Graph 1: Kernel Density Estimates Gross Hourly Wage
First of all wage dispersion has been measured by the Gini index. This index takes
values in a unit interval. The closer the value is to one the higher inequality is. If
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the Gini index is close to one then a great proportion of wages is concentrated
into a relatively few individuals near to the top of the distribution of wages and
the paid distribution is said to be hierarchical. In average banks show a relatively
low wage dispersion with a mean value of the Gini index of 0.22, the maximum
value being 0.44 and the minimum value being 0.11. Noting that a Gini coeffi-
cient of 0.26 in 2000 for the total Luxembourgish economy has been computed
by EUSILC. Frising and Haag (2004) indicate that the Gini index computed for
the economy from the Structure of Earning Survey is 0.29. The distribution of the
Gini index exhibits some dissymmetry:
Graph 2: Kernel Density Estimates Gini Coefficient
The main a priori disadvantage by using the Gini index is that it is an uncondi-
tional measure of inequality. It does not take into account possible elements that
may explain objective differences in wages such as the level of education, age,
seniority, job position. Gender was also considered as a possible explanatory var-
iable. Then as a second measure of wage dispersion the standard deviation of
errors of a wage equation is used. Wage dispersion is measured by the residual
inequality after controlling for human capital variables. The framework is close
to Winter-Ebner and Zweimuller (1999) and Lallemand, Plasman and Rycx
(2007). It requires the estimation of a wage equation on a set of variables includ-
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for possible heteroskedasticity. Dummy variables have been added to take into
account for the job position in the bank. Seven main categories were considered:
Heads, researchers and analysts, technicians, clerks and sales persons (noting that
the bank provided information following some guidelines defined by STATEC).
It proxies the level of compression of wages. A compressed pay distribution is one
that is spread more equally across individuals in jobs.
First the equation is estimated for the whole sample and results are:
Table 3: Wage Equation Whole Sample
Note: White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance.
The higher the education level of the worker the higher his wage will be. There is
also a positive relationship with age and seniority and as usual a lower wage is
given to women. One should keep in mind that this coefficient is not always sig-
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
Constant 0.772104 0.134355 5.746738 0.0000
Age 0.085983 0.004360 19.72077 0.0000
Age squared -0.000817 5.69E-05 -14.35887 0.0000
Women -0.132094 0.009310 -14.18767 0.0000
Seniority 0.002305 0.000750 3.074417 0.0021
Education 0.036830 0.002511 14.66748 0.0000
Heads 0.886426 0.111601 7.942834 0.0000
Researchers – Analysts 0.458568 0.108568 4.223792 0.0000
Technicians 0.345235 0.108252 3.189187 0.0014
Clerks 0.249032 0.107935 2.307233 0.0211
Sales persons 0.234702 0.108203 2.169094 0.0301
Blue collars 0.263627 0.149435 1.764156 0.0778
Unqualified workers (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
R-squared 0.610121 Mean dependent var 3.314229
Adjusted R-squared 0.608872 S.D. dependent var 0.408623
S.E. of regression 0.255554 Akaike info criterion 0.112710
Sum squared resid 224.2016 Schwarz criterion 0.134114
Log likelihood -182.1431 F-statistic 488.3915
N=3445 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
gross hourly wage ()  = log
α0 α1age α2age




suerf2009.book  Page 172  Tuesday, November 3, 2009  2:42 PMINTERNAL WAGE STRUCTURE AND BANK PERFORMANCE 173
larcier
nificant for all banks. In other words there is not a gender issue in some banks.
However this coefficient is never positive! Then the same equation is estimated
bank by bank and standard errors are collected. These standard errors measure
to what extent ‘similar’ workers are given different wages, this is an intra-firm
wage dispersion for similar workers. These standard errors may be thought as
level paid differences due to individual performance given work responsibilities
and human capital (Milkovich and Newman (1996)):
The mean value is 0.19 and standard errors range from 0.01 to 0.39. Furthermore
the correlation with the Gini index is low (0.29). In other words, intra-firm wage
dispersion and wage dispersion between similar workers move in the same direc-
tion but they are not closely tied. Interestingly it is often assumed that these two
proxies are highly correlated (e.g. Beaumont and Harris (2003)). This issue
should deserve more investigation and comparisons between different economic
activities. One drawback in using standard errors compared to the Gini index is
that it is impossible to state if inequality is significant as standard errors are only
lower bounded by zero. The distribution of standard deviations is symmetric:
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Graph 4: 
9.2.3. Estimation of Bank Efficiency
The next step is the measurement of efficiency. Efficiency is measured in this study
using Data Envelopment Analysis. Efficiency is the ability to maximize outputs
for a given bundle of inputs compared to the best performers. The term Data
Envelopment Analysis was first used by Charnes et al. (1978) who drew upon the
efficiency concepts discussed in Farrell (1957). Thanassoulis (2001) provides a
clear introduction to DEA models. Each bank (or decision making unit, DMU)
produces a set of M outputs   using a set of N inputs  . The tech-
nology is described by:
.
For each input vector   there is a set   of possible outputs:
.
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Assume there is K DMU efficiency scores can be compute using the following
linear program:
A bank is said to be efficient if the score takes value one and the closer to zero the
score is the less efficient the bank is. One hypothesis that should be made is the
nature of returns to scale defining the technology. Various returns to scale may be
imposed and/or tested. It is assumed that constant returns to scale apply in this
study. However, efficiency indexes were computed assuming: constant, non-
increasing, non-decreasing and variable returns to scale and results are similar or
close (correlation coefficients between indexes range from 0.88 to 0.99). The lin-
ear program is run for each bank and produces 69 efficiency scores. Results are
the following: 23 out of the 69 banks are efficient, the average score is 0.62 and
the minimum value is 0.06.
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9.2.4. Impact of Wage Dispersion
The next step is to investigate whether wage dispersion may explain efficiency of
banks. A Tobit analysis is conducted. Simar and Wilson (2007) advocate for the
use of a bootstrap procedure whereas a simple two-steps Tobit approach remains
a popular method (e.g. Pasiouras (2008)). In this study a bootstrap approach has
been used to compute the value of Tobit estimates only4. The aim is to assess to
what extent wage policy – wage dispersion in banks affects their efficiency.
According to the theoretical literature and applied works there is no clear answer.
By construction efficiency scores are bonded by zero and one. Efficient banks
have a score of one while inefficient banks have a score close to zero but no bank
can have a score of zero. In order to estimate a Tobit model, efficiency score are
modified:
Now efficient banks have a score of one and the scores may take any value
between one and  . To allow for some flexibility the wage dispersion is intro-
duced in the equation in a non linear way. Other variables are added in order to
take account for other phenomena that may explain efficiency of banks. Maddala
(1983) presents the estimation procedure of Tobit models and results are:
4 Simar and Wilson (2007) propose two algorithms, the first one only bootstrap Tobit estimates (this is the
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Table 4: Efficiency and Wage Dispersion
Note: based on 1994 replications. Intervals are based on percentiles and the R squared is computed based on
the mean value of coefficients.
Results unearth two non linear relationships between efficiency and wage disper-
sion indicators. On the one hand the more inequality one has inside a bank
regardless of worker characteristics the more inefficient the bank is (this is shown
by the coefficients associated to Gini variables). On the other hand there is a non
linear relationship with wage dispersion among workers and efficiency. Efficiency
increases with some inequality and then decreases. Two graphs are provided.
Regarding the Gini ‘impact’ everything being equal coefficients are applied for the
range [0,1] but for standard deviations the graph is shown for values ranging









Constant -108.3816 -150.8946 -64.8577
Standard deviation -121.5726 -192.3338 -55.2293
Standard deviation squared 278.0100 127.9352 443.1170
Gini 1495.6866 896.7642 2073.6697
Gini2 -5748.2496 -8081.1331 -3315.2434
Gini3 7042.4296 3884.1629 10069.4077
Other variables
Seniority of the bank -0.0234 -0.0356 -0.0122
Number of employees 0.0041 0.0016 0.0074
Share of employees having a wage convention 0.0040 -0.0341 0.0400
Share of employees having upper secondary education -0.0421 -0.0749 -0.0104
Share of employees having Post-secondary non tertiary education 0.2384 0.1350 0.3575
Share of employees between 40 and 49 years 0.1873 0.1038 0.2749
20% banks having the lowest number of employees
Constant 90.6478 41.6387 161.7310
Share of men -1.1074 -2.1123 -0.4101
Share of employees between 40 and 49 years -0.6376 -1.0093 -0.2914
Employees having lower than upper secondary education 1.1750 -0.2143 2.4926
25% oldest banks
Constant -8.0007 -10.4455 -5.8129
Error Distribution
SCALE 2.4498 2.0443 2.8669
R-squared 0.52
Adjusted R-squared 0.35
S.E. of regression 2.1234
Left censored obs 23
Uncensored obs 46 N=69
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Graph 6: Effect of Wage Disparities Among Workers – Gini Index
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9.3. CONCLUSION
Departing from previous studies this analysis considers simultaneously two dif-
ferent measures of wage dispersion. A ‘pure’ hierarchical wage dispersion regard-
less of employees characteristics and job occupation and another measure of
wage compression taking account for the worker specificities. In addition, a non
linear relationship is tested between wage dispersion indicators and efficiency.
The main results show that a compressed wage structure is positively associated
with bank performance. However, among workers sharing similar characteristics
some wage disparity will also increase efficiency, but too much inequality will
adversely affect efficiency and may even lower efficiency. It is important to note
that the two indicators are not strongly correlated. Hence the human resources
department may at the same time decrease wage differential between workers
having different job positions while introducing another disparity scheme
between workers having the same job positions. The wage structure should be in
part hierarchical and not to compressed. The problem will lie in finding the opti-
mal level of wage disparities for these workers to set-up an optimal ‘coopetition’
framework. Compensation pay should be a blend of incentive for coopetition
inside teams and cooperation inside the bank between employees having different
job duties.
However this work could be improved. First several alternatives for the definition
of outputs and inputs could be used and the stability of results should be checked.
Efficiency scores and the Tobit regression estimates could be improved using
simultaneous bootstrap procedures as in Simar and Wilson (2007). Data for the
year 2006 is now available and one may replicate the analysis on this new set of
information and extend the analysis to the impact of wage dispersion on total
factor productivity rather than on efficiency. Noting that, it leads to the definition
of prices for inputs and outputs in order to have data at constant prices. In addi-
tion other motivating factors are not taken into accounts such as pension funds,
stock options which might greatly affect efficiency. Another important point was
left apart. It is likely that people do not only look at the wage scheme in their own
bank but also in other banks. In that case another indicator should be introduced
to assess the relative position of the bank compared to others.
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10. IMPACT OF ICT AND HUMAN SKILLS ON THE 
EUROPEAN FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 
SECTOR
Georg Erber and Reinhard Madlener
ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the impact of ICT- and non-ICT capital, and of labour at
different skill levels, on productivity and employment in the financial intermedi-
ation sector of twelve EU member countries plus the US and Japan. A stochastic
possibility frontier (SPF) approach is applied to assess the relation between the
production inputs and to compute both time-varying and average inefficiencies.
For the empirical analysis, annual data from 1995 to 2005 are employed that
were obtained from recently released data contained in the EU-KLEMS database.
The results obtained shed some light on the relative impact of ICT- and non-ICT
capital and labour inputs, and provide new insights about the structural dynamics
between these factor inputs. We find that the financial service sectors in the twelve
EU member states studied are quite similar in terms of efficiency, and that effi-
ciency and productivity depends much more on human capital than on physical
capital. We conclude that learning-by-doing and learning-by-using are more deci-
sive elements in shaping the productivity growth path than ICT investment alone,
which can leave managers and employees overwhelmed by the complexity and
needs of structural adjustments in the companies’ organisation.
10.1. INTRODUCTION
In the financial services sector there is an ongoing convergence between banking
and insurance industries. On the one hand, banks increasingly try to extend the
range of financial services by offering insurance contracts as well. On the other
hand, insurance companies have started to acquire banks, such as e.g. Allianz the
Dresdner Bank in Germany, typically by merger and acquisition, enabling them
to use banks as distribution platforms for their insurance service products. With
the introduction of the Euro, and the integration of a subset of the EU-27 into a
common currency area, the financial integration process across the national
boundaries has made some further progress, enhancing competition between
banks and insurance from different Eurozone countries in particular. A further
deepening of the integration of the European financial markets is one important
goal to enable Europe greater independence from external shocks, such as the one
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that triggered the subprime crisis in the US, which has diffused far beyond the US
economy to Europe and other parts of the world.
With the increasing use of standardised products and services in the banking and
insurance business that are based on electronic risk ratings of customers, the
banking and insurance industry increasingly utilises computers and telecommu-
nication equipment connected via the Internet as the ordinary distribution chan-
nel of their services. Ranging from Online brokerage and Home banking to Elec-
tronic insurance contracts by companies like CosmosDirect, information and
communications technologies (ICTs) have changed the financial service industry
significantly over the past decade.
The banking industry exhibits the highest proportion of IT investment compared
to all other industries after 1995 (for the US see e.g. Council of Economic Advi-
sors, 2001, for the EU see EITO, various yearbooks 1996 until 2001).
The financial service industry will only be able to grow steadily in the future by
innovations in terms of new financial services. While automatic teller machines
and credit cards were the early enablers to reduce the need for front-desk service
workers, such as cashiers etc., the pervasiveness of the Internet provides the
opportunity to offer and use ubiquitous financial services from virtually every-
where. A particularly attractive option is the conduct of financial transactions via
mobile communications devices. This transformation process has not been com-
pleted yet, so that one might expect that there is a still ongoing labour-saving
process that could last well into the near- and even mid-term future. This begs the
question on whether there is a significant skill bias involved, i.e. whether the
labour-saving process is unevenly spread across different skill levels.
In this paper we investigate the impact of ICT- and non-ICT capital, and labour
input at different skill levels, on aggregate productivity and employment in the
financial intermediation sector of twelve EU member countries, the US and Japan
(the latter two as potential benchmarks). The EU countries covered are Austria,
Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands,
Spain, Sweden, and the UK. More specifically, we apply a stochastic possibility
frontier (SPF) approach to assess the relation between different production inputs
and to compute time-varying inefficiency trajectories and average technical inef-
ficiencies. We employ annual data from 1995 to 2005, obtained from a recently
released dataset (March 2008) contained in the EU-KLEMS database
(www.euklems.net). The empirical results obtained shed new light on the relative
impact of ICT- versus non-ICT capital versus labour inputs, and provide new
insights about the structural dynamics between the different factor inputs consid-
ered.
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The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 10.2 introduces the
theoretical framework and model specification used, section 10.3 contains a
description of the data, sector 10.4 reports on the results gained, and section 10.5
concludes.
10.2. THE MODEL
Commonly used production functions or possibility frontiers restrict the number
of input factors to a small set (e.g. two or three). The famous Solow model
(1957), for instance, just distinguishes between the two primary input factors
labour and capital, L and K, and additionally includes a time trend t representing
autonomous (Harrod-neutral) technical change. If a Cobb-Douglas production
function is used as a model specification, we can write
,( 1 )
where Y denotes output, A is a scaling parameter, γ the rate of technical progress,
α the partial output to labour elasticity, and t a deterministic time trend (as a
proxy for autonomous technical change). In macroeconomic production func-
tions, typically constant returns to scale (CRS) are assumed, which implies that
the partial output elasticity to capital is equal to ( ). By following this tradi-
tion and taking logarithms, we obtain the following linear model in the trans-
formed variables and parameters:
.( 2 )
We can now add the usual two random variables for a stochastic possibility fron-
tier (Aigner et al. (1977); Kumbhakar and Lovell (2003)): an error term
 and a random variable for inefficiency  ,
the latter of which exhibits a left-truncated normal distribution. vt and ut are
assumed to be independently distributed of each other and of the regressors (e.g.
Kumbhakar and Lovell (2003), p. 74), which yields a stochastic Cobb-Douglas
production frontier of the form
.( 3 )
Note that a shortcoming of the Cobb-Douglas function is that irrespective of the
number of input factors considered the implicit substitution elasticity between all
factors is always restricted to unity, which is admittedly a very restrictive assump-
tion1.
1 The constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function, suggested as a useful alternative specification by Arrow
et al. (1961), has an elasticity of substitution that is constant but not necessarily equal to one. This implies that
the elasticity (or complementarity) between input factors becomes measurable.
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For our empirical analysis we decided to use a stochastic possibility frontier (SPF)
that is based on the secondary intermediate inputs, two primary input factors
(capital broken down into two different types, ICT and non-ICT), and labour
input, measured in working hours, broken down into three different skill levels
(low, medium, high). In other words, we consider the following variables:
(1) intermediate input per total hours worked (THW); (2) ICT capital stock per
THW; (3) Non-ICT capital stock per THW; (4) High-skill working hours (WH)
per THW; (5) Medium-skill WH per THW; (6) Low-skill WH per THW; and (7) a
linear time trend.
We estimated this model using a panel data set for the twelve EU member coun-
tries mentioned above (see also section 10.3) plus two other major global finan-
cial markets, the US and Japan. As a particular specification we used the error
component model of Battese and Coelli (1992), which not only allows to estimate
average efficiency levels by country (i.e. 100 is equal to full-scale efficiency, values
below measure the percentage points below the overall efficiency level of an
industry production possibility frontier at a certain period of time). In order to
guarantee CRS for the possibility frontier, the output and input variables were
normalised by the total hours worked. This led to a restricted SPF model, where
the real gross production value per working hour is explained by six factor inten-
sities using total working hours as the denominator. In addition to the constant
term, a time trend was included as well to measure autonomous technical change.
Additionally, an extension including fixed effects into the estimation of the SPF
model was tested. This addresses some criticism raised by Greene (2002, 2005)
that omitting fixed effects could lead to distortions and biases in the SPF param-
eters estimated. Caudill and Ford (1993) showed that omitting heteroscedasticity
may lead to biased estimates of SPFs. In particular, an overestimation of the inter-
cept and an underestimation of the slope coefficient might results from it.
While Kumbhakar and Wang (2005) and Kumar and Russel (2002) embodied
such fixed effects in the estimation of a macroeconomic SPF, Lozano-Vivas et al.
(2002) have applied a latent class stochastic frontier model (LCSFM) to account
for heterogeneity in the individual banks at a country level. Specifically, they use
environmental variables for different countries instead of simple fixed effects
accounting for country differences. Numerous studies using a variety of different
approaches including data envelopment analysis (DEA) have been undertaken for
the banking industry. Accounting for heterogeneity by country fixed effects in the
SPFs therefore offers the possibility to test the underlying assumption of a com-
mon frontier. In our analysis this would implicitly assume that by globalization,
in particular in financial markets, a common global financial market frontier is a
reasonable benchmark for the analysis. Due to flexible global capital markets and
intensive competition across national boundaries, the separation between specific
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national regulatory environments and cultural traditions would become less
important. However, this ideal state must not show up accordingly in the data
available in the national statistics.
10.3. DATA
The financial intermediation sector, as defined by NACE 1.1 (classification code
J) includes, apart from banking services, also insurance and pension funding as
well as activities related to financial intermediation. The EU-KLEMS database
published by the Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC) in March
2008 has insufficient information on the banking sector alone. Hence, for our
econometric analysis based on estimating a SPF, we decided to focus on the some-
what broader ‘financial intermediation’ sector.
From the currently 27 EU member states only less than half supply a complete
dataset that is running at least over the time period from 1995 until 2005. EU-
KLEMS is generally based on annual data only. The twelve countries included in
EU-KLEMS that have a consistent dataset at least for this decade are: Austria,
Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands,
Spain, Sweden, and the UK. They will be denoted as ‘EU-12’ in the following.
Additionally, we have also included the US and Japan as non-EU member coun-
tries but important players in global financial markets in our sample.
Data are available for the gross production value, total intermediate inputs, total
working hours, ICT capital stock and non-ICT capital stock input plus total
working hours. The latter are broken down into working hours for three separate
skill categories (high, medium, low skills).
10.4. RESULTS
For the econometric estimation we used the Frontiers 4.1 software program
(Coelli (1996)). The estimation results were obtained for a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function specification. We studied three different model specifications, in
order to find out how much the inclusion of fixed effects in an SPF estimation
influences the outcome. The first model included fixed effects for the US and
Japan but omitted the dynamic adjustment term (model 1), the second included
the fixed effects and the dynamic adjustment term (model 2), and the last
excluded the fixed effects but included the dynamic adjustment term (model 3).
The results are summarised in table 1, while the specific t-values etc. for each
single model specification have been relegated to the appendix. We also tested a
model variant with fixed effects for all twelve EU-member countries, but it turned
out that eliminating the inefficiency term as a significant variable of the model
suerf2009.book  Page 187  Tuesday, November 3, 2009  2:42 PM188 PRODUCTIVITY IN THE FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR
larcier
leads to a collapse of the SPF model. This might be due to the still fairly short time
frame of eleven years. One might test the consequences of a more unbalanced
panel on the parameter estimation by using in the estimation all data back until
1970 for those countries for which these data are available. However, this exer-
cise is beyond the current state of our analysis reported in this paper.
Table 1: Parameter Estimates of a Stochastic Possibility Frontier (SPF) for Financial 
Intermediation, Models 1, 2 and 3
Gross Production Value per Total Working Hours, based on EU-121 plus US and Japan 
Multi-Country-Panel, 1995-2005
1 EU-12 – Austria, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK
2 TWH – total working hours
Note: *** denotes significance at the 5% level.
Source: EU-KLEMS database provided by GGDC, own calculations.
The parameter estimates obtained are measures for the respective output elastic-
ity of the respective input factor, i.e. an increase of one unit in the respective input
factor increases the output variable by the respective output units. Looking at the
six plus one parameter values we notice that, except for the ICT capital intensity,
all parameters are statistically significant at the 5% level of significance2. It can
also be observed that for all three model specifications tested the parameter esti-
mates are fairly stable. However, when embodying fixed effects for the US and
Japan, two financial markets quite different from the EU with regard to their
regional and economic environment, we find that the significant fixed effects
found in model 1 are not sustained if we allow for time-varying inefficiency terms.
This is due to the fact that the possibility of each country to follow a specific
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Explanatory variables coeff. coeff. coeff.
Constant 0.447*** 0.362*** 0.441***
Intermediate Input per TWH² 0.291*** 0.394*** 0.366***
ICT Capital Stock per TWH2 0.057 0.059 0.056
Non-ICT Capital Stock per TWH2 0.153*** 0.193*** 0.204***
High-Skilled WH per TWH2 0.162*** 0.113*** 0.120***
Medium-Skilled WH per TWH2 0.335*** 0.243*** 0.252***
Low-Skilled WH per TWH2 0.024*** 0.020*** 0.022***
Time 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.017***
Fixed effect USA 0.143*** 0.053 –
Fixed effect Japan 0.169*** 0.077 –
Sigma square 0.012*** 0.026*** 0.029***
Gamma 0.787*** 0.909*** 0.921***
Eta – -0.096*** -0.083***
2 As a rule of thumb t-values above 2 (in absolute values) assure this 5%-signficance threshold of the test.
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inefficiency trajectory is causing a trade-off with the fixed effects which can
adjust for these differences in a more simple way. Keeping both effects statistically
significant is impossible with the current data set and time frame.
So model 1 and model 3 show two alternative ways to explain most of the vari-
ance of the multi-country panel dataset. Only if there were additional variation
in the data there is some hope that both dimensions of fixed effects for some or
even all countries and a dynamic trajectory of inefficiency become statistically
significant. Based on our analysis model 3 without fixed effects seems to be the
superior specification because of the higher value obtained from the maximum
likelihood estimation. The common frontier hypothesis for the EU-12 countries,
the US and Japan finds support against the one where additional heterogeneity
measured by country fixed effects matter.
Statistically, the single parameters in the three models, if tested for equality by
using 95%confidence intervals calculated from the estimates of the three different
models, confirm that they are equal at the chosen significance level (cf. table 2).
Only if the respective intervals defined by lower and upper bounds would not
overlap, the respective parameters would be statistically significantly different
from each other. Therefore, the results show a robust performance of the SPF
estimates even if different specifications are applied.
Table 2: Single Parameter 95%-Confidence Intervals
Source: EU-KLEMS database provided by GGDC, own calculations.
Figure 2 illustrates this outcome for model 2. Note that the different variability
of the single parameter estimates is visualised nicely by this graph.













Constant 0.180 0.543 0.309 0.585 0.280 0.602 identical
Intermediate Input per TWH² 0.261 0.526 0.191 0.392 0.238 0.493 identical
ICT Capital Stock per TWH² -0.006 0.124 -0.004 0.117 -0.007 0.119 identical
Non-ICT Capital Stock per TWH² 0.117 0.269 0.088 0.218 0.133 0.274 identical
High-Skilled WH per TWH² 0.064 0.161 0.124 0.200 0.069 0.171 identical
Medium-Skilled WH per TWH² 0.145 0.341 0.254 0.415 0.154 0.350 identical
Low-Skilled WH per TWH² 0.006 0.034 0.009 0.039 0.008 0.036 identical
Time 0.006 0.028 0.006 0.023 0.008 0.029 identical
Fixed effect USA -0.058 0.164 0.024 0.262 identical
Fixed effect Japan -0.040 0.194 0.066 0.272 identical
Sigma square 0.002 0.049 0.003 0.020 0.004 0.054 identical
Gamma 0.823 0.996 0.623 0.951 0.849 0.993 identical
Eta -0.158 -0.035 -0.137 -0.028 identical
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Figure 1: Confidence Intervals for Parameter Estimates of Model 2
Source: EU-KLEMS database provided by GGDC, own calculations.
Looking at the individual values we can observe that the least significant output
elasticity has to be attributed to the ICT capital stock intensity. This is somewhat
surprising and in sharp contrast to previous empirical findings published, e.g., by
Jorgenson, Stiroh and others (see e.g. Jorgenson et al. (2000, 2005); Stiroh
(2002)). Jorgenson and associates usually found a high impact in their growth
accounting studies with US data on labour productivity growth. Similar finding
are obtained by O’Mahony, Timmer and van Ark (2003, 2007, 2008) for Europe.
However, they calculate their growth accounts using gross value added (i.e.
excluding intermediate inputs) for their calculations and accounting for heteroge-
neity in the labour input by using a quality change indicator instead of the three
more specific human capital variables differentiated by skill classes. Therefore,
there seem to be two potential trade-offs to be considered between the gross pro-
duction value approach versus the gross value added approach. In general, it can
be shown that total factor productivity measured by using gross value added
diminishes if the intermediate factor intensity varies with regard to the gross pro-
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services thus leads to a diminished total factor productivity growth based on
gross production values. Furthermore, in the above-mentioned growth account-
ing studies, insufficient accounting for the impacts of compositional changes in
the labour force according to their skills apparently tends to shift the balance
from human capital as a dominant factor towards a more prominent role of phys-
ical capital, and in particular of ICT capital. By more explicitly taking into
account these other dimensions in our econometric analysis the results are, how-
ever, still consistent with the common EU-KLEMS database. The more detailed
data structure used in this analysis shifts the emphasis from physical capital
towards the important role of human capital. This view is more in line with
endogenous growth theory (see e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995); Aghion and
Howitt (1998)). It also emphasises the importance of outsourcing as a key driver
of labour productivity growth in the financial intermediation industry.
In growth accounting analysis the labour inputs have been included in a very
different approach, where total working hours where not broken down into dif-
ferent skill classes as it is done here. Therefore, a specific skill-bias of technolog-
ical progress could not explicitly be analysed. Instead, only a compositional
change indicator for the compositional changes was used as a proxy variable.
This might have led to an important specification bias, where too much emphasis
was put on physical capital inputs and much less so on human capital inputs. Our
results, however, point into a different direction compared to those attributing a
high impact on physical ICT capital investment. In contrast, we find a high sig-
nificance in the increasing high- and medium-skill using bias while low-skilled
labour inputs have little to contribute to enhancing output productivity. We find
the strongest impact on output productivity per working hour for medium-skilled
labour intensity with 0.335, followed by intermediate input intensity with 0.291,
in model 1. This ranking is changed, when the time-varying efficiency term η is
included in models 2 and 3. Now the intermediate inputs-output elasticity for
models 2 and 3 is even larger, with 0.394 or 0.366 respectively, than the one for
the medium-skilled labour intensity. The high value for the output elasticity of
intermediate input intensity may be attributable to the productivity-enhancing
effect of outsourcing of activities in the financial service industry. By focussing on
the core competencies and outsourcing, those activities where financial interme-
diators in a particular country lack comparative advantages, the optimal make-
or-buy decision-making according to Coase’s theory of transaction costs (Coase
(1937)) can contribute significantly to the productivity growth of the industry.
This aspect has been neglected in studies which exclude intermediate inputs from
their analysis. Non-ICT capital intensity and high-skilled labour intensity rank
third and fourth, with output elasticities of 0.204 and 0.120, respectively, for
model 3. Finally, we find an average annual rate of technical progress of about
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1.7% for the labour productivity growth in the financial service industry in mod-
els 2 and 3.
Concerning the parameters  ,   and   related to the efficiency estimates of the
SPF we obtained the following findings: The first two estimates are statistically
significant at the 5% level of significance, while the latter is not.   is a parameter
determining the autoregressive trajectory of the inefficiency random variable. If
it is statistically insignificant this shows that there is no statistically significant
autocorrelation observable in the inefficiency random variable. The actual
parameter value would show a mild negative autocorrelation. For this reason we
omitted this parameter when estimating the average technical efficiencies by
country, the results of which are summarised in figure 2.
Figure 2: Average Technical Efficiency Estimates in Financial Intermediation Based on 
Fixed Effects Estimates
EU-12 Member States plus US and Japan, 1995-2005 (average values)
1 EU-12 – Austria, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK
Source: EU-KLEMS data provided by GGDC, own calculations.
The range of average efficiency estimates by country varies between 0.98 for Den-
mark and Austria with 0.82. It is noteworthy that with the revised EU-KLEMS
data the efficiency estimates for the UK improved considerably to 0.96, from 0.77
when using the old database3, which embodied a significant underestimation of
the gross production values for the UK. All other countries exhibit average effi-
ciency levels in between. Apart from Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy and the
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UK are very close to each other, with values ranging from 0.98 to 0.96, i.e. differ-
ing only by two percentage points. Similar average efficiency levels are found for
the financial intermediation industries in the US and Japan, with 0.97 each. Spain
(0.94), the Netherlands (0.88), Sweden (0.88), Czechia (0.90), Hungary (0.86),
and France (0.88) are lagging by 5 to 10 percentage points behind those five, with
values between 0.94 and 0.86. According to these results, the least efficient coun-
try in the financial service industry is Austria with 0.83.
These estimates are based on SPF including fixed effects for the US and Japan (i.e.
model 1). By including a time-varying model specification we obtain the dynamic
inefficiency trajectories depicted in figure 3.
Figure 3: Technical Efficiency Estimates in Financial Intermediation Based on Fixed 
Effects Estimates and Time-Varying Efficiencies
EU-12 Member States plus US and Japan, 1995-2004 (annual values)
1 EU-12 – Austria, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK
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From the graph we can see that the efficiencies tend to decline for all countries.
This might be attributable to the fact that technological progress makes it more
and more difficult for all banking and insurance companies in the different coun-
tries to stay abreast, or to catch up, with the new technologies available. Struc-
tural, regulatory and cultural impediments lead to different paths of divergence
from the overall efficiency frontier. However, this outcome would need further
investigation, in order to find out whether it is robust against different alternative
model specifications and interpretations.
10.5. CONCLUSIONS
The fairly invariant efficiency ranking for the twelve EU member countries
obtained in our analysis might be attributable to the fact that we could utilise data
ranging only over an eleven-year time span. It is worth noting that new EU-mem-
ber countries are doing quite well in comparison with some of the older ones. The
shock of the transition period and the complete overhaul of the financial service
industry in the former socialist countries have had a significant efficiency-enhanc-
ing impact, since they did not have to gradually dismiss a defunct legacy. Starting
from scratch they could realise quite reasonable efficiency levels.
Another aspect which probably should be taken into account in this industry is
that with financial market integration, in particular in the Eurozone, the country-
by-country efficiency perspective might be getting less and less appropriate. Due
to the concentration of financial services in a few locations – like London, Paris,
Frankfurt, but also Luxembourg, Dublin etc. – the industry is developing a more
locally concentrated structure, supplying financial services for the entire Euro-
pean Union and worldwide. Therefore, the scale and scope effects of such finan-
cial centres and the mass market for local branch offices for the ordinary custom-
ers would be a much better separation principle to study the changing efficiency
and productivity development. Innovations in complex financial services on the
one hand, and the efficient supply of highly standardised mass at local offices of
banks and insurance companies on the other hand, give very heterogeneous tra-
jectories for the diffusion of new ICTs.
Overall, the financial service sector in the EU-12 member countries considered
lacks a strong heterogeneity or divergence in efficiency with the exception of Aus-
tria. Furthermore, we observe that efficiency and productivity development
depend much more significantly on human capital than on pure physical capital
investment. In particular, there must also have been a significant overinvestment
in ICT capital in this industry in the years 1995-2000, i.e. during the new econ-
omy boom. Only by developing complementary organisational changes and
employing higher-skilled human capital the promises of the ICT revolution
showed up in a much more gradual fashion. This would explain as well why
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labour productivity growth is more steadily related to human skills than to the
pure ICT capital investment boom. Learning-by-doing and learning-by-using are
much more determining the productivity growth trend than a pure ICT invest-
ment boom, which left both employees and managers overwhelmed by the com-
plexity and needs for structural adjustments in the (re-)organisation of their com-
panies. Only by solving these problems and overcoming a number of obstacles the
true long-term benefits of the ICT revolution can be harvested by increased
labour productivity growth.
The policy implications from our analysis are quite clear-cut. In a knowledge-
economy driven by rapid technical change the ability to empower the work force
by appropriate investments in training and skill-formation is much more impor-
tant than investment in information and communications technology per se. ICT
is an enabler, but without sufficient capabilities of the human workforce to use it
efficiently, the costly investments become ineffective. The focus of managers mak-
ing investment decisions should therefore be much more on the implications of a
new technology related to changing needs in skill formation and consequences in
the organisation of business processes than on pure technical equipment: A com-
puter or a broadband Internet terminal device is a general purpose instrument,
but the intelligence of their users and organization of the company concerned
determine the real benefits obtained in the end.
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10.7. APPENDIX
Table A.1: Parameter Estimates of a Stochastic Possibility Frontier (SPF) for Financial 
Intermediation, Model 1: Error Component Model Including Fixed Effects, 1995-2005
Gross Production Value per Total Working Hours based on EU-121 plus US and Japan 
Multi-Country-Panel
1 EU-12 – Austria, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK
2 TWH – total working hours
Source: EU KLEMS database provided by GGDC, own calculations.
Table A.2: Parameter Estimates of a Stochastic Possibility Frontier (SPF) for Financial 
Intermediation, Model 2: Error Component Model Including Fixing Effects and Time 
Varying Adjustment Term
Gross Production Value per Total Working Hours based on EU-121 plus US and Japan 
Multi-Country-Panel, 1995-2005
1 EU-12 – Austria, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK
2 TWH – total working hours
Source: EU KLEMS database provided by GGDC, own calculations
Explanatory variables coeff. standard error t-value
Constant 0.447 0.069 6.468
Intermediate Input per TWH² 0.291 0.050 5.814
ICT Capital Stock per TWH2 0.057 0.030 1.880
Non-ICT Capital Stock per TWH2 0.153 0.032 4.727
High-Skilled WH per TWH2 0.162 0.019 8.476
Medium-Skilled WH per TWH2 0.335 0.040 8.329
Low-Skilled WH per TWH2 0.024 0.007 3.258
Time 0.014 0.004 3.284
Fixed effect USA 0.143 0.060 2.400
Fixed effect Japan 0.169 0.051 3.281
Sigma square 0.012 0.004 2.798
Gamma 0.787 0.082 9.574
Explanatory variables coeff. standard error t-value
Constant 0.361 0.091 3.987
Intermediate Input per TWH² 0.393 0.066 5.942
ICT Capital Stock per TWH2 0.059 0.033 1.805
Non-ICT Capital Stock per TWH2 0.193 0.038 5.079
High-Skilled WH per TWH2 0.113 0.024 4.652
Medium-Skilled WH per TWH2 0.243 0.049 4.975
Low-Skilled WH per TWH2 0.020 0.007 2.932
Time 0.017 0.006 3.050
Fixed effect USA 0.053 0.055 0.958
Fixed effect Japan 0.077 0.058 1.322
Sigma square 0.026 0.012 2.216
Gamma 0.909 0.043 21.061
Eta -0.096 0.031 -3.128
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Table A.3: Parameter Estimates of a Stochastic Possibility Frontier (SPF) for Financial Inter-
mediation, Model 3: Error Component Model Including Time Varying Adjustment Term
Gross Production Value per Total Working Hours based on EU-121 plus US and Japan 
Multi-Country-Panel, 1995-2005
1 EU-12 – Austria, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK
2 TWH – total working hours
Source: EU-KLEMS database provided by GGDC, own calculations.
Explanatory variables coeff. standard-error t-value
Constant 0.441 0.081 5.463
Intermediate Input per TWH² 0.366 0.064 5.744
ICT Capital Stock per TWH2 0.056 0.031 1.787
Non-ICT Capital Stock per TWH2 0.204 0.035 5.796
High-Skilled WH per TWH2 0.120 0.025 4.720
Medium-Skilled WH per TWH2 0.252 0.049 5.140
Low-Skilled-WH per TWH2 0.022 0.007 3.142
Time 0.019 0.005 3.616
Sigma square 0.029 0.013 2.306
Gamma 0.921 0.036 25.699
Eta -0.083 0.027 -3.054
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11. ARE THERE ANY EU MEMBERSHIP-RELATED 
EFFICIENCY ENHANCEMENTS IN BANKING 
SECTORS OF THE NEW EU MEMBER STATES 
DETECTABLE?
Marko Košak and Jelena Zorić
ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the potential effects of the EU membership
for the banking sectors’ efficiency in the new EU member states. Following a
general belief and relatively limited research on the positive effects of the EU
integration processes for the improvements in competitiveness of banking mar-
kets and consequent enhancements in banking efficiency, we decide to test the
evidence on banking efficiency prior to and after the entry to the EU for the set
of eight acceded Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries that became EU
members in 2004. Cost frontier function in the 1996-2007 period is estimated by
employing different panel data stochastic frontier methods. Average cost effi-
ciency is found to be around 80%, indicating a potential for significant cost
reductions in the CEE banks. Contrary to the prior expectations that the EU
accession processes and associated regulatory reforms and institutional changes,
which intensify competition, should facilitate substantial bank efficiency
enhancements, we find rather weak evidence in support of this hypothesis. It is
very likely that some barriers to the full scale integration and efficiency improve-
ments still remain in place.
11.1. INTRODUCTION
Prior to transition, banking sectors in most of the Central and Eastern European
countries were virtually non-existent in terms of performing standard banking
functions. Nevertheless, banking sectors in the new EU member countries in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe (CEE) have undergone a remarkable transformation,
particularly in the process of the EU accession. They adopted the common EU
legislation and regulation, undertook extensive structural and institutional
reforms, and integrated their banking systems, at least to some extent, into the
EU banking sector.
Several authors studied efficiency in banking sectors of the CEE countries (e.g.
Weill (2003); Fries and Taci (2005); Rossi et al. (2005); Kasman and Yildirim
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(2006); Holo and Nagy (2006)). These studies mostly focus on the impact of
foreign and/or state ownership on bank efficiency and comparative analysis of
banking sector efficiency across countries, while none of them has focused on the
investigation of the impact of the EU membership on banking sector perform-
ance.
As pointed out by Altunbas et al. (2001) and Schure et al. (2004) the enforcement
of the single market programme in the EU should increase competition in banking
sectors of member states and therefore affect also the cost efficiency of the indi-
vidual banking firms. Similarly Berger et al. (2000) elaborate extensively on the
interrelationship between the efficiency and international consolidation within
the financial services industry in the EU and confirm the existence of a substantial
potential for efficiency gains from financial services industry consolidation in
Europe. They postulate the actual efficiency gains to be relatively limited because
of the different barriers preventing financial institutions from taking a full scale
advantage of the EU integration. However, the empirical research on the effi-
ciency gains in financial sector as a result of the EU integration is very limited and
virtually not existent for the EU member states that joined the integration
recently.
Therefore, the main challenge of this study is to evaluate cost efficiency improve-
ments of banking firms in the CEE countries due to their entry in the EU. We
hypothesize that vast institutional changes, regulatory and economic reforms,
stimulated by the EU membership, should enable substantial enhancements in
banking sector efficiency in the ‘new’ EU member countries. Several stochastic
frontier panel data models are employed to estimate cost efficiency of the CEE
banks, which also makes possible to examine the reliability of obtained efficiency
scores. A translog cost frontier function is estimated based on an unbalanced
panel data set of 221 banks over the 1996-2007 period. We are interested in
detecting the effects of EU membership and related regulatory and institutional
changes on the efficiency improvement of banking sectors in the ‘new’ EU mem-
ber states. Due to the simultaneous entry in the EU on 1st May 2004 and very
similar pre-accession development paths (i.e. similarities in the economic, politi-
cal and social transition) we focus on a set of eight CEE countries (i.e. Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia) and
their banking sectors.
The introductory section is followed by a brief literature review. In section three
model specification and methodology are provided. Section four introduces data
and provides description of the variables, while section five brings interpretation
of the estimation results. Section six concludes the paper.
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11.2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The research on banking efficiency in Central and Eastern European economies
has intensified only recently and has been stimulated by the growing importance
of these banking sectors, by improved data availability and the quality of the
data. At first efficiency studies were focused strictly on studying efficiency in indi-
vidual countries or smaller group of countries in the region, subsequently cross
country studies have followed.
A study by Weill (2003) represents an attempt of a direct comparison of the bank-
ing efficiency in Western and Eastern European countries. Weill’s research pro-
vides evidence on the existence of an efficiency gap between Western and Eastern
banks, which is mainly caused by differences in managerial performance, while
environmental and risk preference effects did not turn out to be important. As
indicated by the author, further research in this area is needed, not only on the
existence of the efficiency gap but also on the evolution of efficiency and its expla-
nations.
In one of the first cross country studies in the region Yildirim and Philippatos
(2002) examine cost and profit efficiency of banking sectors in twelve CEE econ-
omies over the 1993-2000 period. They show that higher efficiency levels are
associated with larger size, higher profitability and equity. The level of competi-
tion and GDP growth are found to increase efficiency while market concentration
is negatively linked to banking efficiency. With respect to the relationship
between ownership and efficiency foreign banks are found to be more cost effi-
cient but less profit efficient.
In the first one of the two papers Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel (2005a) analyse
banking efficiency and related ownership effect for banks in eleven transition
countries (five Central and Eastern European countries, three Baltic countries,
and Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia) by using data for the 1996-2000 period.
Their findings show that government-owned banks are not appreciably less effi-
cient than domestic private banks but they proved that foreign-owned banks are
more cost-efficient than other banks and that they also provide better service, in
particular if a strategic foreign owner involved. In the second paper Bonin, Hasan
and Wachtel (2005b) employ data for six transition countries, for the period
1994-2002 and show that both the method and the timing of privatization matter
to the performance of banking firms.
The study by Fries and Taci (2005) was performed on a sample of 289 banks from
15 East European countries for the period 1994-2001. The authors focused on
cost efficiency of banks and investigated an extensive set of correlating factors
that could be associated with costs of banking operations. They confirmed that
greater macroeconomic stability and competition resulting from foreign bank
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entry, as well as development of the supportive institutions, promoted cost effi-
ciency. However, they emphasized that for most Eastern European countries the
major challenge after their accession to the European Union and the common
market for financial services would be the increased competitive pressure. As they
used only data up to 2001, this effect could not have been examined empirically.
In the very recent paper Hollo and Nagy (2006) concentrate on studying bank
efficiency in the enlarged EU. They confirm the existence of the X-efficiency gap
between the banking sectors in the ‘old’ and ‘new’ EU member states, but the
competitive edge of old EU members in relation to cost efficiency is decreasing
over time. A comparative analysis of bank efficiency in eight CEE countries by
Kasman and Yildirim (2006) reveals great variability in efficiency and superior
efficiency of foreign owned banks.
Typically cross country studies on banking efficiency in Eastern European econ-
omies focus on comparing efficiency among transition economies (e.g. Kasman
and Yildirim (2006)) or on detecting the existence of an efficiency gap between
more developed banking sectors of Western Europe on the one side and still devel-
oping banking sectors in Easter European countries (e.g. Hollo and Nagy (2006);
Košak and Zajc (2006)) on the other side. Studies, which would aim at capturing
the effect of the EU membership on the efficiency in banking sectors of the new
EU member states are rare. So Brissimis et al. (2008) for ten newly acceded coun-
tries show that banking sector reform has a positive effect on bank efficiency,
which is partly channelled through the effects of competition and risk taking of
banks. As opposed to the aforementioned studies Brissimis et al. (2008) in their
model apply DEA method for measuring efficiency by using data for the 1994-
2005 period.
In their attempt to analyse, at least indirectly, the effects of EU membership on
banking sector efficiency most of the authors concentrate on the Western Euro-
pean countries. Schure et al. (2004) study cost efficiency of banks in 15 EU mem-
ber countries in the 1993-1997 period and find out that the efficiency varies a
great deal within Europe and there seems to be no tendency towards convergence.
Altunbas et al. (2001) draw attention to the significance of the single market
programme within the EU, which is supposed to strengthen competitive pressures
and make firms to reduce costs either by enhanced productivity or by the
improved exploitation of scale economies. In this paper the authors don’t test
directly the effects of the establishment of the single market but rather estimate
scale economies, X-inefficiencies and technical change for a sample of European
banks between 1989 and 1997.
Berger et al. (2000) are much more exhaustive in elaborating the efficiency gain
potentials due to the European integration and related EU policies, such as the
Single Market Programme and European Monetary Union. They hypothesize that
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international consolidation of financial institutions should be intensified across
national boundaries in the EU and should be related to several efficiency effects
(i.e. scale, scope and X-efficiency effects). However, they also point at several
barriers to efficiency gains such as difficulty of managing and monitoring institu-
tions from a distant headquarters, differences in language, culture, currency, dif-
ferences in regulatory / supervisory structures, differences in explicit or implicit
rules against foreign competitors etc. The findings provided by Berger et al.
(2000) indicate that barriers to cross border operating efficiency offset most of
potential efficiency gains from cross border consolidation. In their most recent
paper Bos and Schmiedel (2007) address the issue of comparability of European
major banking markets by employing the meta frontier approach and they find
evidence in favour of the existence of a single European banking market, charac-
terised by common cost and profit meta frontiers.
The integration and cross border consolidation opportunities seem to be critical
to the achievement of significant efficiency gains. As stated by Goddard et al.
(2007) the “quantification of the extent to which European banking markets
have achieved integration, in the sense of the complete elimination of barriers to
cross border activity, remains an imprecise science”, although some indicators are
available. Dermine (2006) summarises evidence on the degree of banking integra-
tion in Europe based on three criteria: (i) the law of one price on the retail bank-
ing markets, (ii) cross border banking business and (iii) market share of foreign
banks. Based on pricing of cross border transfers and interest margins on deposits
the author claims that the law of one price (1st criterium) does not hold in the
retail banking market. Similarly, the evidence on the cross border banking busi-
ness and market share of banks in foreign ownership in the ‘old’ EU member
countries is not very strong.
On the other side, we can find somewhat stronger evidence on the cross border
banking business (2nd criterium) and market share of foreign banks (3rd crite-
rium) for the banking sectors in the new EU member states. For example, the very
recent report by UniCredit Group (UniCredit Group (2008)) designates the bank-
ing model commonly in place in Eastern European markets as a “banking model
that implies need for external funding”, which is predominantly provided to the
local subsidiaries and branches by their parent banking companies. Similarly, the
data on foreign ownership in banking sectors of Eastern European markets reveal
heavy presence of foreign owned banks in most of the markets in Eastern Europe.
Both, the presence of foreign owned banks and external funding dependence have
intensified parallel to the progress of the EU accession processes in Eastern Euro-
pean economies, therefore we can assume that they reflect a relatively strong inte-
gration in the EU banking market, which was not the case before the accession
processes started in these economies.
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11.3. MODEL SPECIFICATION AND METHODOLOGY
The most commonly used approaches in empirical literature to model banks’
costs are the production approach and the intermediation approach. The two
approaches differ in the view on the role of deposits, which have both input and
output characteristics. The first approach views banks as using labour and capital
to produce deposits and loans and therefore considers deposits as an output,
while the second approach considers financial institutions mainly as mediators of
funds between savers and investors. Under the latter approach it is assumed that
banks collect deposits to transform them using labour and capital in loans, mean-
ing that deposits are considered as input. The production approach is usually
viewed to be suitable when analysing the efficiency of bank branches. In contrast,
the intermediation approach is adopted when analysing banks that operate as
independent entities (Bos and Kool (2006)). Moreover, Berger and Humphrey
(1991) and Bauer et al. (1993) proposed a modified production approach, which
allows both the input and output characteristics of deposits to be considered in
the cost function. According to this approach the volume of deposits should be
viewed as an output while the interest rate paid on deposits should be considered
as an input price (Rossi, Schwaiger and Winkler (2005)).
Following Sealey and Lindley (1977) the intermediation approach is employed in
our study1. Additionally, by not considering deposits as outputs we avoid a poten-
tial multicollinearity problem as the estimated correlation between loans and
deposits in our sample is very high2. For the specification of the cost model, we
consider a bank which uses several inputs (borrowed funds, physical capital and
labour) to produce multiple outputs (loans, securities and other earning assets).
In addition, to control for heterogeneity between countries and banks several
environmental and exogenous factors are introduced in the cost function.
Exogenous variables included in the model may belong in the cost frontier or they
may belong in the inefficiency term. In the former case, the exogenous variables
influence performance by influencing the production process and not by influenc-
ing efficiency, while an alternative approach tries to explain variation in efficiency
with variation in exogenous variables. In the first formulation the frontier cost
function is more accurately specified, but on the other hand, variation in ineffi-
ciency is left unexplained. On the contrary, in the second formulation environ-
mental and non-discretionary variables influence costs indirectly through its
effect on estimated efficiency. However, in most cases, it is not evident whether a
certain exogenous variable is a characteristic of production technology or a deter-
minant of inefficiency and a decision has to be made based on the researcher’s
1 The intermediation approach has been, for example, used by Berger and Mester (1997), Weill (2003), Bos and
Kool (2006), and Hollo and Nagy (2006).
2 The correlation coefficient between loans and deposits is estimated to be above 0.95.
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judgment (Deprins and Simar (1989)). Both approaches will be considered in this
work to establish to what extent are the efficiency estimates sensitive to the
employed specification of the cost function.
Initially, a two-stage procedure was proposed for estimation of the frontier cost
function when exogenous variables directly affect efficiency. The two-stage
approach in which efficiency estimates from the first stage are regressed on a
vector of potential correlates has been used in several bank efficiency studies, for
example Allen and Rai (1996), Berger and Hannan (1998), Berger and Mester
(1997), Chang, Hasan and Hunter (1998) and Mester (1993 and 1994). Hasan
and Marton (2000a) performed a two-stage efficiency analysis for Hungary, and
Nikiel and Opiela (2002) for Poland. Among the most recent studies a two stage
approach was used in Bonin et al. (2005). However, the two-stage formulation
has serious econometric flaws. Wang and Schmidt (2002) argue that if there are
any interesting effects to be observed in the second step, then it follows from
considerations of omitted variables that the first-step estimators are biased and
inconsistent. To overcome this problem, Kumbhakar, Ghost and McGuckin
(1991) proposed a single-stage stochastic production frontier model. Battese and
Coelli (1995) extended this approach to accommodate panel data. Based on the
above discussion, only the latter approach will be used in our study.
Estimation of cost function requires a specification of the functional form. The
translog functional form is employed which is a locally flexible functional form
widely used in the empirical literature3. The usual assumptions on linear homo-
geneity in input prices and symmetry conditions are imposed. Given the relative
input prices, output levels and output mix, banks are assumed to choose inputs
so as to minimise total cost. The translog form of the cost function to be estimated
is specified in the following way:
lnCit =  (1)
where i = 1, …, N and t = 1, …, Ti, C represents total cost, yj (j = 1, 2, 3) stands
for j-th output, wl (l = 1, 2, 3) stands for l-th input price, while zk (k = 1, …, K)
3 An alternative would be to use a globally flexible Fourier functional form, which increases the number of
parameters to be estimated and thus requires large samples. Given the relative small sample size of banks in our
study, any gains from estimating more flexible and general functional form would be probably outweighed by
the substantial loss of degrees of freedom. Moreover, Berger and Mester (1997) compared the translog to the
alternative Fourier form and found out that the difference in results in terms of banks’ inefficiency is almost
negligible.
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stands for k-th environmental variable. To allow for the impact of technological
change on efficiency, a linear time trend term is included. Time variable t is con-
sidered to be a neutral technological change. Furthermore, normalization of cost
and input prices by one of the input prices is used to impose linear homogeneity
in input prices. Hence, the total cost, the price of borrowed funds and the price
of physical capital are divided by the price of labour.
As the evidence from empirical studies shows that the various benchmarking
methods often produce different results with respect to firms’ efficiency scores
and rankings4, the stochastic frontier cost function in (1) is estimated using three
different SFA methods. In this way we will be able to examine whether the
obtained efficiency scores are sensitive to the method applied. The differences
between the various specifications are related to the assumptions imposed on the
error term (εit), cost inefficiency and firm-specific effects. Model I is a pooled
frontier model estimated by Maximum Likelihood (ML) method as proposed by
Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977). Since the focus of the SFA is not on estimating
the frontier cost function but rather on the error term, especially the inefficiency
component, let us express the cost frontier function in (1) in the following way:
ln  = c(yit, wit, zit; α, β) + vit + uit,( 2 )
where C* denotes the normalised costs, vectors of explanatory variables y, w and
z stand for outputs, input prices and environmental variables, respectively, β is the
vector of coefficients and α is the regression constant. The error term ( ) in
Model I is composed of two parts: a stochastic error (vit), capturing the effect of
noise, and a one-sided non-negative disturbance capturing the effect of ineffi-
ciency ( ). To estimate the stochastic cost frontier using the ML method, the
following distributional assumptions have to be made:  ,
, and vit and uit are distributed independently of each other and
of the regressors. This model is referred to as a Normal-Half Normal Model. The
cost efficiency is usually expressed in terms of cost efficiency score:
(3)
where Cit is the observed total cost and   is the stochastic frontier or minimum
cost of the i-th firm in time t. Cost efficiency score of one indicates a firm on the
frontier, while non-frontier firms receive scores between zero and one. Alterna-
tively, the cost inefficiency score can be calculated as the reciprocal of the cost
efficiency score defined in (3).
4 For example, see Bauer et al. (1998), Estache, Rossi and Ruzzier (2004), Farsi, Filippini and Greene (2005),
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Since Model I does not assume any firm-specific effects, we furthermore turn to
the panel data stochastic frontier models. The conventional panel data stochastic
frontier methods proposed by Pitt and Lee (1981) and Schmidt and Sickles (1984)
assume that inefficiency is time-invariant. In a lengthy panel, this can be rather
limiting assumption. Therefore, in Model II we consider time varying inefficiency
model proposed by Battese and Coelli (1992):
ln  = c(yit, wit, zit; α, β) + vit + uit,( 4 )
in which inefficiency component uit is assumed to be an exponential function of
time:
(5)
where eta ( ) is the decay parameter in modelling the inefficiency effects. The
function in parentheses is positive and decreases (increases) at an increasing rate
if   > 0 (  < 0) or remains constant if   = 0. A normal distribution for vit and a
truncated normal for ui is assumed and the model is estimated using the ML
method. However, the systematic movement of inefficiency retains a rigid model
structure.
In Model I and Model II the cost inefficiency is left unexplained by the model as
environmental variables are included in the cost function. Therefore, in Model III
we additionally estimate the stochastic frontier cost function in which inefficiency
is specified to depend on exogenous variables. Battese and Coelli (1995) model is
applied, which is formulated in the following way:
ln  = c(yit, wit; α, β) + vit + uit,( 6 )
where the cost inefficiency term uit has a systematic component γ’zit associated
with exogenous variables and a random component eit:
uit = γ’zit + eit (7)
Inserting the expression for uit in (7) in the cost frontier function in (6) yields:
ln  = c(yit, wit; α, β) + vit + γ’zit + eit,( 8 )
This model is estimated in a single stage by the ML procedure where
(γ’zit, ). It was introduced as an alternative to the two-stage estimation
approach which was found to suffer from serious econometric problems.
Cit
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11.4. DATA
The analysis includes eight new EU member states, five from Central and Eastern
Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia), and three Bal-
tic countries (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia). Although there are differences
among the banking sectors of these countries, they form a relatively homogene-
ous group. In particular, preparations for EU membership and the membership
itself brought about the introduction of the common EU legislative framework
and the common regulation standards. This allows us to compare estimated bank
efficiencies across countries.
To construct the sample, we used information drawn from the financial state-
ments of individual banks provided by the Fitch IBCA’s BankScope database.
Fitch IBCA collects data from balance sheets, income statements and other rele-
vant notes in audited annual reports. To ensure consistency, only data for com-
mercial banks in the unconsolidated format were used. Data, expressed in euros,
were collected for the 1996-2007 period and corrected for inflation in order to
ensure comparability in time (see Table 1 for description of variables obtained
form the BankScope database).
Mathieson and Roldos (2001) indicate three important characteristics of the
BankScope database. First, its comprehensive coverage as BankScope has data on
banks accounting for around 90% of total bank assets in each country. Second,
comparability – the data-collection process is based on separate data templates
for each country to accommodate different reporting and accounting standards.
Fitch IBCA adjusts the collected data for country specificities and presents them
in a so-called global format, i.e. a globally standardised form for presenting bank
data. Thus, BankScope data is comparable across banks and across countries, i.e.
it allows cross-country comparisons (Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga,
2001). Third, BankScope provides balance sheet data for individual banks, which
are usually not available from other sources.
In specifying input prices and outputs of the cost function, we follow the interme-
diation approach. Three inputs (labour, deposits and physical capital) are used to
produce three outputs (loans, other earning assets and deposits). The three inputs
reflect the three key groups of inputs in the bank production process: bank per-
sonnel and the management expertise necessary for the provision of bank serv-
ices, funds collected on the liabilities side, and offices, branches and computer
hardware.
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Table 1: Input and Output Variables from the Bankscope Database
BankScope does not provide data on the number of employees that would enable
the construction of the price of labour ( w3). Instead, the ratio of personnel
expenses over total assets is used as a proxy, which is a common approach in bank
efficiency studies based on BankScope (Yildirim and Philippatos (2002)). Price of
funds (w1) is constructed as the ratio of interest expenses over funding. Price of
physical capital (w2) is obtained as noninterest expenses over fixed assets. The
three outputs, loans, securities and other earning assets are considered to be suit-
able proxies for banking services provided. Total loans (y1) is the total amount of
loans of each individual banking firm. Other earning assets (y3) is the sum of
deposits with other banks and equity investments. Total securities (y2) is the sum
of securities held by banks among their assets. The dependent variable, total cost
(C), is the sum of, personnel expenses, interest expenses and other expenses.
Equity ratio (EQ) is considered in the model to reflect the riskiness of banking
operations.
Furthermore, to control for the heterogeneity, a number of exogenous or environ-
mental variables have been included in the model. Potential environmental vari-
ables have been tested in various studies, for example Allen and Rai (1996),
Berger and Mester (1997), Casu and Molyneux (2000), Dietsch and Lozano-
Vivas (2000) and very recently Fries and Taci (2005) and Bonin et al. (2005). To
select environmental variables we particularly draw on three recently published
studies. Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000) was one of the first papers investigating
closely the factors that could explain cross-country differences in measured effi-
ciency scores. The authors isolated three groups of environmental variables: main
conditions, bank structure and regulation, and accessibility of banking services.
Fries and Taci (2005) employed two categories of variables: country-level factors
and correlates with bank inefficiencies. Bonin et al. (2005) focus on ownership
characteristics affecting efficiency score variability and also control for some
environmental variables.
Variable type Symbol Variable name Variable description
Dependent
Variable




w1 Price of borrowed funds Interest expenses over the sum of deposits 
w2 Price of physical capital Noninterest expenses over fixed assets
w3 Price of labour Personnel expenses over total assets
Output
quantities
y1 Total loans Sum of short- and long-term loans
y2 Securities  Sum of securities held by banking firms
y3 Other earning assets Total earning assets less total loans and securities
Other variables EQ Equity ratio Equity capital as proportion of total assets
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Following the above-mentioned studies we formed three groups of variables that
are assumed to be associated with cost and efficiency differences across banks.
The first group are country level variables explaining macroeconomic conditions
(GDP per capita, population density and dummy for EU membership). The sec-
ond group consists of variables describing the structure of the banking industry
in specific countries (intermediation ratio, HH index of market concentration,
number of banks operating within the country and EBRD index of banking sector
development). Finally, variable indicating foreign ownership status, market share
and net interest margin are included in the third group of variables describing the
individual bank characteristics. Table 2 gives an overview of the selected variables
to be included in the cost frontier function. Variables were obtained from differ-
ent sources, including central bank publications, IMF’s International Financial
Statistics and from various issues of the EBRD Transition Reports.
Table 2: Description of the Environmental Variables Included in the Model
Note: *– Variables MS, NIM and NRBANK are only included in Model III to explain variation in cost ineffi-
ciency.
Variable type Symbol Variable name Variable description
Individual bank 
characteristics
DOW Ownership status of 
individual bank
Dummy variable identifying the ownership of an 
individual bank (value 1 if bank is in foreign 
ownership, value 0 if not)
MS* Market share Market share of an individual banking firm as 
measured by total assets.
NIM* Net interest margin Net interest income to total assets ratio, where net 
interest income is calculated as a difference 
between the interest income and the amount of 




INTERMED Intermediation ratio Ratio of total banking sector loans to total 
deposits of the banking sector
HHI Hirschman – Herfindahl 
index
HHI index of market concentration, measured by 
total assets of banking firms in each national 
market separately
EBRD EBRD index EBRD banking sector development index as 
defined by EBRD and taking values on a 1 to 4 
scale, where 1 reflects the least developed and 4 
the most developed banking sector, according to 
the EBRD criteria.
NRBANK* Number of banks Number of banks operating in the banking sector.
Country level 
variables
POPDEN Population density Number of inhabitants per square kilometre.
GDPpc GDP p.c. in PPP GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (in 
EUR)
DEU EU membership Dummy variable for post EU accession period 
(takes on value 1 from the year 2004 on and 0 
value otherwise)
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Special attention was paid to composing the ownership variable, which contains
information on the ownership structure of each individual banking firm included
in the sample. The BankScope database provides information on bank ownership.
There are, however, two problems with this information. First, no ownership
information is available for some banks, especially banks that ceased to exist, or
were merged with or taken over by other banks. Second, BankScope classifies
banks as foreign or domestic at the time the database was last updated. Many
authors use the built-in filter to separate domestic from foreign banks, but we
believe that this is not an optimal procedure. Although it is a very time consuming
and difficult procedure, one should gather ownership data for each bank in each
year. We used a wide array of sources, e.g. annual reports, home pages as well as
financial periodicals to compile precise and up-to-date ownership data on indi-
vidual banks. Bol et al. (2002) apply a similar approach to construct their data-
base.
Descriptive statistics of all variables included in the model are presented in
Table 3. The sample of banks is not constant over time. Thus, an unbalanced
panel data set was created consisting of 221 banks over the 1996-2007 period.
The sample consists of total 1093 observations. Following Bonin et al. (2005)
prior to the estimation of the cost function all the observations containing missing
variables and variables with non-positive values have been excluded. As a result
not all of the active banks in individual countries were included in our sample.
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11.5. ESTIMATION RESULTS
The estimation results of the translog cost frontier function for the sample of CEE
banks over the 1996-2007 period are given in Appendix. It can be noticed that
different models lead to quite similar results with respect to the coefficient esti-
mates. The expansion point of the translog stochastic frontier cost function is
chosen to be the sample median. Since total cost and all the continuous explana-
tory variables are in logarithms, the estimated first-order coefficients can be inter-
preted as cost elasticities evaluated at the sample median. As expected, results
show that input prices and outputs are positive and highly significant. The sum
of the three output coefficients slightly exceeds 1, indicating the presence of slight
diseconomies of scale in the median-sized banks. A one percent increase in loans,
securities and other earning assets would lead to an increase of a little more than
1% in total cost at the median point. Nevertheless, the operation of median-sized
bank is not very far from the optimal size which is characterized by the constant
returns to scale and the sum of output coefficients equalling 1. Time seems to
have a negative influence on the cost, where the time coefficient is being strongly
significant in Model I and Model III. Based on the results it can be concluded that
due to the technical progress total costs of CEE banks have been decreasing over
the 1996-2007 period.
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics of the cost efficiency estimates of CEE
banks obtained from Models I-III. It is evident that different models result in very
similar average cost efficiency levels and that significant cost inefficiencies are
present in the banking systems of the CEE countries. Cost efficiency is estimated
to be between 79% and 82% on average indicating that the CEE banks should
on average decrease their costs between 18% and 21% in order to become cost
efficient. While cost inefficiency is left unexplained by the pooled model (Model
I) and time-varying Battese and Coelli (1992) model (Model II), Battese and
Coelli (1995) model (Model III) is formulated in such a way that variation in
inefficiency can be explained by the exogenous variables considered in the model.
Following from Table A.2 in Appendix, cost inefficiency in Model III tends to be
lower for banks with higher market share and for countries with higher number
of banks. The latter captures the effect of the degree of competition in a given
country, while the former could indicate the existence of the efficient structure
hypothesis. According to the efficient structure hypothesis high concentration
endogenously reflects the market share gains of efficient banking firms (e.g.
Berger et al. (2004)), which could be the case in rapidly developing Eastern Euro-
pean banking markets where the opening up process has led to fierce competition
among banks. On the other hand, net interest margin and foreign ownership are
not found to significantly influence the cost inefficiency of the CEE banks.
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Results obtained by Model II furthermore indicate that the EU membership has
a negative and significant influence on cost inefficiency which speaks in favour of
our assumption that the EU membership would lead to improved cost efficiency
of the CEE banks. Alternatively, when the EU membership is assumed to influ-
ence the cost directly as in Model I and Model II, it can be detected that the costs
have on average lowered since the entrance in the EU, however, this effect is not
being significant. A significant and positive coeffiecient η estimated in the time
varying Model II (see Table A.2 in Appendix) provides evidence on average effi-
ciency improvement over time, although it does not distinguish between the pre-
and post-entry period.
Table 4: Estimated Cost Efficiency Scores (EF)
As empirical literature provides mixed evidence on robustness of efficiency scores
obtained by different methods, it is also important to check the reliability of
obtained efficiency scores5. Bauer et al. (1998) proposed a set of consistency con-
ditions which frontier efficiency measures should meet so as to be most useful for
regulatory purposes. Following Bauer et al. (1998) the efficiency estimates should
be consistent in their efficiency levels, rankings, identification of best and worst
practice, consistent over time and with competitive conditions in the market, and
consistent with standard non-frontier measures of performance. To test whether
the models provide similar rankings of the banks with respect to the cost effi-
ciency scores, the pair-wise Pearson correlation coefficients between the cost effi-
ciency estimates are given in Table 56. We can observe that the estimated correla-
tion between the efficiency scores resulting from the three models is significant,
positive and fairly high. In particular, very high correlation can be observed
between the inefficiency scores from Model I (pooled) and Model III (BC 95).
EFit Model I (Pooled) Model II (BC92) Model III (BC95)
Mean 0.7904 0.8183 0.7937
Median 0.8157 0.8588 0.8334
Std. Dev. 0.1021 0.1296 0.1335
Min 0.3533 0.3348 0.2444
Max 0.9625 0.9819 0.9727
5 For example, in the context of banking efficiency studies robustness is confirmed by Resti (1997), while Bauer
et al. (1998) and Weill (2004) reveal some notable differences between the efficiency scores obtained by different
parametric and non-parametric approaches.
6 The conclusions based on the rank correlation between the inefficiency scores from different models (Spearman
correlation coefficients) are very similar to those found in Table 5.
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Table 5: Correlation Between Cost Efficiency Scores (Pearson Correlation Coefficients)
Note: * – significant at 0.1%.
As the main objective of our paper was to analyse the impact of EU membership
on the efficiency of the CEE banks, Table 6 compares the estimated average cost
efficiency in the pre- and post-EU accession period. Both Battese and Coelli
(1992, 1995) models provide certain evidence in support to our assumption that
the process of accession to the EU and associated regulatory reforms and changes
in institutional settings of the new EU Member States would facilitate efficiency
improvements. Nevertheless, the evidence is not particularly strong, as the aver-
age efficiency scores in Model II and Model III are found to be only slightly higher
for the post-accession period as compared to the pre-accession period. In con-
trast, the pooled model does not find any improvement in the cost efficiency of
the CEE banks in the post-EU accession period as compared to the pre-accession
period. Similar findings also follow from the average annual efficiency scores as
presented in Figure 1.
Table 6: Estimated Average Cost Efficiency Scores in the pre- and post-EU Accession 
Period
Note: * (**) – difference between group means significant at 1% (0.1%). We applied group mean comparison t
test and alternatively also non-parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test. Both tests render same results.
Model I (Pooled) Model II (BC92) Model III (BC95)
Model I 1.0000 0.6921* 0.9086*
Model II 1.0000 0.7399*
Model III 1.0000
DEU Pre-accession period (0) Post-accession period (1) Total
N 742 351 1093
Model I (Pooled) 0.7907 0.7897 0.7904
Model II (BC92)** 0.8086 0.8389 0.8183
Model III (BC95)* 0.7869 0.8082 0.7937
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Figure 1: Breakdown of Average Cost Efficiency Scores by Year
Finally, Table 7 provides average cost efficiency estimates and rankings at a coun-
try level. All three models reveal some notable differences in average cost effi-
ciency at a country level. Based on the average rankings from all three models
Estonia, Slovenia and Poland are found to have the most efficient banks, while on
the contrary Slovakia and Czech Republic have the worst performing banks on
average. Reassuringly, all three models provide very similar rankings of the CEE
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Based on the estimated results it can be concluded that the reliability of obtained
efficiency scores in our study is fairly satisfactory, although the mutual consist-
ency conditions proposed by Bauer et al. (1998) are not fully met. Estimated
average cost efficiency levels based on the three models are highly similar and all
models seem to be quite consistent over time and they also lead to very similar
country rankings. Some differences can be observed in rankings of the CEE
banks, which is to a certain extent expected since the various models employ
different assumptions regarding cost inefficiency.
Finally, the decision on the most appropriate model has to be made. Baring in
mind our research question, the pooled model does not seem to be particularly
appealing, as it does not provide an answer regarding the evolution of cost effi-
ciency due to the EU accession. The predominant reason for introduction of this
model was to check for the robustness and reliability of the obtained results.
Furthermore, Battese and Coelli (1992) model allows for the cost efficiency to
systematically evolve over time, but can only be used to indirectly compare cost
efficiency of pre- and post-accession period. The most suitable model to directly
address the research question posed is therefore believed to be Battese and Coelli
(1995) model, where efficiency is modelled to depend on environmental varia-
bles, including the EU post-accession period. By adopting this model we are able
to show that the EU membership had a positive effect on the cost efficiency of the
CEE banks. The final point to be made is that although both Battese and Coelli
models provide some evidence on cost efficiency improvement over time and/or
due to the EU accession, this improvement is not found to be particularly strong.
11.6. CONCLUSIONS
Banking sectors in Central and Eastern Europe have undergone a remarkable
transformation since mid 1990s, particularly in those, more advanced, countries
that started the process of the EU accession early and eventually became part of
the enlarged EU in 2004. They adopted the common EU legislation and regula-
tion, undertook extensive structural and institutional reforms, and integrated
their banking systems, at least to some extent, into the EU banking sector.
According to the integration indicators provided by Dermine (2006) we could say
that the degree of integration has been elevated significantly with the EU member-
ship of those economies. Taking into account the fact, that back in the mid 1990s
the level of internationalisation in Eastern European banking markets was poor
and markets were dominated by government owned credit institutions, the
progress that was made in terms of internationalisation, regulatory reforms and
institutional changes in the ten year period is astonishing. Simultaneously to the
opening up and accomplished reforming processes the competitiveness of these
markets has been intensified and one would expect the cost efficiency of banking
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firms to be improved accordingly. Having in mind all this, we decided to evaluate
the potential efficiency effects that could be associated with the EU membership
of the ten Central and Eastern European countries due to related institutional and
regulatory changes in banking markets.
Based on different stochastic frontier panel data models, the average cost effi-
ciency in the 1996-2007 period is estimated to be between 79% and 82%, indi-
cating the presence of significant cost inefficiencies in the CEE banks. Some minor
improvements can be detected in terms of both decreasing cost and increasing
efficiency over time. The reliability of obtained results is fairly good as all three
models lead to very similar cost efficiency levels and country rankings and they
also exhibit sufficient stability over time.
As considers the EU membership and related efficiency effects in the studied CEE
banking sectors, we find some evidence on the beneficial effects of the EU
membership and related regulatory and institutional changes for the average
banking efficiency. This finding is firstly based on the comparison of the average
efficiency scores for the pre- and post-accession period, where both Battese and
Coelli (1995) and Battese and Coelli (1992) models confirm improved efficiency
of the CEE banks after the EU accession. Secondly, time dynamics of cost effi-
ciency was also explicitly tested within both models. So, Battese and Coelli (1995)
model also reveals a significant and positive effect of the EU membership on the
cost efficiency improvement. Similarly, the time-varying cost inefficiency model
by Battese and Coelli (1992) reveals evidence on a significant cost efficiency
improvement over time, although it does not distinguish between the pre- and
post-entry period. Nonetheless, it is likely that some barriers to efficiency
enhancements are still in place, since the empirical evidence on efficiency
improvements is found to be rather weak. This implies that policy makers could
take some additional measures for further strengthening of the integration proc-
esses.
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11.8. APPENDIX
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Notes: standard errors in brackets; * – significant at 10%, ** – significant at 5%, 
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12. HOW OUTPUT DIVERSIFICATION AFFECTS 
BANK EFFICIENCY AND RISK: 
AN INTRA-EU COMPARISON STUDY
Nikolaos I. Papanikolaou1
ABSTRACT
This paper examines how banks have been diversifying away from traditional
financial intermediation activity into noninterest income business and how this
shift has affected their efficiency and risk-taking behaviour. To this end, we
construct a global best-practice efficiency frontier following the Stochastic
Frontier Approach and relying on the technique of Battese and Coelli (1995),
which permits the estimation of the frontier and of the coefficients of efficiency
variables in a single stage. We opt for an application of this model to the EU-27
countries performing an intra-Union comparisons between the old and the new
EU members that provide us with substantial information concerning the level
of harmonization of the European banking systems. Results indicate that the
diversification of bank output enlarges efficiency margins in both cost and
profit terms without altering the way banks treat risk. Moreover, that the envi-
ronment identically affects the performance of European banks. By and large,
both old and new EU member states are found to follow similar behavioural
patterns that are not influenced by product diversification, which reveals a
rather harmonized European banking market.
12.1. INTRODUCTION
Over the past couple of decades or more, the extensive regulatory changes and
the technological advances have transformed financial systems to a great extent.
Banks have reacted to the challenges posed by the new operating environment by
creating new products and services and expanding the already existing ones,
which allowed them to diversify the product mix of their portfolio. The tradi-
tional business of taking deposits from households and making loans to agents
that require capital has thus declined in favour of a considerable growth in activ-
ities that generate noninterest (fee) income and are not necessarily reported on
1 The author would like to thank Angelos Antzoulatos for his support and guidance. Thanks are also due to
Charles Calomiris and other participants at the 7th Conference on Research on Economic Theory & Econo-
metrics (CRETE) for their valuable remarks as well as participants at the SUERF Conference on ‘Productivity
in the Financial Services Sector’ for helpful comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer remains.
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banks’ balance sheets2. In consequence, the sources of revenues and profits of
banking institutions have been diversified as noninterest income relative to its
interest counterpart from traditional financial activities has considerably
increased3.
In the present work we assess the effect of alterations in product mix on the
performance of European banking markets. To clarify, we examine how banks in
the EU have been diversifying away from traditional financial intermediation
activity into noninterest income business and how this shift has affected their
efficiency and risk-taking behaviour. Cost and profit efficiency frontiers are esti-
mated with and without proxies of non-traditional activities in order the impact
of diversified product offerings on banking performance to be explicitly meas-
ured. Regarding risk, it plays a central role in our analysis as non-traditional
instruments are thought of as a basic tool for financial institutions to manage risk
more efficiently. Recognizing this modern way of dealing with risk exposure and
also taking into account that efficiency is likely to be miscalculated in case risk
characteristics are not included in the cost and profit functions, we investigate the
relationship that holds between product diversification and bank risk-taking
behaviour focusing on the most important sources of bank risk.
Our data set encompasses the EU-27 countries thus allowing us to test whether
the move towards the new financial intermediation business has affected the
Union’s banking systems uniformly. In other words, we examine whether Euro-
pean banking markets have jointly improved their performance by increasing
their efficiency and lowering their risk after diversifying their portfolios. To this
aim, we proceed in making various intra-EU comparisons between the 15 long-
term members and the group of the 12 states that lately ascended to the Union.
Such comparative analysis can provide us with substantial information concern-
ing the performance of banks within the Union, thus giving us a thorough picture
of the level of harmonization in the European banking environment as a whole.
For the intra-EU efficiency comparisons to be meaningful, it is of importance not
only to allow for variation in relative factor prices across countries, but also to
control for country- and bank-level characteristics that lead to performance het-
erogeneities across banking systems or individual banks, respectively. In fact, effi-
ciency literature has reached the agreement that operational environment is such
an important component in cross-country efficiency comparisons that, if ignored,
2 A number of studies have documented this upsurge in fee-generating activities of banks using data from
different banking industries. See e.g. Rogers (1998), Rogers and Sinkey (1999), and Stiroh (2004) for US
banking; also, Rime and Stiroh (2003) and Tortosa-Ausina (2003) for the Swiss and Spanish banking sectors,
respectively.
3 It has to be mentioned here that banks have long earned noninterest income by charging their customers’ fees
in exchange for a number of traditional services like checking and cash management, safe-keeping services (e.g.
insured deposit accounts and safety deposit boxes), investment services (e.g. trust accounts and long-run certif-
icates of deposits), and insurance services (e.g. annuity contracts). This sort of income, however, has only been
a small fraction of banks’ total income.
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results will vary a lot (see e.g. Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000); Cavallo and
Rossi (2002)). We thus employ the stochastic efficiency frontier model of Battese
and Coelli (1995), which enables efficiency comparisons as it pools the data
defining a common frontier for all the countries under scrutiny also accounting
for both environmental conditions – which are far beyond the control of bank
managers – and bank-specific factors in a single stage4.
To account for differences in the regulatory conditions among the EU banking
sectors, we exploit the World Bank Regulation and Supervision Databases of
Barth et al. (2001, 2008). Moreover, the Worldwide Governance Indicators devel-
oped by Kaufmann et al. (2002) are employed to capture the various levels of
institutional development in our sample countries. The degree of banking market
concentration that significantly affects efficiency (see e.g. Dietsch and Lozano-
Vivas (2000)) is further considered in our empirical analysis. Finally, we control
for variations in the macroeconomic environment, the level of technological
progress, and the size of banks.
Our study contributes significantly to the current literature from several perspec-
tives5. First, in contrast to the existing works that focus exclusively on individual
banking industries and mainly that of US, the analysis here focuses on the effects
of product diversification on the performance of a group of banking markets -
those of the EU-27- also conducting intra-EU comparisons.6 Second, the current
analysis is differentiated from previous ones in that it investigates whether banks
alter their risk-taking behavior after being entangled with diversified activities. In
fact, the impact of output diversification on risk has been rather neglected from
bank performance literature. More specifically, if we except the studies of Rogers
and Sinkey (1999) and Vennet (2002) that explicitly examine how non-tradi-
tional activities influence the level of bank risk, the rest of the relevant studies
either simply control for risk preferences by incorporating capital ratio or total
equity in their empirical models (see, e.g. Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 2008), or
indirectly consider for risk by utilizing several risk-based measures of non-tradi-
tional activities (see, e.g., Stiroh, 2000; Clark and Siems, 2002). A further inno-
4 The Battese and Coelli (1995) methodology, though not so recently developed, has been very lately employed
in several bank efficiency comparison studies (Cavallo and Rossi (2002); Williams and Nguyen (2005); Fries
and Taci (2005); Kasman and Yildirim (2006); Barros et al. (2007); Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras (2008);
Lensink et al. (2008)). Nevertheless, with only exception the study of Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras (2008) that
shares some common features with the current one, none of the other studies that belong to this recent empirical
literature strand shows any interest in the impact of output diversification on bank performance thus at best
accounting for non-traditional activities only parenthetically. In fact, all the above studies are designed to
address other issues, such as the efficiency differences among European banking sectors (Cavallo and Rossi
(2002)), the effect of financial deregulation on bank performance in transition economies (Fries and Taci
(2005); Kasman and Yildirim (2006)) or in South East Asian countries (Williams and Nguyen (2005)), the main
factors that explain the probability of bank efficiency (Barros et al. (2007)), and the link between efficiency and
bank ownership (Lensink et al. (2008)).
5 For an extended review of the current literature, see Section 12.2 that follows.
6 An exception in the literature is the recent empirical study of Vennet (2002) that also uses data from a group of
European banking markets. Vennet (2002), however, does not proceed in making any cross-country efficiency
comparisons.
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vative feature of our work is that it sketches the theoretical considerations that
provide the rationale for the shift of banks away from traditional services. Over-
all, the current paper offers the ground to empirically test the dilemma of focus
versus diversification, which has not been addressed thoroughly in the context of
financial intermediation theory. 
Our empirical results indicate that product diversification increases cost and
profit efficiencies without affecting the way banks treat risk. As for the environ-
mental conditions, they seem to have an identical role in the performance of Euro-
pean banks. On the whole, the banking sectors of both old and new EU member
states are found to follow similar behavioural patterns, which are not signifi-
cantly influenced by output diversification. This is to say a rather harmonized
European banking industry is supported by the findings.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 12.2 reviews the role of non-
traditional activities in bank performance literature, whereas Section 12.3 illus-
trates the theoretical underpinnings of the paper. Section 12.4 provides a descrip-
tion of the data set and a justification of the variables used. Section 12.5 presents
the cost and profit efficiency models and the estimation methodology followed.
Section 12.6 discusses the empirical findings, and, finally, Section 12.7 concludes.
12.2. THE ROLE OF NON-TRADITIONAL ACTIVITIES IN BANK 
PERFORMANCE LITERATURE
As noted earlier, deregulation process and technological innovation have let
banks to engage with non-traditional business. Even though one part of bank
performance literature does not consider the relevance of this sort of business at
all (see Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell (1996); Wheelock and Wilson (1999); Maudos et
al. (2002); Lensink et al. (2008)), some other has recently turned to utilize differ-
ent proxies of non-traditional products as an additional bank outputs. In partic-
ular, Altunbas et al. (2000) examine the link between efficiency and risk in the
Japanese commercial banking sector proxying non-traditional activities with the
nominal value of Off Balance Sheet (OBS henceforth) items. The same proxy is
also incorporated in the output vector of the models of Altunbas et al. (2001a,
2001b) and Casu et al. (2004) that study the efficiency and productivity of Euro-
pean banks.
Moreover, Isik and Hassan (2003) evaluate the performance of Turkish banks
including the risk-adjusted value of OBS activities according to the Basel Accord
in their econometric model arguing that such an adjustment provides conformity
with other bank outputs in terms of credit risk. Alternative proxies of non-tradi-
tional products are also included in the output vectors of other bank performance
studies: Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000) and Maudos et al. (2002) use other
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earning assets, Drake and Hall (2003) utilize net fee and commission income,
while Tortosa-Ausina et al. (2008) employ the broader proxy of noninterest
income.
Notwithstanding the incorporation of alternative proxies of non-traditional
activities in the vector of outputs, none of the above studies estimates the clear
effect that portfolio expansion has on bank performance. This gap is bridged by
a recently developed thread of literature that compares performance measures
derived by alternative models specifications, that is, with and without the inclu-
sion of non-traditional items. The origins of this literature can be traced back to
1994, when DeYoung explicitly addressed the impact of noninterest and fee
income on the efficiency of US commercial banking sector. DeYoung (1994) esti-
mated a cost efficiency frontier and found that the standard formulation, which
disregards non-traditional income devalues efficiency for banks with a large share
of this type of income.
Albeit several works followed that of DeYoung (1994), research has been almost
exclusively focused on the US banking system. Indeed, Jagtiani et al. (1995) esti-
mate the importance of OBS activities captured by guarantees, foreign currency
transactions and interest rate products on the efficiency of US commercial banks,
where efficiency is measured in terms of scale economies and cost complementa-
rities7. Also using US commercial banking data, Rogers (1998) formulates cost,
revenue, and profit frontiers to estimate efficiency with and without non-tradi-
tional services, which are proxied by net noninterest income. The same proxy
measure is used by Rogers and Sinkey (1999), who empirically assess the level of
involvement of US banks in non-traditional activities, and Stiroh (2000), who
examines cost and profit efficiencies as well as productivity growth and scale
economies for US bank holding companies. The latter study also uses a Basel-
based credit equivalent measure (CEM) that converts all OBS activities to credit
risk equivalents. Net noninterest income, CEM, and AEM (an asset equivalent
measure that uses the rate of return on balance-sheet items to capitalize the
noninterest income from OBS activities) are utilized in the empirical work of
Clark and Siems (2002) that gauges the importance of non-traditional activities
in the performance of US commercial banks.
As already mentioned, there is just a handful of works that use data other from
US to estimate how non-traditional items affect bank performance. To start with,
Vennet (2002) investigates the existence of efficiency differences between special-
ized and non-specialized financial institutions in Europe; whereas the latter form
of institutions consists of universal banks and conglomerates that offer both tra-
ditional and non-traditional services. Moreover, Rime and Stiroh (2003) measure
7 Using the same proxies for OBS activities, Jagtiani and Khanthavit (1996) study the effect of the introduction
of risk-based capital requirements on the cost structure of large US banks.
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cost and profit efficiencies as well as economies of scale and scope of large Swiss
banks. In their analysis, output is defined in such a way as to include two proxies
for non-traditional services: the CEM of OBS derivative activities and the trading
and portfolio management activities (see above). Furthermore, Tortosa-Ausina
(2003) examines the role of noninterest income on the efficiency of Spanish com-
mercial and savings banks, where the more recent study of Casu and Girardone
(2005) tests whether the expansion of OBS activities has an effect on the produc-
tivity of five large European banking sectors.
Although proxies of non-traditional activities, bank performance measures and
estimation techniques vary in the studies reviewed above, the empirical findings
converge to the conclusion that ignoring non-traditional activities leads to a mis-
specification of bank output8. In particular, average performance is improved
when these types of activities are taken into account. A possible explanation for
this is that the resources that are used to produce non-traditional products are
included in the input vector but not in the output vector. Or, according to some
other explanation, banks are better producers of non-traditional rather than tra-
ditional items (Rogers (1998)). In either way, the finding that bank performance
is underestimated in case non-traditional activities are ignored corroborates the
growing importance of this kind of activities in the operation of banks.
12.3. THE FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION THEORY: 
THE TRANSITION FROM THE TRADITIONAL TO 
MODERN APPROACH
The traditional financial intermediation theory relies mostly upon the vitiation of
the Arrow-Debreu complete markets paradigm and of the Modigliani-Miller
famous theorem. According to the former, firms and governments are financed by
households via financial markets. As these markets are assumed to be perfect and
complete (i.e. there are no transaction costs and no credit rationing, whilst there
is a full set of contingent markets), the allocation of resources is Pareto optimal
and hence there is no role for intermediaries. The Modigliani-Miller theorem, on
the other hand, assumes that all households are involved and there is full partic-
ipation in markets. This implies that financial structure is irrelevant as house-
holds can construct portfolios offsetting actions of intermediaries and thus inter-
mediation cannot add value.
Still, in real life, imperfect information and transaction costs that exist in the
economy restrict the scope for direct financing and vitiate the Arrow-Debreu
8 Exceptions are the study of Jagtiani et al. (1995) that finds no impact of non-traditional activities on bank
performance, and that of Clark and Siems (2002), which concludes that cost efficiency estimates increase with
the inclusion of OBS items, whereas profit efficiency estimates are largely unaffected.
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model of resource allocation. Moreover, there is evidence that full participation
does not hold in practice and thus the Modigliani-Miller theorem is not valid.
Accordingly, financial institutions intervene between savers and borrowers taking
advantage of market frictions9. Financial intermediaries allow transaction costs
to be shared thus obtaining an advantage over individuals. In addition, they sig-
nal their informed status by investing their capital in assets about which they have
special knowledge. By doing so, intermediaries manage to limit the problems that
asymmetric information generates.
In recent decades, however, transaction costs have been reduced and information
asymmetries have shrunk as information has become cheaper and more easily
available due to technological advances. However, these changes have not coin-
cided with a decline in financial intermediation; instead, the volume of interme-
diation has been enhanced. In fact, where banks’ total assets as a percentage of
financial intermediation assets have fallen in all developed financial sectors and
the total number of banking institutions has dropped mainly due to Mergers &
Acquisitions (M&A), the intermediation role of banks has been amplified.
Apparently, the traditional financial intermediation theory, which relies on the
existence of transaction costs and asymmetric information, cannot satisfactorily
explain the observed increase in intermediation activity.
The answer to this puzzle has been provided by Allen and Santomero (1998,
2001) who revised the traditional intermediation theory. By arguing that the
focus of the latter theory has been too narrow, they indicated risk management
and reduction of participation costs as the primary factors that have led to the
increase of the overall volume of intermediation. More specifically, Allen and
Santomero showed that financial liberalization and technological progress have
generated a large amount of novel financial products and thus the need for new
markets where all these products could be traded. Most individuals and firms,
however, have neither the appropriate information nor the specialized knowledge
to deal with this complex maze of modern financial tools. For them, the costs of
learning how to use these tools and then participate in the new markets on a daily
basis are especially high. However, this does not hold for financial institutions
that are both informed and skilled enough to intervene in the new financial mar-
kets and trade all this volume of non-traditional instruments in favour of their
9 The two major aspects of financial intermediation activity are brokerage and qualitative asset transformation.
Brokerage is usually referred to as ‘soft’ intermediation, while asset transformation as ‘hard’ intermediation
activity. By brokerage, banks match transactors with complementary needs asking for a fee-based compensa-
tion. Banks take no particular position, although reputation risk is inherent in brokerage activity. Moreover,
brokerage incurs a cost of gathering information; yet, information can be reused – either cross-sectionally or
through time – at zero cost. Examples of banks’ brokerage activity are transaction services, financial advice,
screening, origination, issuance, and funding. As regards qualitative asset transformation, it refers to the trans-
formation of the attributes of an asset (e.g. monitoring, management expertise, guaranteeing, liquidity creation
etc.).
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clients at significantly lower costs. Thereby, financial institutions facilitate partic-
ipation, whereas at the same time can manage risk more effectively.
In the EU, which is the focus of the current study, limits on banking activities were
substantially removed with the implementation of the Second Banking Directive
in 1989 and the Directive on Investment Services in 1996. These two enactments
allowed all banks to operate outside their home countries and engage in all sorts
of financial services. As a result, a number of bank consolidations within and
across EU member states have taken place over the past years that have led to the
emergence of universal financial institutions, which provide a broad range of
diversified activities that generate substantial amounts of noninterest income.
12.4. DATA AND VARIABLES
12.4.1. Data Description
All the bank-level data used in the study are obtained from the BankScope data-
base produced by the Bureau van Dijk and Fitch-IBCA. In particular, our dataset
is composed of commercial banks from the 27 EU member states and covers the
period 2000-2007. We incorporate all those banks for which at least four years
of data are available. This refinement allows us to reliably distinguish between
the random and the inefficiency component in the Battese and Coelli composite
error model that we use (see Fries and Taci (2005)). After checking the data for
reporting errors and other inconsistencies (missing, negative or zero values), we
obtain an unbalanced panel of 5928 observations corresponding to 741 banks10.
The choice of using an unbalanced panel is mainly justified by the fact that we
would like to account for mergers and acquisitions as well as for any bank failures
and new entries that took place during the sample period in order to avoid selec-
tivity bias. All data are reported in euros as the reference currency and are
expressed in real 2000 prices.
The data for market concentration as well as those used in the construction of the
regulatory variables were gathered from Versions II and III of the Bank Regula-
tion and Supervision databases of Barth et al. (2001, 2008)11. Since regulatory
policies do not vary a lot from year to year (see Barth et al. (2008)), we use the
information contained in Version II and collected from 2000 to 2002 for the first
four years of our data set (i.e. 2000-2003), and the Version III information that
describes the situation in the 2005-2006 period for the rest four years (2004-
10 The Battese and Coelli (1995) model has the advantage that can be estimated for an unbalanced panel dataset.
This augments the number of observations and thus the accuracy of the results obtained.
11 An important point that has to be made here is that the Barth et al. databases refer only to commercial banking,
which is the focus of our study.
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2007) of our sample. Regarding the degree of institutional development and the
quality of governance, they are both captured by an overall index based on the
Worldwide Governance Indicators developed by Kaufmann et al. (2002). Lastly,
real GDP growth rate and interbank rates are extracted from Eurostat.
12.4.2. Variables Definition
We now move to describe the variables employed in our empirical analysis. We
justify why we decide to use these specific variables and how each is calculated.
An analysis of summary statistics is offered in Table 1.
12.4.2.1. Output Quantities and Input Prices
An important concern in the empirical estimation of efficiency is the definition of
bank inputs and outputs, which is strongly related to the specific role that depos-
its play in the operation of financial institutions. The banking literature addresses
this issue by largely using two approaches: the intermediation or asset approach
and the production or value-added approach12. Under the former one, financial
firms are thought of as intermediaries that transform deposits and purchased
funds into loans and other earning assets. This is to say, liabilities and physical
factors are viewed as inputs, whereas assets are treated as outputs. The produc-
tion approach, on the other hand, views financial institutions as producers of
services for account holders measuring output with the number of transactions or
documents processed over a given time period. Therefore, deposits are encom-
passed in the output and not in the input vector, which exclusively includes phys-
ical entities.
Berger and Humphrey (1991), however, propose a third approach that, contrary
to the above two approaches, captures the dual role of banking operations. In
fact, the so-called modified production approach can be viewed as a combination
of intermediation and production approaches as it enables the consideration of
both the input and output characteristics of deposits in the cost/profit functions.
More specifically, the price of deposits is considered to be an input, whilst the
volume of deposits is accounted as an output. In this specification, banks are
assumed to provide intermediation and loan services as well as payment, liquidity,
and safekeeping services at the same time.
In the current paper we adopt the modified production approach to define the
inputs and outputs since it seems to go one step further describing the activities
of banks in a more complete setting providing therefore a closer representation of
12 See Berger and Humphrey (1997) for a detailed analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of each of the two
approaches.
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reality. Five variable outputs are specified in total: traditional banking activities
are captured by three outputs, namely total loans (y1), total other earning assets
(y2), and total deposits (y3), whereas non-traditional activities are proxied by
noninterest income (y4) – calculated as the sum of commission, fee, trading and
other operating income – and the value of OBS items (y5). As regards inputs, we
consider three of them in our analysis, i.e. deposits, labour, and physical capital.
The price of deposits (w1) is defined as the ratio of interest expense scaled by total
deposits, the price of labour is calculated by dividing personnel expense to total
assets (w2)13, and the price of physical capital (w3) is proxied by the ratio of
noninterest expense other than personnel expense to fixed assets.
12.4.2.2. Risk Variables
We utilize four different metrics to capture the variation in the risk-taking strate-
gies of banks. The first two concern individual bank risk-taking, whereas the
other two measure risk at a country level. In particular, the ratio of loan loss
provisions to total loans is used to proxy credit risk (crdrisk); the ratio of liquid
to total assets measures liquidity risk (lqdrisk); the one-year standard deviation
of the day-to-day interbank rate captures interest rate risk (intrisk); and, lastly,
insolvency risk (inslrisk) is measured with the Z-score computed as follows:
where   stands for the average Return On Assets calculated by the mean ratio
of variable profits (Prijt) to total assets (TAijt), and  ) is the mean ratio
of equity to total assets14. Z-score combines three elements of bank risk and is
inversely related to the probability of failure. By taking average values, we meas-
ure the z-score of the typical bank in each country at every sample year.
12.4.2.3. Environmental and Control Variables
With the purpose of enhancing the comparability of bank performance across the
groups of old and new EU member states, we select a set of variables that capture
a number of bank- and country-level differences. In specific, these variables
account for the level of bank regulation and supervision, the quality of govern-
ance and the degree of institutional development, the structure of the banking
13 We recognize that dividing personnel expense by the total number of employees instead of total assets would
produce a rather more accurate measure of the unit price of labour. Nevertheless, due to a paucity of data on
the number of employees in the Bankscope database, such an approach would result in the loss of a large
number of observations.
14 The definition of profits (Prijt) differs between the restricted and the unrestricted model specifications (see
Section 12.5.3 below). As a result we obtain two different Z-scores, one for each specification.
Zjt
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market, the macroeconomic conditions, the technological advances and the size
of the sample banks.
To start with, we construct five indices that describe the regulatory and supervi-
sory environment of the banking sectors under examination15. The first one is the
activity restrictions index (restr) that measures the degree to which banks are free
to engage in securities, insurance and real estate activities as well as the extent to
which banks may own and control nonfinancial firms. This index takes values
between 4 and 16, with higher scores indicating a less liberalized banking envi-
ronment, where banks are prevented from diversifying their product offerings.
Moreover, we construct the capital regulatory index (capreg) that considers: a)
the stringency of regulatory requirements concerning the amount of capital that
banks must hold, b) the extent to which banks are allowed to include assets other
than cash, government securities, or borrowed funds in their initial regulatory
capital, and c) whether authorities confirm the sources of capital. This index
ranges from 0 to 8, with larger values signifying greater capital stringency. Yet,
the relationship that holds between capital and risk is rather vague. On the one
hand, capital serves as a safety net for banks especially in periods of increased
uncertainty. Under this scenario, better capitalized banks are expected to be less
fragile. On the other hand, more stringent capital regulations are associated with
reduced banks’ rents, since banks are forced to supply fewer loans. To hedge
losses, banks may engage in riskier activities.
The third index is the private monitoring index (prvmon) that measures the
degree to which supervisory authorities encourage private-sector oversight of
banks and is calculated according to the following qualitative criteria: a) whether
banks are required to obtain outside licensed audits and/or ratings by internation-
ally credit-ratings agencies, b) whether an explicit deposit insurance scheme is
imposed, c) whether banks are required to disclose accurate information to the
public by producing consolidated accounts that cover the whole range of their
activities and risk-management procedures, and, finally, d) whether bank direc-
tors are legally liable for erroneous/misleading information. This index varies
from 0 to 9, where higher values implying more private monitoring. Again, there
exist contradictory views in the literature regarding the role of private sector in
bank monitoring. Some assert that private monitoring agencies operate more reli-
ably and efficiently than official supervisory authorities mainly because they are
not influenced by political or similar pressures, whereas others provide support
to the supervisory role of public authorities.
Finally, the quality characteristics of bank supervision are proxied by two differ-
ent indices: the first is the official supervisory power index (suprvpower), which
15 The exact survey questions used for the construction of each index as well as the scoring system followed are
that of Barth et al. (2004).
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measures the extent to which supervisory authorities have the power to intervene
in the banking system. This index has a minimum value of 0 and a maximum
value of 14, with 14 being the highest level of supervisory power. The second is
the supervisory forbearance discretion index (forbdiscr) that shows the degree to
which authorities is likely to engage in forbearance in cases banks behave impru-
dently. It takes values from 0 to 4, with higher values indicating greater discre-
tion. Whereas strong supervisors can undertake specific actions against the vul-
nerabilities of the system (market failures, asymmetric information, excessive
risk-taking) that will potentially improve bank performance, at the same time, it
is easier for a powerful authority to benefit favoured constituents thus undermin-
ing competition and interrupting the development of the banking sector. Accord-
ingly, the influence of supervisory power on the operation of banking system is
rather contradictory.
To proxy the overall level of institutional development and the quality of govern-
ance we construct the KKZ index, which is the simple average of the following
six indicators: voice-accountability, political stability, governance effectiveness,
regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. Higher values of the
KKZ index indicate a more developed institutional framework16.
An important determinant of bank performance is market structure, which is
strongly related to the degree of competition. We measure the degree of market
concentration with the 5-bank concentration ratio (c5), i.e., the sum of assets of
the five largest banks divided by the value of total banking system assets17.
It is widely accepted that the demand and supply of banking services are seriously
affected by economic performance. More precisely, high levels of banking activity
are generally related to favourable economic conditions. We thus include real
GDP growth rate (GDPgr) to control for differences in the level of economic
development and also proxy the degree of bank activity.
According to the conventional wisdom big banks are heavily involved in non-
traditional activities. We thus employ the log of TA in the model to capture the
non-linear effect of bank size on performance. The inclusion of a size variable
(size) is also essential since a strong scale bias might be produced making large
banks more efficient than small banks, if otherwise.
Finally, technological changes over time are captured by a linear time trend (t) as
well as its squared root (t2) since the model used follows a second order approx-
imation (see Lensink et al. (2008)).
16 Since no values are reported for 2001 for any of these six indicators, we use the mean average of 2000 and 2002
to proxy KKZ for this particular year.
17 Concentration ratios for Austria and Ireland are not available in the Barth et al (2001, 2008) databases and are
therefore computed using data from Bankscope.
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12.5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
12.5.1. Cost and Profit Efficiency Frontiers
The Battese and Coelli (1995) model that we use to estimate bank efficiency relies
on the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) of Aigner et al. (1977). SFA is com-
monly represented by two-stage parametric models: in the first stage the stochas-
tic frontier production function is specified and estimated together with technical
efficiency; in the second stage efficiency estimates are regressed against a set of
environmental variables to test whether these variables have an effect on effi-
ciency levels. However, as Wang and Schmidt (2002) point out, parametric two-
step approaches produce biased coefficients for the reason that the assumptions
made in the first step concerning the distribution of the inefficiency term are vio-
lated in the second18. The Battese and Coelli model avoids the pitfalls present in
the standard SFA by estimating bank efficiency and its determinants in a one-step
process. To clarify, efficiency scores are drawn from an ex ante specified func-
tional form and regressed on a vector of bank- and country-specific variables in
a single step. An additional advantage of the model is that it can be estimated for
an unbalanced panel data set, which enhances the number of observations and
thus the reliability of the empirical outcome.
Both cost and profit specifications of the Battese and Coelli model are employed
in our analysis. Regarding cost efficiency, it refers to technical and allocative effi-
ciency and is defined on the basis of how close the actual cost of a sample bank
is to the cost of the best-practice bank, according to which the cost efficiency
frontier is determined. Using longitudinal data the model specifies a stochastic
global cost frontier of the following general form:
(1)
where Cijt is the observed variable cost that bank i (i = 1, 2, …, N) faces in country
j (j = 1, 2, …, K) at time t (t = 1, 2, …, T); yijt denotes the vector of output
quantities for bank i in country j at time t; wijt denotes the vector of input prices
for bank i in country j at time t; qijt is the vector of risk variables that influence
bank efficiency; β is a vector of all unknown parameters to be estimated; vijt
stands for the random error term that is assumed to be i.i.d.  , and inde-
pendent of the term uijt ≥ 0 that accounts for technical and/or allocative ineffi-
ciency in production and is imposed to be non-negative (as higher level of ineffi-
ciency is associated with higher cost); moreover, uijt is independently but not iden-
tically distributed, such that it is obtained by truncation at zero of the normal
18 In the first stage typical SFA assumes that the inefficiency component of the error term has a truncated-normal
distribution. This assumption is vitiated in the second stage, where a normal distribution is assumed instead.
lnCijt Cy ijt wijt qijt β ; ,, () vijt uijt ++ =
N 0 σv
2 , ()
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distribution with mean mijt equal to zijtδ, and variance  , i.e.  19.
The term zijt represents the vector of explanatory variables that affect the ineffi-
ciency of bank i of country j at t and δ is the vector of the unknown coefficients
to be estimated that also includes an intercept term20. The inefficiency term can
therefore be written as follows:
uijt = zijtδ + wijt (2)
where wijt is defined by the truncation of the normal distribution with zero mean
and variance  , such that the point of truncation is -zijtδ, and because uijt ≥ 0,
we obtain that wijt ≥ -zijtδ.
The stochastic cost frontier (1) and the model for the inefficiency term (2) are
simultaneously estimated using the maximum likelihood method. The likelihood
function is expressed in terms of the variance parameters, that is, 
and  . The cost inefficiency score for an individual bank i in
country j at the t-th observation is obtained as Costineffijt = exp(uijt), and takes
values between unity and infinity. To stay in line with bank performance literature
that measures efficiency rather than inefficiency scores, we calculate CEFFijt =
(Costineffijt)–1, which produces the cost efficiency score for bank I in country j at
time t. Values closer to unity correspond to higher efficiency.
While cost efficiency has been almost monopolized the interest of bank perform-
ance evaluation literature, profit efficiency might be of equal or even greater
importance if compared with its cost counterpart as it combines both the cost and
revenue sides of banking operation21. Profit efficiency measures the extent to
which the profits of a sample bank fall below the profits of the best practice bank.
Literature (e.g. Rogers (1998); Stiroh (2000); Clark and Siems (2002)) estimates
profit efficiency utilizing the so-called alternative profit function, which takes
input and output quantities as given for banks letting output prices to vary. This
non-standard approach is also preferred in the current study for a couple of rea-
sons. First, in the standard profit function output prices are exogenously given
implying that banks have no market power in the pricing of their output. How-
ever, empirical evidence shows that, notwithstanding the fact that deregulation
has increased the degree of competition in the financial sector of the economy,
banks still do not operate under perfectly competitive conditions22. This provides
support to the use of the alternative profit function that allows banks to have
19 The truncation at zero safeguards that the costs of the best-practice bank are always lower than those of the
best-practice bank.
20 As Battese and Coelli (1995) note, “not including an intercept parameter may result in the estimators of δ-
parameters associated with the z-variables being biased and the shape of the distribution of the inefficiency
effects, uijt, being unnecessarily restricted”.
21 Berger and Mester (1997) characteristically argue that “profit efficiency is superior to the cost efficiency concept
for evaluating the overall performance of the firm”.
22 See e.g. the study of Bikker and Haaf (2002) that evaluates competitive conditions and market structure in the
banking sectors of 23 industrialized countries including those of the EU-15.
σu
2 uijt Nz ijtδσ u
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control over the output prices. Second, literature reports a serious lack of output
price data, which are necessary for the standard profit function approach to be
implemented. This is also the case for the current study, since it is not possible to
calculate the prices of non-traditional output for which only income information
is available. Overall, the alternative profit specification seems to be much more
attractive.
The empirical procedure that we follow in the estimation of profit efficiency is
essentially the same with that discussed above for cost efficiency, except that we
replace variable cost (Cijt) with variable profit (Prijt) in Eq. 1 and transform the
dependent variable to  , where   represents
the absolute minimum value of profit over all sample banks. This transformation
safeguards that, in case there are banks in the sample that report losses, the nat-
ural logarithm is taken of a positive value. Moreover, the sign of the inefficiency
term of the profit function now turns into negative thus obtaining the profit effi-
ciency score for an individual bank i in country j at time t as PREFFijt = exp(-uijt).
PREFFijt  takes values from zero to one, with unity being the highest score
achieved by the best-practice bank.
The cost (profit) function is specified as a standard translog specification. There-
fore Eq. (1) can be written as follows23:
 =
(3)
where the inefficiency term uijt is defined by
uijt = 
(4)
23 This model refers to the restricted cost model as the cost function contains only traditional bank outputs. The
extension to the unrestricted models is straightforward. (For the distinction between the restricted and the
unrestricted models see Section 12.5.2 that follows).
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+ φ1crdriskijt φ2lqdriskijt φ3inslriskijt φ4intriskijt uijt vijt ++ + + +
δ0 δ1restr δ2capreg δ3prvmon δ4suprvpower ++ + +
+ δ5forbdiscr δ6KKZ δ7c5 δ8GDPgr δ9size ++ + +
+ δ10t δ11t
2 wijt ++
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In Eq. (3), the restrictions of symmetry of the second order parameters are
imposed, i.e. αmh = αhm and βsp = βps. Also, the dependent variable and all input
prices are scaled by one price (here we arbitrarily choose w2) in order to guarantee
linear homogeneity in prices. Thus, the sum of the coefficients of input prices
equals to 1, i.e. .  The basic model that is estimated in a single-step by
using maximum likelihood consists of Eqs. (3) and (4).
12.5.2. Restricted and Unrestricted Models
As already said, we use two different frontier specifications: one that relies on the
cost function and one that relies on the alternative profit function. Across the two
specifications, three separate models are estimated to test for the significance of
output diversification on bank performance. The first model is the restricted
model that includes only traditional banking products in its output vector. The
second (which we call unrestricted model A) also considers modern banking
activities by augmenting the output vector with noninterest income. The third
model (labeled unrestricted model B) differs from A in that it proxies output
diversification not with noninterest income, but with OBS items. A comparison
of the findings of the three models is expected to lead to a robust view of the
importance of diversified products on bank performance and risk.
12.5.3. Cost and Profit Definitions
The definition of variable cost (Cijt) depends on the vector of inputs used that
remains unaltered across the restricted and the unrestricted model specifications.
Thus Cijt is computed by adding interest with noninterest expense. On the other
hand, the way variable profit (Prijt) is defined differs between the two model spec-
ifications depending on the income-generating activities of banks. More specifi-
cally, in the case of the restricted model where the output vector consists solely of
traditional bank products that create interest income, profit is equal to interest
income less the variable cost defined above. Yet, in the case of the unrestricted
models (A and B), profit is calculated as the sum of interest income and noninter-










Tables 2 and 3 report the mean cost and profit efficiency scores for the traditional
EU-15 countries and for the 12 New Member States (NMS). Apparently, the
banking systems of the first group of countries operate more efficiently in both
cost and profit terms (see restricted models). This superiority is further verified
when noninterest income is included in the output vector (see unrestricted models
A in Tables 2 and 3). In particular, cost efficiency is augmented by approximately
10% for EU-15 and by 7% for NMS. In similar vein, profit efficiency estimates
increase by 15% in the case of EU-15 and by 13% in the case of NMS. On the
contrary, almost no change is reported in the efficiency levels when OBS items are
considered instead of noninterest income (see unrestricted models B in Tables 2
and 3). This might be evidence that the nominal value of OBS activities is a rather
poor proxy of diversified banking products.
We test the statistical significance of the observed differences in efficiency scores
between the restricted and the unrestricted model A of both cost and profit func-
tions by conducting the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test. It turns out
that the p-value of the Wilcoxon t-statistic is below.05 in all cases, which indi-
cates that the mean scores obtained from the restricted models are statistically
lower than the ones obtained from the unrestricted models A24.
12.6.2. Output Diversification and Risk-taking
Let us now turn to analyze the performance of risk variables. Tables 4, 5, 6, and
7 document a negative and significant relationship between cost and profit effi-
ciencies with all four measures of risk. In fact, this relationship remains
unchanged across the restricted and the unrestricted model specifications. This
finding suggests that output diversification does not affect the risk-taking behav-
iour of banks.
More analytically, our results reveal that more efficient banks perform a lower
credit risk. This implies that banks should focus more on credit risk management,
which has proved problematic in the recent past. Serious banking problems have
arisen from the failure of banks to recognize impaired assets and create reserves
for writing off these assets. A considerable help toward smoothing these anoma-
lies would be provided by improving the transparency of the financial systems,
24 Using the parametric t-statistic we reach the same conclusion.
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which in turn would assist banks to evaluate credit risk more effectively and
avoid problems associated with hazardous exposure.
Concerning liquidity risk, it has also a negative sign showing that increased
liquidity leads to higher efficiency levels. This finding is rather expected as banks
have been traditionally solving their liquidity problem by holding cash together
with a considerable amount of short-term government securities that they could
sell for cash. As regards interest rate risk and insolvency risk, they are also found
to significantly reduce cost and profit efficiencies.
All in all, the estimation results suggest that higher levels of risk aversion are
related to increased levels of efficiency. And, more importantly, this behavioral
pattern is not influenced by the inclusion of non-traditional items in the model
since the signs of all risk coefficients remain unaltered across the different model
specifications.
12.6.3. How the Environment Affects Bank Efficiency
Results (Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7) confirm the effectiveness of regulatory policies for
increasing bank efficiency. Indeed, looser restrictions on bank activities combined
with more stringent capital regulations, higher degree of private monitoring and
powerful supervisory authorities boost the efficiency of the EU banking sectors.
Furthermore, the KKZ index has a significantly positive effect on the dependent
variable in all models showing that developed institutional environments are pos-
itively associated with cost and profit efficiencies. We interpret these results as
suggesting that bank regulations and high-quality governance are both necessary
and sufficient conditions for banking systems to operate in high efficiency levels.
To continue, the most efficient banking sectors are those with higher market con-
centration. Moreover, economic development boosts efficiency since a statisti-
cally significant positive link between real GDP growth and efficiency is docu-
mented. This latter finding implies that an increase in GDP leads to lower total
costs and higher profits. An explanation for this could be that the more prosper-
ous countries become, the better access to new technologies their banks acquire.
Banks are thus able to produce more output using less input. This is supported to
a great extent by the finding that technological advances (captured by t and t2)
have a positive impact on cost and profit efficiencies. Finally, we report a positive
relationship between bank size and efficiency, which shows that larger banks –
that are highly involved in non-traditional activities – operate more efficiently.
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12.7. CONCLUSION
In this study we examined the effect of output diversification on the performance
of the European banking systems utilizing cost and profit efficiencies as well as
the risk-taking behaviour of banks as alternative performance measures. To assess
the degree of harmonization in the entire European banking market, we com-
pared the performance of the 15 old EU member states with that of the 12
recently acceded EU countries. To make comparisons meaningful, we relied upon
the technique of Battese and Coelli (1995), which allows the estimation of the
frontier and of the determinants of efficiency in a single-stage. A number of
sophisticated variables that account for environmental differences were also
taken into account in our econometric analysis.
A rather uniform impact of output diversification on the performance of the EU
banking sectors is documented: on average, cost and profit efficiency margins
are enlarged, while the risk-taking behaviour of European banks is not critically
altered. Concerning environment, it plays an essential role in bank efficiency:
greater market openness combined with stricter capital regulations and stronger
supervision positively affect efficiency. Economic development and technological
progress are also found to increase efficiency levels. Most notably, the involve-
ment of banks in diversified product offerings has no considerable impact on the
aforementioned trends.
On the whole, the banking sectors of both old and new EU member states are
found to follow very similar behavioural patterns, which are not significantly
influenced by output diversification. This finding might suggest that the banking
markets in the EU are highly harmonized, thus paving the way for further
research.
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Table 2: Cost Efficiency Estimates
Table 3: Profit Efficiency Estimates
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Note: The first number in each cell is the mean and the second is the standard deviation of the variable. Also:
***, **, * correspond to 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively.
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Note: The first number in each cell is the mean and the second is the standard deviation of the variable. Also:
***, **, * correspond to 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively.
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Note: The first number in each cell is the mean and the second is the standard deviation of the variable. Also:
***, **, * correspond to 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively.
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Note: The first number in each cell is the mean and the second is the standard deviation of the variable. Also:
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13. THE EFFECT OF THE ENVIRONMENT ON PROFIT 
EFFICIENCY OF BANK BRANCHES
Mohamed E. Chaffai and Michel Dietsch
13.1. INTRODUCTION
The banking efficiency literature presents two peculiarities: (i) it has focused
mainly on cost efficiency; (ii) most of works in that field have been devoted to
measure the efficiency at the bank level. Concerning the first peculiarity, it has
been proved that profitability is a better measure to be considered when the objec-
tive is to measure bank performance. Färe et al. (2004) provided a recent over-
view of the empirical literature on profit efficiency and they noticed that profit
efficiency is in its ‘infancy’. Concerning the second point, among the numerous
papers devoted to bank efficiency measurement very few have been devoted to the
issue of efficiency at the branch level. Berger et al. (1997) have encouraged
researchers to consider the efficiency measurement in banking using branch level
data; they have also presented an exhaustive literature survey of empirical effi-
ciency studies at the branch level. Moreover, they have noticed that efficiency at
the branch level was largely missing. Compared to the empirical banking effi-
ciency literature at the industry level, the literature at the branch bank level is still
limited.
Cook and Hababou (2001) have considered a measure of efficiency scores by
evaluating both sales and service performance for a sample of 20 Canadian
branches; while Conceição et al. (2005) have estimated profit efficiency measures
of a sample of 57 Portuguese bank branches. In this study these authors have
proposed a new methodology to decompose profit inefficiency into technical and
allocative inefficiency. To our knowledge, this is the only empirical paper devoted
to profit inefficiency at the branch level.
Another important issue addressed in this paper is the link between profit effi-
ciency and environment. Dietsch and Lozano Vivas (2000) find evidence in
France and Spain, that environment is an important component while comparing
cost inefficiency of banks at the industry level. In their study, the authors show
that the introduction of environmental variables, together with macroeconomic,
bank structure, and regulation variables in the cost frontier model reduces the
cost inefficiency gap between the studied two countries. However, they do not
propose any specific measure of the inefficiency related to environment. This
paper contributes to this field by showing the environment effect at the branch
level. We also propose a measure of environment on technical inefficiency.
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The paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we outline the methodology. Sec-
tion 3 presents the data and the specification of the frontiers. Section 4 discusses
the results and section 5 concludes.
13.2. THE METHODOLOGY
Färe and Grosskopf (1997) have emphasized the duality between the profit func-
tion and the directional distance function. Their model has been used by Färe et
al. (2004) to obtain a measure of profit efficiency of US banks and recently by
Park and Weber (2005) for Korean banks. These authors used the directional
distance function: The first paper decomposes profit technical inefficiency into
allocative inefficiency and technical inefficiency while the second focuses on inef-
ficiency changes and productivity changes. In this study we also use the method-
ology of parametric directional distance function to establish an efficiency meas-
ure to bring into consideration the impact of the environment. This methodology
has two advantages at least while conducting efficiency at the branch level.
Firstly, it allows a simultaneous contraction of the inputs and expansion of the
outputs in constructing the efficiency frontier. This is based on the duality
between the directional distance function and the profit function (Färe and Weber
(2004)). So, this technical inefficiency measure is more complete at the branch
level than the restricted measures derived from an input distance function or the
output distance function. These two functions are dual to the cost function and
revenue function respectively. Secondly, the aggregate inefficiency of the mother
bank is the sum of the inefficiencies of the branches (Färe et al. (2005)).
13.2.1. The Parametric Directional Distance Function
We consider that each branch uses a vector of inputs   to
produce a vector of outputs  . Let T denotes the produc-
tion possibilities set of all the combinations of inputs X which can produce the
vector Y. We also assume that this set satisfies the familiar regularities condi-
tions1. The directional distance function envelop the data in the direction vector
g =( –gx, gy) and is defined by:
(1)
The directional distance function is defined by simultaneously expanding the out-
puts and contracting the inputs in the direction g, which needs to be specified. The
scalar b solution of (1) will measure the maximum outputs expansion and input
1 The set T is non empty and convex. Both outputs and inputs are freely disposable.
Xx 1 x2 … xk ,,, () = Rk
+ ∈
Yy 1 y2 … yp ,,, () Rp
+ ∈ =
DXY g x gy , – ; , () X βgx Y βgy + , – () T ∈ {}
β
Max =
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contraction technically possible. For any combination of inputs and outputs,
profit is maximum when the branch inputs outputs combination is on the frontier
β =0 .  I f  n o t ,  β > 0, the branch could improve profit by improving its technical
efficiency in the g-directional vector.
It is important to mention that the measure of inefficiency derived from this
model depends on the direction vector g in which the data are projected on the
frontier. Two important particular directions vectors should be mentioned. The
first direction g =( 0 ,gy) allows for only output expansion given a level of inputs.
This model refers to the output distance function which is dual to the revenue
function. The second direction g =( – gx,0) allows for input contraction given the
level of outputs produced which refers to the input distance function. We retain
the direction g =( –gx,gy) = (–1,1) which allows to measure technical efficiency
that the branch can reach if it increases its revenues by one Euro and reduces its
costs by one Euro.
To estimate the frontier two methods could be used: the non parametric method,
which uses the DEA methodology, and the parametric-econometric method. In
this paper we chose the latter one to estimate the directional distance function.
The directional distance function should verify the translation property2 (Cham-
bers et al. (1996)). Not all flexible functional forms such as the Translog or the
Fourier verify this property. Chambers (1998) has proposed the flexible quadratic
functional form. The latter is linear with respect to the parameters. This form has
been used in several studies (Färe et al. (2005), Park and Weber (2005)), among
others. The estimation of the model needs to add linear restrictions to the model
parameters in order to verify the translation property. This is the only functional
form used in the empirical studies dealing with the directional distance function.
The quadratic directional distance function is:
(2)
Two methods are used to estimate the parameters of the directional distance func-
tion. The linear programming method of Aigner and Chu (1967) and the stochas-
tic frontier approach. The first method consists in solving the following program
for the sample of N branches:
2 The directional distance function satisfy the translation property if 
. DX αgx Y αgy gx – gy , ; + , – () DXY g x – gy , ; , () α – =








































The set of restrictions (i) imply that each branch is located on or below the fron-
tier; the restrictions (ii) and (iii) imply the monotony of the directional distance
function which should be non increasing in output and non decreasing in inputs,
which means that the branch becomes less inefficient when its outputs increase
given the level of its inputs, and more inefficient if for a given level of outputs the
inputs increase. The translation property of the directional function generates the
following set of linear restrictions on the parameters of the directional distance
function:
(4)
In addition, the symmetry restrictions are imposed:   and  .
The main advantages of the LP method are: (i) the possibility to estimate the
frontier while taking into account all the restrictions on the derivatives of the
distance function (see the restrictions (4) in the optimization program (3)), and
(ii) the possibility of obtaining directly the inefficiency scores once the parameters
of the distance function are estimated. However this method has many disadvan-
tages: no error noises are incorporated in the frontier, there is no possibility to
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obtain the standard error of the parameters estimates3 and finally this estimation
method is not suitable to conduct some tests on frontier specifications (for exam-
ple, to test whether the frontier is common to all the environments or it is specific
to each of them).
The stochastic specification of the directional functional is due to (Färe et al.
(2005)). Using the translation property in equation (2), a stochastic specification
of the directional functional form is possible using the translation property of the
directional distance function. According to these authors, the stochastic specifi-
cation of the directional functional form is possible using the translation property
with respect to  , for example. The stochastic frontier becomes:
(5)
(6)
where   is a one sided disturbance term which captures technical inefficiency.
v is a usual normal two-sided noise disturbance. This frontier could be estimated
by maximum likelihood method or by the method of moments (Kumbhakar and
Lovell (2000)). In that case, we need to assume that the two error components are
independent and also a particular choice for the inefficiency distribution u (half-
normal, truncated normal,…). In our case, we assume that u is half normal. The
inefficiency components are obtained by taking the expected value of   condi-
tional on ( ), as is suggested by Jondrow et al. (1982).
The main advantage of the stochastic approach is that the model takes into
account possible noise in the data and also that it is possible to conduct inference
tests of the value of model parameters. It has the disadvantage of not imposing
the inequality restrictions on the derivatives of the directional distance function4.
3 Unless one uses the bootstrapping method.
4 The other disadvantage is the endogeneity problems with the inputs. The solution could be to use instrumental
variable estimators instead of the maximum likelihood method. But the decomposition of the u terms from the
residuals still remains.
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13.2.2. The Environment Inefficiency Effect
Environment is an important issue at the bank industry level. Dietsch and Lozano
(2000) have found evidence that environment is important in efficiency compar-
isons between banks at the industry level. At the branch level, environment
should also affect branches’ profitability. So, it would be interesting to derive
measures of the inefficiency components and to decompose the environmental
effect on this inefficiency.
To capture the environmental effect on the efficiency differences between
branches which operate in several environments, we proceed in three steps as
follows. In a first step, we estimate a frontier by environment. The environments
are previously classified according to a cluster analysis. We notice, at this step,
that the technical inefficiency measurement is net of environmental effect, let
this score estimated. In a second step, we translate all the branches
on their frontier, according to their level of estimated inefficiency. Here, this
translation or correction should be made for each specific environment sepa-
rately. The transformation of the observed point into efficient ones is obtained by
expanding the inputs and contracting the outputs according to the measure
. 
Now, the new sample in a given environment J is composed of efficient branches
only. In a third step, and for environment J, we re-estimate the frontier by consid-
ering a new pooled sample. Let J be the sub-sample of the efficient branches in
their environment (with data adjusted on the frontier),   the sub-sample of all
other branches in the five other environments. It should be noted that the data in
the last sub-sample  , on outputs and inputs are the observed ones and are not
corrected to take into account potential inefficiency. In this third step, we re-
estimate a distance function on the pooled sample and calculate the new effi-
ciency scores for the branches which belong to the environment J only. These
scores will measure potential profit which could be realised if the branches which
belong to environment J would switch to the other environments. If the estimated
value of the distance function is null, it means that switching to the other envi-
ronments would not increase profit for the branches which belong to environ-
ment J.
DX i Yi 11 , – ; , ()
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Figure 1.
To illustrate this decomposition in the case of two environments, we consider the
figure 1. Branch A which belongs to environment 1 is projected in A’ by estimat-
ing the frontier for all the branches which belongs to that environment. In the
second step, all the branches which belong to environment 1 are projected on
their own frontier. In the third step, the adjusted data for environment 1 and the
unadjusted data for all other environments except ENV1, denoted here  ,
are pooled and a second frontier is estimated and we focus only on the ineffi-
ciency score for the branches which belongs to environment 1. For example, point
A’ is projected to A” if we re-estimate a frontier model on the pooled sample in
order to get the second measure of technical inefficiency for the branches which
belong to environment 1. The last inefficiency score A’A” derived from the second
frontier measures the pure environmental effect. Let us mention that when esti-
mating the pooled sample without adjusting the data in the first step, we just get
the distance AA” for branch A, which is a gross technical efficiency measure
incorporating both technical inefficiency and environmental inefficiency.
13.3. DATA AND SPECIFICATION OF THE PROFIT FRONTIERS
The sample we use in this study contains 1.618 branches belonging to the
branches’ network of a large French banking group. In fact, each branch is affil-
iated to one regional bank. The role of this regional center is to allocate means
(human and physical capital) to the branches and to assign commercial objectives















suerf2009.book  Page 265  Tuesday, November 3, 2009  2:42 PM266 PRODUCTIVITY IN THE FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR
larcier
gives two types of information at the branch level: (i) annual accounting informa-
tion about the branches’ activities and results – information concerns year 2004 –
and (ii) information about the characteristics of the branches’ local environment,
such as the commercial potential of the merchandising zone, the average wealth
of its inhabitants, their socio-demographical characteristics, the unemployment
rate, the conditions of the housing markets and so on. By using a cluster analysis,
we have been able to regroup the branches in six different types of environments.
This typology of local environments was then validated by the management of
regional branches. The six environments are defined as follows: (1) rural zones;
(2) tourist residential areas; (3) medium-sized towns; (4) medium-sized towns
with high unemployment rate; (5) residential suburban areas of large urban cent-
ers; and (6) city centre areas of large urban centers.
The measure of technical inefficiency and the environmental effect may be sensi-
tive to the specifications of the input and output vectors. In this paper, we used
three different approaches of branches’ profitability. The first one considers bank
branches gross operating income, defined as the sum of interest margins and com-
missions. The second one defines profit as the branch’s net operating income and
subtracts personal expenses and other expenses from gross operating income. The
last one takes into account loans losses on branch’s customers-borrowers and
defines net profit as net operating income minus loans losses. Ultimately, three
different frontiers have been estimated and in each case, the set of inputs and
outputs depends on the model specification.
Therefore, the origin of profitability comes in the three approaches from the same
sources which are linked to the main functions of the branches in a bank: the
lending function, the depository function, the sale of financial savings products
such as shares on mutual funds and the sale of insurance products. The revenues
associated to the bank branches’ lending function are twofold: (a) interest paid
by the customers on loans and (b) commissions on loans. The second source of
branch’s revenues comes from the depository function. Here the revenues take the
form (a) of commissions on the sale of credit cards and on the operations linked
to the management of the customers’ demand deposits accounts, for instance and
(b) of interest gained on the customers’ balance of demand deposits surplus: in
fact, the interests the branch receives for the investment of these excess funds in
the regional bank. The third source of revenues comes from commissions on the
sale of savings products, such as term deposits, life insurance products or mutual
funds shares. Finally, the fourth source of revenues comes from the sale of car or
personal insurance products. These revenues define the fourth outputs of the
three profit frontiers we are estimating in this work.
The inputs change with the frontier specification. Concerning the gross operating
income frontier, we have taken as inputs a set of two financial costs: (a) financial
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costs of deposits, that correspond to interests paid by the branch to its customers
on their deposits accounts (demand deposits and savings accounts) and (b) finan-
cial costs of funds borrowed to the regional bank centre to finance loans. Con-
cerning the net operating income frontier, we add to the previous one two other
types of costs which are associated with the use of human and real capital. The
labor costs, measured by the salaries paid to the employees and the expenses
linked to the use of real physical capital (office rental costs and current operating
costs). Finally, concerning the net of losses profit frontier, we have taken into
account the loans losses measured by loans in state of default (90 days past due).
These losses have been added to financial costs.
Thus, we have used three frontier specifications: a gross operating income fron-
tier (model 1), a net operating income frontier (model 2) and a net profit after
losses frontier (model 3). In these frontiers outputs are measured by the financial
revenues raised by the branches. As mentioned above, the frontiers differ in terms
of costs specifications. It is straightforward to verify that the difference between
revenues (outputs) and financial costs (inputs) is equal to gross operating income
(before taking into accounts branches’ real expenses) in the first model. There-
fore, the difference between revenues and the sum of real and financial costs is
equal to the net operating income or gross profit in the second model and equal
to the profit net of losses in the third model. These specifications of the profit
frontiers are consistent with the distance function methodology which is dual to
the profit function, as shown by Färe, Grosskopf and Weber (2004).
According to these definitions of the profit frontier at the branch level, the dis-
tance functions have been estimated by using two specifications: (a) four outputs
and two inputs specification, model 1 and (b) four outputs and four inputs spec-
ification model 2 and model 3.
13.4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
13.4.1. Common Frontier Results
We first estimate a common frontier for the 6 environments by pooling the data.
Two different estimation methods have been used: the deterministic LP method,
and the stochastic maximum likelihood method. The inefficiency component is
assumed to follow a half normal distribution. The objective here is to check for
the robustness of our results relying on the two different estimation methods
used. The first estimation method ignores the noise while the second incorporates
it. The stochastic frontier model allows us to test for the pooling assumption
needed for the efficiency decomposition. We will not report the parameter esti-
mates obtained for the six frontiers here. We just report in table 1 the mean effi-
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ciency scores obtained environment by environment, and for the three distance
specifications. The inefficiency scores obtained by the LP method are much higher
than those obtained using the stochastic frontier model. However, the magnitude
of the mean inefficiency scores is quite stable according the three different model
specifications. Inefficiency varies between environments; the branches in environ-
ment 4 and 6 (medium-sized towns, large towns center areas) are the most ineffi-
cient, versus the branches which belong to environment 1 and 2, the least ineffi-
cient (rural zone and tourist zone). These inefficiencies differences may be attrib-
uted to managerial inefficiencies, but also they may reflect environmental differ-
ences.
Table 1: Mean Technical Inefficiency Estimates – Common Frontier
We also calculate the spearman rank correlation coefficient of the inefficiencies
scores obtained by the two methods. The correlations are positive and significant,
which suggests that the two estimation methods are robust in classifying these
branches in terms of their inefficiencies. Since the LP estimation method is not
suitable to conduct a specification test on the effect of environment on the tech-
nology, we can focus only on the stochastic frontier model in order to test
whether the frontiers are common for the six environments or not. Table 2 pro-
vides the likelihood ratios test values obtained for the six models specifications.
The null hypothesis of common frontier is rejected by the three models at 99%
level of significance. We can conclude that the frontiers are different among the
environments. This result suggests that the inefficiency differences between
branches obtained by estimating a common frontier have two possible sources:
differences in the managerial inefficiencies (technical inefficiency) and the impact
of the environment, i.e. environmental inefficiency. This last component is less
under the control of the staff managers of these branches compared to the first
component. So the question becomes how important is the impact of environ-
ment on the inefficiency scores of theses branches.
# Branch by environment
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Table 2: Likelihood Ratios Test Statistics
13.4.2. The Environmental Impact on the Branches 
Inefficiencies
The second issue addressed in this paper is the effect of environment on profit
inefficiency. We will apply the decomposition method developed in the previous
methodology section of the paper, and for the decomposition the LP method5 will
be used. In a first step we estimate a frontier by environment in order to obtain
the net technical inefficiency of the branches which belong to each environment.
In a second step, the data are adjusted on their frontier by adding the distance to
the outputs and by subtracting the same distance from the inputs. This exercise
has been done 6 times. The adjusted data are pooled in the last step to the five
other environments (without adjusting the data) and the frontier is re-estimated.
According to the LP programming method used, the distance to the frontier in
this last step is still positive or equal to zero. In this latter case, it would suggest
that the contribution of environment to technical inefficiency for the branch
retained is not relevant. If the distance is not equal to zero, it shows by how much
the revenues could be increased and the costs could be reduced if the branches
under consideration in a specific environment would switch to the other environ-
ments. In table 3, we provide technical inefficiency scores obtained environment
by environment from the first step. In the last column of this table, we report the
percentage of branches on the frontier. We notice here that the average ineffi-
ciency components between environments are not comparable since they are eval-
uated from environment specific frontiers, but they will be compared later with
the inefficiency due to environment.
Frontier Specification Likelihood Ratio test statistics
LR DF
Model 1 ( 4outputs- 2 Inputs)
Model 2 ( 4 outputs- 4Inputs)







5 The stochastic method is not suitable here, because adjusting the data and pooling them with the unadjusted
ones may alter the statistical distributions of the inefficiency components in the second step. For this reason this
estimation method has not been used for the decomposition.
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Table 3: Net Technical Inefficiency Measure by Environment
The second issue addressed in this study is the importance of environment contri-
bution to the inefficiency. In table 4 we present the environmental effect obtained
according to the methodology presented below.
The mean value of environmental inefficiency scores averaged between 1.3% and
10.3%, which suggests a high heterogeneity in environmental inefficiency scores
obtained among environments. The highest levels of environmental inefficiency
are obtained in environment 6 (large towns center areas), when compared to the
five other environments. Environmental inefficiency varies between 5.7% in
model 2 to 10%, according to the three model specifications. Three other envi-
ronments 4, 2 and 3 follow (medium-sized towns with high unemployment rate,
tourist zones and medium-sized towns). However, the branches located in envi-
ronment 5 (residential sub-urban areas) have the lowest average rate of environ-
mental inefficiency. This result reinforces our assumption on the importance of
environment while comparing profit inefficiency at the branch level. In other
words, there is evidence that when pooling all the branches together their profit-
ability is sensitive to which environment these branches belong. The common
frontier results reported in table 1, show that the branches located in environ-
ments 6, 4 and 3 are the most inefficient. But this inefficiency is also environment
depending. To check for the robustness of the three models specifications (gross
profit. net profit...), we have calculated the Spearman rank correlation between
the environmental scores obtained by the three models. The correlations are pos-
Environment Mean Std Min Max
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itive and highly significant whatever is the model specification6. This result sug-
gests that the conclusions do not seem to be sensitive to the model specification.
To show the importance of environment in branch inefficiency, we consider the
ratio of environmental inefficiency to total inefficiency (the sum of environmental
inefficiency and net technical inefficiency). Figure 2 reports the average ratios
obtained according to the three model specifications (shr1 is the ratio obtained
for model 1, shr2 for model 2, and shr3 for model 3). The results suggest that the
environment is an important component of the branches profitability in most of
the cases. The share of environmental effect is on average greater than 60% for
the branches which belong to environment 6, 4 and 2. It varies between [40%,
55%] in environment 1 and 3. Finally, the environmental effect is the lowest in
environment 5, with a 20% value. In figure 1 we show the share effect obtained
for the three estimated models.
Table 4: Environmental Inefficiency Measures
6 The rank correlations between the environmental inefficiency scores obtained according to the three model
specifications and the six environments ( Env1-Env6) are the following:
Model1 & Model2 Spearman [0.82. 0.83. 0.35. 0.87. 0.73. 0.79]
Model1 & Model3 Spearman [0.84. 0.65. 0.47. 0.72. 0.62. 0.60]
Model1 & Model2 Spearman [0.85. 0.61. 0.69. 0.76. 0.66. 0.80]
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Figure 2: Environmental Contribution to Total Inefficiency
We have also calculated the Spearman correlations between the net inefficiency
scores obtained in table 3 and the environmental inefficiency scores obtained in
table 4. The correlations provided in table 5 do not suggest that there is a clear
conclusion between the two inefficiency components. The sign of these correla-
tions depends on the environment and also on the model specification. Moreover,
even for a given environment the sign varies according to the frontier specifica-
tion.
Table 5: Rank Correlation Matrix: Net Technical Inefficiency-environmental Inefficiency
(Numbers between brackets are the p-values of the test that the correlation is null.)
13.5. CONCLUSION
This paper has attempted to estimate technical inefficiency of a sample of 1.618
branches of a large French banking group, while taking account the impact of the
environment. The branches are located in 6 different environments. Using the
directional distance function which allows for simultaneous adjustments of
inputs and outputs and the linear programming methodology, a decomposition
of these two components has been proposed. First, we have estimated gross tech-
nical inefficiency levels ignoring the environmental effect and a pooling test
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(0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.569) (0.000)
(0.012) (0.000) (0.210) (0.012) (0.673) (0.425)
(0.421) (0.000) (0.000) (0.025) (0.068) (0.000)
0.368 0.335 0.225 0.281 0.076 0.197 3  
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ronment to get adjusted measures of net technical inefficiency and environmental
inefficiency. The results show that, at the branch level, environment is an impor-
tant factor of technical inefficiency. In most of the cases, the average inefficiency
contribution of environment to total inefficiency is greater than 40%.
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14. EFFICIENCY AND PRODUCTIVITY OF RUSSIAN 
BANKS: DISTINGUISHING HETEROGENEITY AND 
PERFORMANCE
Karligash Kenjegalieva and Thomas Weyman-Jones
ABSTRACT
This paper describes procedures in panel data econometrics for efficiency meas-
urement and productivity decomposition in the banking system of an economy in
transition: Russia. The estimation challenge is to allow for both latent heteroge-
neity and inefficiency, encapsulating the monetary authorities’ dilemma in com-
parative efficiency analysis for banking system regulation. Panel data methods
offer a potential means of achieving this in a credible and consistent manner,
however, the specification of the error terms in panel data analysis is critical. In a
transition economy just emerging from decades of state control, it can be
expected that efficiency change is initially slow moving; but such time-invariant
inefficiency can often be confused with latent heterogeneity giving rise to oppos-
ing modelling strategies. This paper uses a large panel data set of over 900 banks
from 1997-2006 to identify sources of inefficiency in the banking system by esti-
mating a stochastic input distance function with composed error term. It then
develops a productivity decomposition from the fitted distance function.
14.1. INTRODUCTION
This paper describes procedures in panel data econometrics for efficiency meas-
urement and productivity decomposition in a transition economy’s banking sys-
tem.
The transformation of the transition countries and the development of their
banking systems have attracted considerable attention in terms of highlighting the
need to better understand the competitiveness and the efficiency of financial insti-
tutions in the process of financial integration and convergence in the global mar-
ket. In particular, since the banking sector plays an important role in financial
systems, the stability of Russian banking is crucial for the overall systemic stabil-
ity in the country and given the high economic cross-border repercussions of any
instability, for the stability in the entire region itself. Hence, we aim to investigate
the performance of Russian banking system in terms of its efficiency and produc-
tivity.
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However, the first hurdle that such as analysis faces is the difficulty of modelling
banking production processes not only because of “the usual difficulties in studies
of this kind, such as measuring ‘input’ properly, but raise even more difficult
questions concerning concepts of output” (Speagle and Kohn (1958), p. 22). Sev-
eral input/output approaches are suggested in the literature, nevertheless there is
no consensus among them. Thus, this study focuses on a comparative analysis of
the performance of Russian banks from the financial intermediation, production
and profit generating perspectives. In our investigation, we make use of a wide
panel of over 900 commercial banks in Russia covering the years 1997-2006
thereby covering the 1998 Russian financial crisis. In addition, this sample con-
tains a large number of variables that indicate the technology of the banks as well
as a substantial collection of heterogeneous bank characteristics, including
branch network, and participation in deposit insurance scheme. Distinguishing
heterogeneity, i.e. bank characteristics, from performance is a critical and difficult
issue for both the suppliers of equity capital and regulators; yet it is a vital indi-
cator in the prediction of successful risk management.
In the empirical analysis we utilize the recent parametric stochastic frontier tech-
niques which separate the inter-bank heterogeneity effect from the banking inef-
ficiency and, importantly, can be applied to panel data setting. The models used
in the paper allow the researcher to be more confident in specifying the impor-
tance of heterogeneity and differences in market and bank characteristics in
explaining relative bank performance. We specify a stochastic frontier model rep-
resented by the input distance function, which captures the technology of banking
in a fully comprehensive manner. The productivity of intermediation, production
and profit generating activities of Russian banks is estimated by the methodology
of Orea (2002). The results demonstrate whether, allowing for a rich variety of
heterogeneous characteristics, it is possible to identify inefficiencies in relative
performance and to relate these to differences in banking management goals.
Despite substantial research efforts, it is generally recognised that one of the main
difficulties in the analysis of performance in banking is the lack of agreement in
defining of banks’ inputs and outputs. We utilize three different input/outputs
approaches to describing the banking production process, namely Intermedia-
tion, Production and Profit/Revenue. In our model specifications, the Profit/Rev-
enue approach captures the profit maximization goal of bank management; serv-
ice/utility production bringing together elements of service provision and utility
provision (Production approach); and finally the intermediation of deposits to
loans (Intermediation approach).
The Russian banking system has undergone rapid transformation in the last few
years, and the Central Bank itself is less than 20 years old in its present formula-
tion. A dominant trend in the banking system, as the Russian economy has been
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in transition is, as Bank of Russia (2008b) notes that growth in banking sector
assets was largely a result of greater lending, with a particularly strong growth in
lending to the household sector. However, the Russian banking system has not
been immune to the worldwide credit crunch, and considerable central bank
intervention has been necessary to maintain the stability of the banking system in
Russia. The central bank has become aware that rapid growth in lending can
accumulate risks, and therefore a study of productivity growth trends in Russian
banking is timely. A central finding of this paper is that when productivity growth
results for the Russian banking system are decomposed into the components of
technical change, efficiency change, and scale efficiency change, it is the third of
these factors which has accounted for the major part of the measured productiv-
ity growth. We shall show in this paper that the scale efficiency change compo-
nent of a productivity growth decomposition analysis can be most easily linked
to output growth when other factors such as input growth, frontier shift and
frontier catching up have been netted out. Consequently, we shall argue that it is
possible to see in the measured productivity growth estimates for the Russian
banking system, the signs of the lending boom which has characterised so many
other countries as well and which has led to the credit crisis of 2008.
14.2. MODELLING THE TECHNOLOGY OF BANKING SYSTEMS
To capture the performance of the banking system we focus on the idea of the
banking firm transforming inputs to outputs through the income account and the
balance sheet activities of the bank. The outputs are   and the required
inputs are  , and we represent the technology at time t by the input distance
function,  , McFadden (1978). Since the value of the input distance
function equals one if a producer is on the efficient production frontier, and
exceeds one where the producer is inefficient, , we write
The non-negative variable   corresponds to the inefficient slack in the use of
inputs by each producer; it is the feasible contraction in inputs which will project
an inefficient producer on to the efficient frontier of the input requirement set. In
the econometric approach to inefficiency measurement   is treated as a random
variable distributed across producers with a known asymmetrical probability
density function, as described below. McFadden (1978:26) and Kumbhakar and
Lovell (2000:32) state that properties of the input distance function include:
(i) non-decreasing in x, 
(ii) homogeneity of degree one in x, 
(iii) concave in x
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(v) scale elasticity of the production technology is measured by: 
Applying the property in (ii), and using the input distance definition, provides an
equation for estimation purposes:
Three elements can make this equation operational in a setting of panel data,
:
In this model   represents the technology as the translog approxi-
mation to the log of the distance function containing the inputs normalised by the
input on the left hand side of,   is the inter-bank heterogeneity that is separate
from inefficiency and includes the exogenous operating characteristics, and   is
the conventional idiosyncratic error term incorporating sampling error, measure-
ment error and specification error. The remaining term, i.e. ( ), is the ineffi-
ciency component of the disturbance error. The formulation is less general than
it could be however since it imposes separability of the distance function in oper-
ating characteristics. With non-separability, the exogenous characteristics can be
modelled as if they enter the y vector directly so that they appear with second
order and cross-product terms interacting with the other outputs, inputs and time
to reflect the intrinsic nonlinearity of their impact on production technology
The TI (i.e. time invariant) model used in the paper is the original random effects
stochastic frontier analysis (RE-SFA) model with specified inefficiency distribu-
tions suggested by Pitt and Lee (1981). This model emphasises the persistence of
inefficiency over time for each firm. The joint probability density functions of the
error components   and   are as follows (Pitt and Lee (1981)):
Here the inefficiency persists in a constant form.
In the TVD (time varying decay) model the persistence of inefficiency is a function
of time common across all firms (Battese and Coelli (1992)):
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In TI and TVD models the effect of firm heterogeneity is assumed to affect pro-
duction technology of the firms. Therefore, firm specific z-variables appear on the
RHS of the regression as a set of regressors. In next three models (UHET, VHET
and CM), on the other hand, it is assumed that the bank-specific factors affect the
inefficiency or idiosyncratic error directly. The regression equation in these mod-
els is defined as
(1)
In UHET model the variance of the inefficiency term is parameterised as sug-
gested by Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991) and Caudill and Ford (1993), i.e.
,(2)
where   is the vector of bank-specific and heterogeneity factors influencing tech-
nical inefficiency and δ is the vector of parameters to be estimated. In CM model,
the exogenous influence on inefficiency is captured by the parameterised mean of
the pre-truncated inefficiency distribution   (Battese and Coelli
(1995)). In particular, the mean of inefficiency term is equal to  .
We parameterise the variance of the idiosyncratic component in a similar way as
the variance of the technical inefficiency (Caudill et al. (1995) and Hadri (1999))
in VHET model:
(3)
The advantage of the modelling specifications utilised in this paper is that they
allow us to assess the influence of the operating environment of the banks on the
production efficiency of the banking system, as well as to incorporate into the
model inter-bank heteroskedasticity in inefficiency uit or idiosyncratic error vit.
Although our model incorporates bank-specific factors, the models based on
maximum likelihood estimation are estimated in a single ‘step’. Hence the bias
problems associated with two-step parametric frontier models with z are elimi-
nated (see, Wang and Schmidt (2002)). In addition, the UHET model satisfies the
‘scale property’ of uit described by Wang (2002), Wang and Schmidt (2002) and
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Alvarez et al (2006) because the distribution of uit is   which is
equivalent to  .
Making use of the notation:  ,   and
, the translog input distance function   is:
= + α  + β  +  +   +  Γ  +   +   +
µ  + η
The property of continuity of the function requires the symmetry restrictions on
the elements of the matrices A, B:  and  . The empirical
elasticities needed for the productivity index calculations are
, ,  and
. These can be solved in terms of the coefficients of the fitted trans-
log distance function as:
Here   is the column vector of output elasticities,   is the column vector of
input elasticities. The normalising input and therefore the dependent variable in
the regression analysis is ; in the sample used here, this will be the (negative
log of) fixed assets in production and intermediation models of bank activity, and
the (negative log of) variable costs in the profits approach to modelling bank
behaviour. Consequently, intuitive interpretations of the approach are as follows.
In the production and intermediation approaches, the regression explains the
demand for fixed asset capital in terms of outputs, other (normalized) inputs and
the operating characteristics variables. In the profits approach, the regression
explains the behaviour of variable costs in terms of outputs, other (normalized)
inputs and the operating characteristics variables. Although the structural inter-
pretation of the fitted regressions differs among the different approaches, the
interpretation of the inefficiency component is the same since it is directly inferred
from the behaviour of the maximum likelihood residuals.
Concavity of the input distance function in x can be expressed in terms of the
Hessian, by applying the arguments of Diewert and Wales (1987) for the cost
function. The Hessian of the input distance function with respect to x is:
N
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Here,   is a diagonal matrix with the input elasticities   on the
leading diagonal, and zeros elsewhere.   is the matrix of second order coeffi-
cients on the input terms in the translog function. Concavity requires that 
be negative semi-definite1. At the sample means with mean corrected data, these
first and second order derivatives simplify to:
14.3. PARAMETRIC TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY 
GROWTH
Productivity growth is the growth of output less the growth in input. Total factor
productivity is the rate of growth in a multiple output quantity index minus the
rate of growth in a multiple input quantity index. Orea (2002) states that there is
a wide consensus that a total factor productivity index which is generalised from





Identity requires that if inputs and outputs do not change, the TFP index is unity,
and monotonicity requires that the weighted output growth rates and input
growth rates are chosen so that higher output and lower input unambiguously
improve TFP. Separability, a property of the chosen technology set, permits the
generalisation to the multiple-output, multiple-input case. Proportionality
requires that the weights in the output and input growth indices add to unity.
Orea (2002) (in the output orientation) and Coelli, Estache, Perelman and Tru-
jillo (2004) (in the input orientation) demonstrate that such an index of total
factor productivity can be constructed from the translog approximation to the
distance function. In particular, since the negative log of the input distance is
input based technical efficiency, i.e. ,  then,
1 Negative definiteness can be checked from the sign pattern of the principal minors of the Hessian.
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Here use has been made of the quadratic identity lemma of Caves Christensen and
Diewert (1982), and the scale factor notation in Saal et al (2007):
with   as the elasticity of scale at time t.
Consequently, the three terms in square brackets in the expression for 
represent the familiar decomposition of total factor productivity change, TFPC,
into efficiency change, EC, technical change, TC, and scale change, SC:
In summary, the purpose of the modelling exercise is twofold: firstly, to calculate
relative firm inefficiency by estimating the translog input distance function and,
secondly, to measure relative total factory productivity change and its decompo-
sition by computing  , using the first order and second
order elasticity and scale parameters from the fitted input distance function for
the computation. An intuitive interpretation of this productivity decomposition
in the case of the input distance function is interesting. From the expression
above, we see that total factor productivity change comprises, ceteris paribus,
inefficiency change (catching up with the frontier), pure technical change (the
shift in the frontier over time) and the returns to scale component. This returns
to scale component is measured by the rate of change of outputs after allowing
for input change weighted by the output elasticity of the input distance function.
In simpler terms, the returns to scale component represents pure volatility in out-
put growth after allowing for input requirements.
14.4. DATA
As we stated above, we utilize three different input/outputs approaches to
describing the banking production process, namely Intermediation, Production
and Profit/Revenue. In our model specifications, the Profit/Revenue approach
captures profit maximization goal of bank management; service/utility produc-
tion bringing together elements of service provision and utility provision (Produc-
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tion approach); and finally the intermediation of deposits to loans (Intermedia-
tion approach).
To develop our modelling methodology, in the Intermediation approach we use:
‘deposits’ (deposits and short term funding), ‘labour’ (personnel and administra-
tive expenses) and ‘capital’ (total fixed assets) as inputs. With respect to outputs
we use: ‘loans’ (total customer loans), ‘other earning assets’ (total other earning
assets), and ‘other income’ (other net operating income, net income from one-
time transactions, net income from foreign currency revaluation).
In the case of the Production approach, we have four outputs and two inputs. The
outputs are: ‘loans’ (total customer loans), ‘other earning assets’ (total other earn-
ing assets), ‘other income’ (other net operating income, net income from one-time
transactions, net income from foreign currency revaluation), and ‘deposits’
(deposits and short term funding). The two inputs are ‘labour’ (personnel and
administrative expenses) and ‘capital’ (total fixed assets).
Finally, three outputs are utilised in the Profit/Revenue approach: ‘Interest reve-
nue’, ‘other income’ (other net operating income, net income from one-time
transactions, net income from foreign currency revaluation) and ‘net commission,
net fee and net trading income’. The inputs are ‘labour’ (personnel and adminis-
trative expenses), ‘interest expenses’ and ‘provisions for losses’.
The unbalanced panel data set of commercial banks utilised in this study is drawn
from the Bank of Russia (2008a), i.e. The Central Bank of the Russian Federa-
tion. The data are available online in the Russian language and the dataset
includes banks that were in operation over the period 1997-2005. It should be
noted that the sample used for estimation represents the surviving banks over the
whole period. Banks which enter the sample during the sample period and have
zero values for ‘deposits’ (deposits and short term funding) and ‘loans’ (total cus-
tomer loans) are excluded from the sample on the year of entry. The distribution
of the banks across the years and their percentage share of total assets as a pro-
portion of the country’s banking system are presented in Table 1, and the sum-
mary statistics for the overall sample is presented in Table 2.
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Table 1: Distribution of Banks During the Analysed Years (1997-2005) and Assets of 
Sample Banks as Percentage of Total Banking System Assets
Source: Bank of Russia, authors’ calculation.
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Eastern European Banks’ Inputs and Outputs
Note. Figures are presented in 000s Russian Rubles. (I) Intermediation Approach, (PR) Profit/Revenue
Approach, (P) Production Approach.
We consider several bank-specific variables which potentially affect the perform-
ance of the banks. Given that the banks in Russia can either engage in business
banking or retail and business banking, the dummy variable for retail banking is
used in the analysis. The branching network system is also taken into account by
inclusion of such variables as number of branches in Russia and abroad, number
of representatives, additional offices and operating cash points, and dummy var-
iable for branch/headquarter in Moscow. Due to the unavailability of relevant
data, the only ownership variable we include is the dummy variable for 100%
foreign ownership. To investigate the impact of the financial crisis of 1998, we
Number of banks in the 
banking system (BS)
Number of banks in the sample





2000 1311 865 57.4%
2001 1319 875 77.5%
2002 1329 897 82.1%
2003 1329 913 84.7%
2004 1299 920 88.0%
2005 1253 925 90.7%
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum
Inputs
Deposits and short term funding (I) 3293293  58533135  1 3783285875 
Personnel and administrative 
expenses (I), (PR), (P)
156316 2347029 13 116699158
Total Fixed assets (I), (P) 120584  2287572  1  136486702 
Interest expenses (PR) 155022  2008843  0 91556138 
Provisions for losses (PR) 6379  586821  -36103582  16025673 
Outputs
Total customer loans (I), (P) 2360360  31493958  1  1923071291
Total other earning assets (I), (P) 419938 7125094  0 300913078
Interest Revenue (PR) 299553  4252679  0 241393818
Other Income (I), (P), (PR) 79730  1208294  -7067713  49956635 
Net commission, net fee and net 
trading income (PR)
103298 1345010  -2065801  59142956
Deposits and short term funding (P) 3293293  58533135  1 3783285875 
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introduce the dummy variable for that year. Two dummy variables for the year
2004 and 2004-05 are designed to capture the impact of deposit insurance
scheme introduced by the Federal Law Nr. 177-FZ of December 23, 2003. Addi-
tionally, to capture the effects of scale we included the SIZE variable (log of total
assets). This variable also indirectly captures the impact of state control of the
banks, given that as of January 1, 2006 40.7% of aggregate banking sector assets
are attributed to 32 state-controlled banks (Bank of Russia 2005, p.19).
14.5. RESULTS
The estimation results for the intermediation approach are given in Tables 3, 4
and 5, for the production approach Tables 6, 7 and 8 and for the profit approach
in Tables 9, 10 and 11.
Table 3: Summary of Efficiency Levels of Russian Commercial Banks Across Utilized 
Efficiency Measurement Techniques During 1997-2005 for 833 – 925 Banks 
(Intermediation Approach)
Table 4: Average Generalised Malmquist Productivity Indices and its Components for 
Russian Commercial Banks Across Utilized Efficiency Measurement Techniques During 
1997-2005 for 833 – 925 banks (Intermediation Approach)
Note: * For these models results cover trimmed sample results of 95 percentile (covering range from 2.5 to 97.5
percentiles) due to outliers.
TVD TI VHET UHET CM
Mean 0.106 0.044 0.806 0.875 0.806
Min 0.025 0.007 0.284 0.017 0.004
Max 0.823 0.523 0.973 1.000 1.000
St. Dev 0.051 0.030 0.040 0.089 0.114
H(mean)
1st order  -0.151 -0.149 -0.121 -0.132 -0.141
2nd order 0.006 0.006 -0.009 -0.007 -0.006
H(sample)
1st order (% with correct sign) 94.96% 94.42% 86.49% 89.83% 92.08%
2nd order (% with correct sign) 80.81% 85.18% 15.59% 16.36% 19.37%
TVD* TI VHET UHET CM*
GPMI 0.673 0.792 0.905 0.898 0.794
TC 0.744 0.885 0.920 0.913 0.924
EC 1.000 1.000 1.002 1.015 1.004
RTS 0.904 0.895 0.991 0.971 0.857
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Table 5: The Observed Influence of the Bank Specific Factors on Russian Commercial 
Banks Across Utilized Efficiency Measurement Techniques During 1997-2005 for 833 – 
925 Banks (Intermediation Approach)
Notes. *,**,*** – significance from zero at 10%, 5%, 1% level.
Table 6: Summary of Efficiency Levels of Russian Commercial Banks Across Utilized 
Efficiency Measurement Techniques During 1997-2005 for 833 – 925 Banks (Production 
Approach)
Table 7: Average Generalised Malmquist Productivity Indices and its Components for 
Russian Commercial Banks Across Utilized Efficiency Measurement Techniques During 
1997-2005 for 833 – 925 Banks (Production Approach)
Note: * For these models results cover trimmed sample results of 95 percentile (covering range from 2.5 to 97.5
percentiles) due to outliers.
TVD TI VHET UHET CM
Retail banking -0.405*** -0.444*** -0.762*** 32.322 0.354***
Number of branches in Russia -0.020*** -0.039*** 0.056*** 0.013***
Number of branches abroad -0.277 -0.465** -0.098 -0.247 0.059
Number of representatives -0.009** -0.004 -0.023*** -0.207* 0.0002
Number of additional offices -0.001 -0.002*** -0.0005 -0.002 -0.0001
Number of operating cash points 0.002*** 0.001** 0.003*** -0.002 -0.0004**
Branch/headquarter in Moscow -0.031 -0.018 0.325*** -1.858*** -0.192***
100% Foreign  -0.305*** -0.316*** 0.469*** 3.510*** 0.317***
1998 0.129*** 0.132*** 0.317*** -0.385 -0.112***
2004 -0.107*** -0.101*** 0.235*** 1.569*** 0.075**
2004-05 0.132*** 0.118*** -0.795*** -2.078*** -0.030
TVD TI VHET UHET CM
Mean 0.046 0.059 0.999 0.842 0.516
Min 0.013 0.012 0.999 0.0003 0.000
Max 0.330 0.520 0.999 1.000 0.994
St. Dev 0.023 0.035 0.000 0.124 0.224
H(mean)
1st order  -0.109 -0.109 0.040 0.019 -0.006
H(sample)
1st order (% with correct sign) 99.80% 99.84% 26.79% 36.82% 51.05%
TVD* TI* VHET* UHET CM*
GPMI 0.682 0.772 0.825 1.492 0.862
TC 0.791 0.904 1.006 0.985 0.947
EC 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.028 1.025
RTS 0.859 0.852 0.819 1.201 0.883
suerf2009.book  Page 286  Tuesday, November 3, 2009  2:42 PMEFFICIENCY AND PRODUCTIVITY OF RUSSIAN BANKS 287
larcier
Table 8: The Observed Influence of the Bank Specific Factors on Russian Commercial 
Banks Across Utilized Efficiency Measurement Techniques During 1997-2005 for 833 – 
925 Banks (Production Approach)
Notes. *,**,*** – significance from zero at 10%, 5%, 1% level.
Table 9: Summary of Efficiency Levels of Russian Commercial Banks Across Utilized 
Efficiency Measurement Techniques During 1997-2005 for 833 – 925 Banks (Profit 
Approach)
Note: For these models results cover trimmed sample results of 95 percentile (covering range from 2.5 to 97.5
percentiles) due to outliers.
TVD TI VHET UHET CM
Retail Banking -0.376*** -0.429*** -0.415*** 30.568 0.274***
Number of branches in Russia -0.030*** -0.007 0.062*** 0.026***
Number of branches abroad -0.329 -0.634*** 0.285 -0.143 0.113
Number of representatives -0.011** -0.007 0.004 0.012 0.005***
Number of additional offices -0.001* -0.003*** 0.001 0.001 0.000
Number of operating cash points 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.0002 -0.004*** -0.001***
Branch/headquarter in Moscow 0.121*** 0.135*** 0.461*** -2.213*** -0.328***
100% Foreign  -0.230** -0.124 -0.038 0.777* 0.135**
1998 0.145*** 0.149*** 0.057 -1.037*** -0.156***
2004 -0.284*** -0.278*** -0.064 1.928*** 0.329***
2004-05 0.613*** 0.601*** -0.482*** -3.652*** -0.665***





St. Dev 0.033 0.018
H(mean)
1st order  -0.003 -0.002
2nd order 1.003e-06 2.660e-07
H(sample)
1st order (% with correct sign) 99.97% 99.95%
2nd order (% with correct sign) 49.30% 34.84%
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Table 10: Average Generalised Malmquist Productivity Indices and its Components for 
Russian Commercial Banks Across Utilized Efficiency Measurement Techniques During 
1997-2005 for 833 – 925 Banks (Profit Approach)
Table 11: The Observed Influence of the Bank Specific Factors on Russian Commercial 
Banks Across Utilized Efficiency Measurement Techniques During 1997-2005 for 833 – 
925 Banks (Profit Approach)
Notes. *,**,*** – significance from zero at 10%, 5%, 1% level.
According to the results, the efficiency estimates are sensitive to the choice of
frontier construction technique. Interestingly, in the models where the bank-spe-
cific characteristics affect the production technology (TVD and TI), the average
efficiency score is under 0.11. However, the average efficiency results are over
80% in the models which assume that the bank-specific factors have direct
impact on inefficiency or idiosyncratic error. The exception is the CM model for
the production approach where the average efficiency is 51.6%.
The generalised Malmquist productivity indices suggest that Russian banks expe-
rienced a productivity decline in their financial intermediation and service pro-
ducing activities. As can be seen from Figure 1, the highest intermediation and
production productivity levels were observed in the period between 1997-1998,
with the sharp decline of productivity in the period between 1998 and 2000 fol-
lowed by a slight improvement in productivity in 2001. However, from 2001 till
the end of the considered period the gradual productivity regress of financial







Retail banking -2.426*** -0.126***
Number of branches in Russia 0.154***
Number of branches abroad -0.260 0.003
Number of representatives 0.061*** 0.0004
Number of additional offices 0.019*** 0.001***
Number of operating cash points -0.022*** -0.001***
Branch/headquarter in Moscow 0.730*** -0.064***
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With regard to the profit generation, on average Russian banks were productive
throughout the sample period. The common feature of productivity decomposi-
tion across all three alternative approaches is that the main driver of banking
productivity of Russian banks is their returns profile. A worrying signal is the
deterioration in the adoption of new technology which is consistently reported by
all models across three utilised approaches.
Figure 1: Dynamics of Russian banking Productivity Across Alternative Production 
Process Definitions: Malmquist Representation
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We can expand on the finding that the returns to scale profile is the dominating
characteristic of productivity growth, by reflecting on the components of the pro-
ductivity index. The first two components capture the pure catching up and the
pure frontier shift aspects of productivity change. We have already identified the
fact that efficiency change is virtually non-existent, and that adoption of new
technology has been slow and hesitant. The returns-to-scale-effect is computed by
weighting the components of individual output change by the shadow price elas-
ticities of the input distance function, i.e. after allowing for input change. Conse-
quently, the main driving force in the productivity change can be identified as the
volatility of output growth. In the Intermediation and Production approaches
therefore, productivity change is essentially a reflection of the volatility of loans
in the post crisis era, and in the profits approach, productivity change reflects the
volatility of the interest and non-interest income of the banks. In the estimated
model, we chose to fit an input distance function which modelled the banks as
competitive cost minimisers for whom output demand is exogenous. The fact that
productivity change is chiefly driven by output volatility (net of input require-
ments) is indicative of the highly variable and risky environment in which the
Russian banking system was operating in these years.
The analysis of the potential factors affecting the performance of Russian banks
suggests that the banks engaged in the retail banking along with business banking
under-perform the banks which offer only business banking services in the pro-
duction and the intermediation approaches. However, according to the profit
approach the retail banking is profitable form of banking.
Branching network analysis suggests that it is inefficient tactic for banks to
increase the number of their branches, representatives or additional offices. The
higher number of operating cash points, on the other hand, has a significant pos-
itive effect on production technology as well as on the efficiency. Banks with
headquarters or branches in Moscow perform better in their banking services
productions than their counterparts with branches and headquarters in regions.
However, in terms of financial intermediation perspectives the results suggest
opposite. Interestingly, although Moscow banks tend to have lower mean ineffi-
ciency, the variance of inefficiency is higher.
The results suggest that the foreign banks are less efficient than their Russian
counterparts. Our results are thus different from those pertaining to many studies
of banking industries in emerging, transition and developed countries (see Bonin
et al. (2005), Fries and Taci (2005), Havrylchyk, (2006), Sathye (2003), Sturm
and Williams (2004) and Fukuyama et al. (1999)). However, they are in line with
those of Hasan and Marton (2003), who find evidence in favour of inferior oper-
ating performance of foreign banks vis-à-vis their domestic counterparts in their
studies of transition banking. In addition, more recently Lensink et al. (2008)
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provide evidence of a negative effect of foreign ownership on bank efficiency in
their analysis of over 2000 banks in 105 countries. In line with these authors, we
cite conditions of the banking system and of the economy as reasons for the
under-performance of foreign banks. In addition, the size variable has a positive
impact on the production inefficiency. Given that most large banks are state-con-
trolled, this results indirectly suggest that state banks lag behind banks with non-
state ownership.
According to our results, the year 1998 had a positive impact on Russian banks.
Additionally, during 2004 when Russian banks start participating in the deposit
insurance scheme the efficiency levels were significantly lower. However, for
profit generating activity the introduction of deposit insurance lowered the vari-
ance of inefficiency. In 2004-05 the efficiency levels were considerably improved
suggesting that the deposit insurance has a significant positive effect on banking
system.
14.6. CONCLUSIONS
In this study, we have estimated efficiency scores and generalised Malmquist pro-
ductivity indices for Russian banks over the period 1997 and 2005 using the
parametric stochastic frontier techniques which separate the inter-bank heteroge-
neity effect from the banking inefficiency. This study considers three different
approaches to the input/output specification of bank production modelling; the
Intermediation, Profit/Revenue and Production approaches. In general, the
results suggest that during the considered period Russian banks experienced pro-
ductivity decline in financial intermediation and banking service production.
However, the profit generating activities of the banks were productive throughout
the analysed time span. All models across three alternative approaches suggest
that the main driver of banking productivity in Russia is the returns to scale pro-
file. We demonstrated that this reflected the volatility of demand for the banks
outputs net of the economic use of inputs. This volatility was reflected both in the
balance sheet activities, captured by the intermediation and production
approaches, and the income account performance captured by the profit
approach.
Results suggest that banks engaged in retail banking are more profit efficient than
those which offer only business banking services. Additionally, branching net-
work structure has a significant impact on banking production. As the analysis
revealed, the most effective type of network structure for Russian banks is one
with high number of operating cash points. Branches, additional offices and rep-
resentatives, on the other hand, have a negative impact on technology and effi-
ciency. Interestingly, we also find that those banks with 100% foreign stake-
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holders tend to perform less well than their domestic counterparts. The results
also suggest that larger banks lag behind. Given that the largest banks are state-
controlled, this indirectly implies that state-controlled banks are less efficient.
Finally, our findings support the view that deposit insurance scheme has a positive
effect on banking system performance.
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15. PRACTICES AS A BUSINESS STRATEGY FOR 
IMPROVING PRODUCTIVITY: 
SUMMARY OF A PANEL DISCUSSION
Marco Colagiovanni, Martin Czurda and Roger H. Hartmann
15.1. BANKING ON LEAN – MARCO COLAGIOVANNI
This presentation is split into three sections – firstly a brief presentation about
Dexia, secondly an explanation of the lean methodology used by Dexia and
thirdly the lessons learned.
15.1.1. Presentation of Dexia
Dexia has more than 35,000 employees worldwide – Mainly in Belgium, France
and Luxembourg.
The strategy of Dexia is based on 2 pillars: firstly, as a retail bank in Europe and
secondly offering Financial Services for the Public Sector worldwide.
As a retail bank, the revenues come mainly from Europe. Dexia has more than 6
million retail clients.
For the Public Sector (Government Financing), this is more global. Dexia is
present in more than 30 countries.
15.1.2. The Lean Approach at Dexia
Dexia calls its lean approach ‘PRISM’. The quality of the refraction depends on
the quality of the Prism! The white light (= the product or service delivered to the
client) is the result of the association of the basic colours of the spectrum (= the
steps of the process delivering this product or service).
Prism is the principle Dexia follows.
As in a factory or in an organization – the quality of an output depends on the
quality of the process delivering this output. The response time and quality of the
response to the demand of your client is as important as the price or technicalities
of the product you offer.
This is why Dexia speaks of an ‘end to end’ vision: from the need expressed by
client to the response he receives. This is how Dexia is improving the level of
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satisfaction of its clients to differentiate itself from the competition where product
in itself becomes more and more a commodity.
There are 3 different steps in the methodology: Listen to your client – Be aware
of your competitive position – Apply the principles of the lean methodology.
15.1.2.1. Listen to Your Client
What does your client want?
For credits, he wants a quick decision… What does ‘quick’ mean? Is it 2 days? Or
3 days? For the delivery of a banking card, he does not necessarily look for speed
but for day-certainty.
The client also wants a professional service… What does ‘professional’ mean?
And who should be ‘professional’: The person behind the counter? The financial
advisor? The call centre operative answering his call? The back-office operator
writing a letter to explain a mishappening?
Ask the client the right questions in order to know what he really wants! Other-
wise you run the risk of improving the process on a dimension that is not the most
important for him.
15.1.2.2. Benchmarking
How do we compare to our competitors? Differences of productivity can be
detected between 2 or more institutions. It should be noted that benchmarks are
not used as absolute targets (because of comparison mismatch) but rather as a
question-raising mechanism: where do the differences between Dexia and the
benchmark lie? Is this a possible source of improvement for the bank?
These differences can notably be explained by differences in the processes. It is
important to say that if you increase the satisfaction of your client, this does not
contradict with an increase in productivity. Lean can improve both efficiency for
the bank and satisfaction of the clients.
15.1.2.3. Apply the Principles of the Lean Methodology
Now, we know more precisely what the client wants and what our competitors
can deliver. The next step is to understand how your department works. What
works well? What doesn’t work?
A good analysis of waste (e.g. redundant steps, idle time, rework, process inter-
ruption, unnecessary displacements, systems mismatch, overquality, etc.) will
lead to focus on possible cost reduction. It also shows that in most cases, waste
happens mostly between departments, not inside it. This helps in convincing the
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managers to better work together, rather than pressing each manager to do better
for its own part of the process. This transversal co-operation between managers
allows for a working environment to be created which is favourable for the suc-
cesful implementation of the change.
Once you understand the current situation of your organisation, the question is
how can you really optimize it? Which decisions do you have to take in order to
reach a higher level of Efficiency & Satisfaction from your clients? How can you
do that? How can ‘Lean’ help you? To optimize your processes, you have to
search and reduce the waste.
A first analysis is the time analysis: the ‘do time’ of activities adding value for the
client; and the time spent to other activities or no activities. A lot of studies show
it’s easier to work on the ‘waiting time’ for 2 reasons:
1) the improvement potential is enormous. The waiting time represents on aver-
age 70- 90% of the total time a process takes!
2) if you focus the study more on procedures and systems – and not on people –
it’s better for the management acceptance – Instead of pressure on the people
which gives resistance, it’s often better to focus your analysis on the ‘waiting
time’.
A second analysis is to work on making the process flow by breaking down the
barriers between process step, which allow for better load balancing, back-log
reduction, flexibility and motivation of the employees. For example, in the
domain of credit, the concept ‘lean table’ allows for an enormous reduction in the
duration of the process. In this concept, everybody is around the table!
The control of the file, the analysis and the confirmation of the decision are done
by various people around the same table. Everybody has a view on the work and
difficulties of each other. Communication is optimal. If some documents (proof
of salary) are not present at the moment of the ‘check in’, it does not have to stop
the process – it does not have to create waiting time! The analyst can begin his
work without interrupting the process. At this moment, the person responsible
for the confirmation of the decision is automatically informed that he will prob-
ably not receive this document and that he will send an acceptance letter with a
‘conditional agreement’. The advantages of the lean table are evident: better coor-
dination – positive work climate and better productivity.
15.1.3. Lessons Learned
Until a few years ago, the Lean methodology was mainly used in the industries.
However, it can also be a reference in the services sector. Not only does it meet
the customer’s expectations, it also increases the productivity of the process by
some 10 to 20% depending on the previous scope.
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The follow-up of the processes’ performance processes is very important. The KPI
(Key Performance Indicators) must be followed up, however especially assessed
compared to the permanent assessment of the clients’ expectations as well as to
the initiatives taken by the competitors.
Dexia took part in a survey organized by the recognized Belgian Vlerick Manage-
ment School academy, in order to assess the level of maturity of our organization
in the field of process management (BPO – Business Process Organization).
The results are interesting.
In the beginning, return on ‘process investment is negative: the organizations start
with a low level of process maturity, and the people are not aware of the potential
impact of the processes. The level of maturity – as perceived is lower than the
already low real level... In other words, the people are not aware of the low
investments of the organization in the field of process development.
This is where you decide to either stop or continue to invest, to reach the phase
of positive investment: then the company reaches a level – we think that Dexia
has passed this mark – where the colleagues are beginning to link every opera-
tional improvement to the optimization of the processes. Within these organiza-
tions, the colleagues are aware of the importance of the support of the processes
in order to carry out the activities they are responsible for.
In some organizations, which are very much ahead in the field of processes, the
people’s perception of the maturity level of the processes can be higher than the
real level.
15.2. CEE BANKING: PRODUCTIVITY GAINS THROUGH 
M&A – MARTIN CZURDA
15.2.1. Executive Summary
This paper starts by outlining the conditions that had made CEE such a compel-
ling region for banks from the early 90’s until mid 2008, followed by a short
section dedicated to the effects of the current financial crisis and the changed
economic outlook. It will be shown that international banks entered the CEE
markets mostly via greenfield operations until 2000, after which acquisitions
became more important in the race for market share. In this context, the expan-
sion of Raiffeisen International and the measures it has taken to improve produc-
tivity are examined. In the next section, a few examples including the acquisitions
of Hungarian OTP and the merger of two Russian regional players to become
URSA Bank are discussed to illustrate the potential effects of M&A on produc-
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tivity. The last section wraps up with some key conclusions. The findings suggest
that productivity gains after M&A transactions in CEE have been dependent
upon a variety of factors, such as size of the acquisition target, choice of market
and the structural overlap between the potential buyer and the bank to be
acquired.
15.2.2. Introduction: The Growing Interlink between 
Western and Eastern European Banks
Since the 90s, a number of favourable developments in the European macro envi-
ronment have turned CEE markets into a promising alternative for international
banks. While Western European markets had become increasingly competitive
and low yielding, financial integration in Europe, economic convergence and pri-
vatisation programmes in the CEE countries offered great potential.
The initial ‘positioning’ phase by the international banks was followed by a phase
of expansion sparked by high growth rates and low banking penetration in CEE
economies. Acquisitions increased as a means of market entry and later, of
increasing market share. Most of the acquisition targets were former state banks
operating with relative inefficiency, offering international banks a great potential
for productivity gains. According to PWC, European banks spent 27 bn Euro on
89 transactions buying stakes in CEE banks between 1996 and 2006. Between
2004 and 2007, international banks increased their market share in the region
from an average 60% to almost 70% (interestingly, private domestic banks lost
more ground to them than state owned banks: 6.4% vs. 4.6%)1.
1 Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers: European Banking consolidation; April 2006.
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Figure 1: International Banking Groups in CEE by Total Assets. ‘Proportional’: Assets 
of Majority Owned Subsidiaries do Account Only by the Percentage of Ownership
Source: Raiffeisen Research (2008).
15.2.3. The Impact of the Financial Crisis and the Future 
Economic Slow-down
While the ‘subprime crisis’ in 2007 was not severe enough for researchers to fun-
damentally review their assessment of the CEE banking market, the deepening of
the financial crisis through 2008, and the liquidity shortages among the Western
banks, especially those with a high leverage factor, has left no doubt that the
outlook is deteriorating. However, all of this does not change the fact that the
region is still heavily ‘underbanked’, as signalled by the banking penetration rate
(total banking assets/GDP), and therefore the region as such maintains a high
potential. Banking penetration, in terms of total banking assets/GDP, has reached
89% in the CE region, 82% in SEE and 63% in CIS in 2007. For comparison, the
figure was 251% in the Eurozone2.
Banking groups in CEE have been relying on growth in their strategies. Growth
seemed plausible due to a number of factors. E.g., the assumptions of OTP for
their markets in the region included an annual real GDP growth of more than
5%, considerable growth of household consumption and steady export growth.
The other two factors listed by OTP are the deepening of financial intermedia-
tion, i.e. rising demand for financial services and moderate margin compression3.
2 Source: Raiffeisen International 2008.
3 Source: OTP Investors Day 2008.
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Investors in banks were probably too focused on the C/I ratio to be stable or
decline. But as data from the 2008 CEE banking report of Unicredit (published
before the crisis) illustrate, cost income ratio is of limited effectiveness in predict-
ing the efficiency and financial flexibility of a company4: In the CE markets, both
costs and profits were expected to grow at the same pace with provisions growing
faster than both. In SEE, costs were expected to grow faster, at the expense of
profits. ‘Broader Europe’ (which includes Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, and Kaza-
khstan according to the Unicredit definition) was expected to face a situation
where profits would slow because of increased costs. With revenue growth
strongly decreasing in the next years and refinancing costs sharply increased,
banks will need to cut costs, especially if they are willing to maintain their prof-
itability targets. According to a recent McKinsey survey, 71% of the companies
in financial services will reduce operative costs before 2009, and 20% will also
leave certain markets in the rest of 20085.
15.2.4. Raiffeisen International in CEE
Raiffeisen International has been one of the true pioneers in the region. The first
branch was opened in Budapest as early as 1986, while the first acquisitions were
Market Banka in Bosnia Herzegovina in 2000 and the Romanian Banca Agricola
in 2001. What exemplifies Raiffeisen’s pioneer spirit even better is the fact that
the Croatian branch was opened while the Balkan conflict was still raging. The
group’s preferred channel of market entry was greenfield operations until 2000,
thereafter acquisitions proved to be more efficient. The biggest acquisitions to
date have been Ukrainian Bank Aval and Russian Impex Bank.
Raiffeisen International created a dedicated staff unit to target gains in efficiency.
This was deemed preferable to the hiring of external consultants to identify and
execute potential productivity enhancements. This staff unit introduced the Six
Sigma standard to increase Raiffeisen International productivity in 2003. Almost
every year, further measures have been taken: Procurement was reinforced by
introducing BMPS (Business Procurement Management Systems) and proactive
management of the purchase base. In 2006, the centralization of back office oper-
ations paved the way for shared service centres and capacity management. While
all of these measures are ongoing, in 2008 Raiffeisen International’s new efforts
on the cost side concentrated on regional operations centres.
Most acquisition targets in CEE were former state banks. Usually, these banks
had a cumbersome structure with a head office and various regional hubs. These
regional hubs operated autonomously and comprised all functional departments
4 UniCredit Group CEE Research Network: CEE Banking – Still the right bet; July 2008.
5 McKinsey Global Survey Results: Economic Conditions snapshot, November 2008.
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(accounting, transaction management, etc.). Therefore, Raiffeisen basically car-
ried out a total restructuring after each acquisition. All organizational functions
except for Sales have been centralized: IT, clearing, admin, back-office and so on.
A very prominent outcome of this policy was the construction of a large back-
office centre in Kherson, Ukraine, where all back office activities for the Ukrain-
ian retail operations have been bundled. In later steps, back-office activities for
branches in other countries will be carried out as well, boosting the number of
employees from currently 300 to 1,000.
15.2.5. OTP and the Productivity Development of 
its Acquisitions
We have examined three of OTP’s acquisitions whose performances were either
excellent or especially weak on productivity figures. A very positive example was
set by their 2003 acquisition of DSK Bulgaria. DSK Bank achieved major suc-
cesses in its first full financial year as a member of the OTP group. After-tax profit
was up 51.1% in 2004 compared to 2003, ROAE was at 19.2% and CIR fell
from 64% to 50%. However, DSK was very likely to develop that well as it was
the most correlated with the parent bank in scale and structure among the poten-
tial targets – the ‘OTP of Bulgaria’, as Raiffeisen research analyst Akos Hercenik
put it. For instance, DSK was already a market leader with a developed network
and branding at the time of acquisition. Its efficiency was better than average,
especially on the cost side through economies of scale. An experienced and well
established management and several development programmes in IT, risk man-
agement and other departments were all well developed to the benefit of OTP.
Figure 2: OTP Group’s and DSK Bulgaria’s Performance in Key Financial Indicators
Source: OTP.
OTP Group  DSK Bulgaria 
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In Romania, another high-growth CE market, the original plan of OTP was pur-
chasing one of the bigger banks in order to achieve economic scale and access to
a sizable deposit portfolio. However, Robank and its subsidiary, Robinv SA, were
officially acquired by OTP Bank on 30 July 2004. Following the acquisition, OTP
Bank increased the company’s capital by EUR 10 million, almost doubling it to
HUF 5.3 billion. Tightening market conditions and worsening profitability in
general, paired with an increase in minimum reserves requirements in 2006, inter-
rupted the development of the Romanian operation, causing a negative RoAE.
CIR soared to 142.2% in 2005 and was still at 121.7% in 2007.
Also in Slovakia, OTP originally wanted to acquire one of the bigger Slovakian
banks. When OTP entered the market by buying IRB, there was already a very
competitive environment on the market dominated by few big players. IRB had a
small network and low quality portfolio at time of acquisition. The bank had also
lost some major state owned corporate clients as they were privatized and the
bank was generally operating in the less developed part of the country. OTP con-
siders Slovakia to be a possible divestment at the time of writing. Despite the good
overall economic environment, the profitability of the Slovakian banking sector
actually deteriorated in 2007, with the average return on equity of the banking
sector at 14.2%, which is a rather modest ratio by regional standards. OBS only
slightly underperformed against the national benchmark by 2.4%, but by the
clear margin of 12.9% against the consolidated group benchmark.
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15.2.6. A Comparison of the Market Segmentation 
Approaches
15.2.6.1. Segmentation Approach of OTP
We can observe some fundamental differences in the approach how the two banks
segment their markets. These differences reflect to some extent the two compa-
nies’ strategic approaches. As a general outline, OTP has already started to follow
a more selective approach in markets and business segments. This is a result of
OTP’s recent strategy modification, which considers single markets and business
segments as investments and judges them as such. That clearly expresses a need
for profitability in each market; underperformers are reduced to a ‘portfolio mar-
ket’ status (as opposed to ‘strategic market’) or in less profitable cases, considered
potential divestments. To illustrate the approach, OTP uses the following chart:
15.2.6.2. Raiffeisen’s Retail Market Segmentation Approach
Raiffeisen International has so far embraced a more aggressive approach that
relies more on high growth and the long-term potential of the region. The result
is a more expansive strategy, which the group shares only with two other compet-
itors, Unicredit and Société Générale. Raiffeisen divides its 15 local retail markets
in four segments. These are defined by a combination of expected average GDP
growth and the potential to increase market share. (See chart; expected growth
estimates reflect pre-crisis assumptions. Mid-term goals will be reviewed.)
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15.2.6.3. Russian Regional Player URSA Bank
In 2006, URSA arose from a merger of Uralvneshtorgbank and Sibacadembank.
The rationale behind the SAB/UVTB merger was based on advantages such as a
larger branch network, better capital position, diversification of the client base,
improved ratings, higher league rankings, better efficiency and economies of
scale. Before the merger, SAB was a Top 50 bank, and UVTB was a Top 70 bank.
Post-merger, the combined bank immediately became the 22nd largest in the
country.
Figure 4: Key Financial Indicators of Sibacadembank and Uralvneshtorgbank before and 
after the Merger
Source: URSA Bank.
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The new institution improved its efficiency by cutting a variety of redundant
functions – e.g. Legal, IT, Treasury, Accounting. There were considerable business
synergies, e.g. Ural had a strong IT platform, and SAB had extensive retail exper-
tise from being one of the retail banking pioneers in Siberia. The performance
gains were immediately reflected in a better CIR (49.4% in the combined bank
versus 61.7% in SAB and 50.5% in Uralvneshtorgbank the year before the
merger). URSA is now the largest of a group of banks controlled by Mr. Kim and
his business partners. In Q1 of 2008, the group dramatically outperformed the
Russian average of 19.0% RoAE at 32.6%6.
On December 3rd 2008, MDM Bank and URSA bank announced their merger to
become one of Russia’s largest private universal banks. The merged bank will
hold assets of RUB 523 bn. Among the benefits are complementary geographic
regions, economies of scale and an increased funding base. The combined bank
will reach every district of the Russian federation through nearly 500 branches.
The merger process is expected to take up to 18 months; meanwhile the bank will
continue to operate independently.
15.2.7. Conclusions
From the experiences of RZB’s subsidiary Raiffeisen International and the cases
of OTP, URSA and others (not included in this paper), we have drawn a number
of conclusions regarding the potential for productivity gains through M&A
transactions in the CEE banking market:
The right choice of markets. Significant exposure to those markets with the high-
est growth prospects is necessary for banks to benefit to a certain degree that
offsets the cost of entry. The costs for misguided investments into the wrong mar-
kets can be very high as these choices can lock in resources that could be put to a
more productive use elsewhere.
Size matters. In large and fast growing markets, lack of size can results in missed
opportunities. In addition, complementary acquisitions in already covered mar-
ket can increase an institution’s base supporting the structural cost of operations.
Size allows for economies of scale, but the efficiency potentials comprised therein
need to be actively realized. As margins shrink, acquisitions must allow the exe-
cution of synergy potentials in terms of more efficient operations and/or financial
synergies.
Small markets, niche strategies and outsourcing to regional hubs. In smaller mar-
kets, a minimum size must be reached to offset the cost of acquisition and inte-
gration within a reasonable time horizon in order to avoid misapplication of lim-
6 Source: URSA Bank 2008.
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ited resources. When acting in such a market with a niche strategy, focus on client
categories and transfer of knowledge and technology become even more crucial
as economies of scale cannot be exploited to the same extent. Major efficiency
enhancements are possible by creating regional and cross-boarder hubs, e.g. for
back office activities, which can enable cost efficient operations in many smaller
markets even when the individual market shares are small.
Fit of competencies and knowledge transfer. Customer and product knowledge is
more easily transferable when the acquisition target is already operating in simi-
lar business segments. When entering a new market or a new business segment,
part of the acquisition price is paid for the knowledge of the target’s management
of the market or sector. Therefore, staff (and thereby, know how) retention is
extremely important. Knowledge transfer to the acquiring company or the exist-
ence of applicable knowledge in other divisions of the holding company can serve
as strategies to decrease dependence on the local management.
Identifying operational productivity potential. When screening potential acquisi-
tion targets, low productivity figures mostly mean potential. Operational produc-
tivity ratios that help decision-making are: volume/employee, clients/branch, cli-
ents/employee or even calls/hour or transactions/head when e.g. assessing call
centre or application processing productivity. Automation and straight through
processing allow a great deal of operational productivity gains.
Timely restructuring. Most acquisitions happen in a situation where operational
expenditures are high (measured against assets), in a market that allows for high
margins. After the takeover by an international bank, there is a natural migration
in the cost/margin structure as operational efficiency increases while margins usu-
ally decrease due to increasing competition. If an institution fails to increase effi-
ciency faster than margins decline, it is trapped in an opportunity cost vs. cost of
abandon dilemma. Feasible strategies are therefore needed to cover both the cost
and the income side. International banks have an advantage in that they strongly
target determined client categories using know-how and technology from other
markets.
15.3. IMPROVING PRODUCTIVITY IN WEALTH 
MANAGEMENT – ROGER H. HARTMANN
15.3.1. What Is Wealth Management?
Wealth management means offering holistic advice and a broad range of wealth
management solutions, tailored to the needs of wealthy clients. Wealth Manage-
ment is used as a generic term for the management of assets. This includes wealth
management for private as well as for institutional investors. Wealth Manage-
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ment can be divided into two sub-categories: Private Banking and Institutional
Asset Management.
It is a very fragmented financial industry where the largest player, UBS, has a
market share of only 3%. The top ten of the industry represent only 15% of the
global wealth management market. It is not so much a cost conscious industry as
the focus lies really in scalability, volume and high-growth potential. These three
elements are deeply linked to the history of wealth management. You cannot
really be profitable if your size is suboptimal and this created over the last ten
years the first moves towards a concentration process. What we have seen so far
in the market are large players buying small players, or small players buying small
players. What we have nearly not seen so far, but history could change rapidly
due to the financial crisis are large players buying large players. In the wealth
management industry you have only two ways to grow: organic growth, which
means the establishment of greenfield projects going into new markets, emerging
or not, or aggressively hiring client advisors from competitors. The other way to
grow is the acquisition process which was and will always be a sensitive process
due to the key importance of the human being, a central dimension for this pro-
fession. The consolidation drivers are the following: looking for a better scale
effect is the primary transaction motive, particularly for smaller banks. Accessing
new growth opportunities in new emerging markets is another important driver
for consolidation. Finally, accessing new client segments, like Ultra High Net
Worth Individuals (UHNWI) or core affluent, are also important parameters.
Needless to say that since 1990 the business complexity has increased dramati-
cally driven by more sophisticated clients who are demanding more and more
sophisticated solutions and leading-edge investment products. This element was
the main driver of a higher cost base in wealth management over the last 15 years.
This of course generated since 1995 a battle for scarce resources, as everyone
wanted to attract and retain the best highly skilled professionals.
Having all these constraints in mind, the big question is to know how to be more
effective and how to improve productivity? There are only two parameters to
work on: one is the cost side, where operational efficiency and reengineering
could bring a better control over this important dimension, the other one being
the income side meaning that we should improve the quality and effectiveness of
the client service delivery.
suerf2009.book  Page 312  Tuesday, November 3, 2009  2:42 PMPRACTICES AS A BUSINESS STRATEGY FOR IMPROVING PRODUCTIVITY 313
larcier
15.3.2. The Luxembourg Private Banking Group: A Best 
Practice in Terms of Industrial Clustering and a 
Major Contribution to Enhanced Efficiency
Created in 2007, the Luxembourg Private Banking Group represents more than
60 banks active in the wealth management industry of Luxembourg and repre-
senting roughly 95% of the private banking assets under management booked in
this financial centre. The driver of this industrial cluster is very much in line with
all other experiences, financial or non financial, seen so far over the last 20 years.
The main goal is to pool and mutualise where it makes sense, knowing that if
every single bank would do it on its own, the global cost for the financial centre
would be just simply huge. Seeking better efficiencies as a cluster is therefore a
major motivator of this group. Let us go through a certain number of best prac-
tices:
– training and education: Probably the most obvious example, as it would not
make sense for every bank to put in place its own wealth management edu-
cation centre. The goal is to cover systematically all the needs from basic
Private Banking requirements to PhD and research programmes. The lower
levels of delivery are already well in place with a good response from the
market and the Private Banking Group is currently working on the superior
levels addressing internationally certified education, high-end master pro-
grammes and PhD environment;
– benchmarking and peer-comparison: Every cluster needs some basic statistics
in order to know where it is positioned. Prior to the creation of the cluster,
private bankers were not able to identify their respective positioning towards
the financial centre, and have also no clue how the wealth management indus-
try in Luxembourg is positioned towards other competitive financial centres
like for example Switzerland, London or Singapore. With the active support
of our regulator, CSSF, we are today able to perfectly understand the dynam-
ics of our cluster, the strengths, the weaknesses, the opportunities and the
threats;
– tax reporting: Luxembourg’s wealth management clients being in most of the
cases residents in other countries, the tax reporting is a key element of the
delivery to be provided to our clients once a year. If every bank wants to do
it for all its clients in all its various markets, the price of such a project would
simply be unrealistic due to the enormous resources you need in order to
establish such tax reportings. The fact to mutualise the cost in order to estab-
lish such tax reportings is the most efficient way to produce quality delivery
at a very reasonable cost. Private Bankers are reasonable managers, and they
know that you do not compete with a ‘must’, meaning that the Unique Selling
Proposition of a tax reporting disappeared long time ago;
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– promotion abroad: In such a small country like Luxembourg, trade missions
of LuxembourgforFinance are important. If the fund industry via ALFI has a
marvellous track record of professional presence at the road shows organised
by the promotion agency, wealth management is today, through the cluster, a
new active partner selling our financial centre in Europe and overseas;
– strategy: During these changing and challenging times, it is more than impor-
tant for such an important cluster, in fact a key player on the Luxembourg
financial centre, to have a clear action plan for the mid to long term future of
the cluster. It is of utmost priority for the 60 over private bankers to know
into which direction we are going in the environment of 2012/2015;
– industrial threats: A key role of the Private Banking Group is to establish a
common approach on industrial threats like for example the various pres-
sures exercised on the regulatory side, having particularly in mind the impor-
tance of privacy and confidentiality for the wealth management industry in a
place like Luxembourg. Coordination on wealth planning innovation is
important too as we need to keep in this field our competitive edge looking
at attractive tax optimized solutions.
It is important to respect the limits of such a cluster. If we have a look at the ‘do’s’
a common view on our SWOT analysis is central in order to better position Pri-
vate Banking in Luxembourg with a long term view. Looking at the ‘undo’s’, it is
so important to respect the fact that we have individual banking strategies with
different focuses, different priorities. The positioning of each bank is decided by
their respective executive board. The same is valid for product offering, the dif-
ferent markets to be addressed, the client segmentation to be used and the pricing
strategy.
15.3.3. Efficiency Gains in Wealth Management
The most relevant key performance indicator of the operational efficiency of a
Private Bank is the so called cost/income ratio (C/I ratio). In Europe this ratio did
not stop to decrease since 2003. If we look more in detail what happened, we see
that income increased very much above average but the cost side was moving too
much in parallel. The scissors are just not open enough. As already said earlier,
cost management is not in the portfolio of best practices of the traditional Private
Banker. In wealth management, cost is very much related to the performance
based remuneration of the personnel, which represents between 60 to 70% of the
total cost of a private bank. We need here to emphasize that it is a relationship
business where the human being plays a totally critical role, which is less the case
in the retail banking business. What is going on now? Since September 2008,
income is definitely going down due to a weak market performance, an AuM
(Asset under Management) basis which is shrinking, clients moving out of so
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called sophisticated products, who are all looking for safety and cash, which of
course has a clear negative effect on revenues. In this environment, it is totally key
to be able to reduce the cost base, meaning to look for a better operational effi-
ciency and reengineer the cost side, if the private bank does not want its C/I ratio
to explode again.
Let us have a detailed look how we could work on the C/I ratio in order to avoid
a too massive increase of this key performance indicator.
The effect on I: How to minimize the impact on the income in a down turning
market? A good customer relationship management (CRM) could be an excellent
leverage as we have a much better coverage of all the client information, the infor-
mation is much more tailor-made with efficient access, the cross-selling is perma-
nently stimulated and it can enhance better synergies with the retail banking part
of the financial institution. Important to take note is, that online services can
differentiate from competitors but will never replace personal touch. Online is
therefore a competitive advantage, internet as a new technology has to be on the
map and it can certainly represent an additional choice, but is not a substitute for
relationship managers.
The effect on C: How to produce a lower, flexible, more valuable and scalable
cost base? In a smart operational business model we have to free up back office
resources in order to reallocate them to front office. This would bring lower cost
levels and a greater sales force, which would bring additional volumes.
But how to free up back office resources?
We have the following solutions:
– outsourcing: The private bank takes the decision to outsource its back-office
to an external service provider situated within the country or outside of the
country;
– off-shoring and near-shoring: The idea here is to transfer these back-office
resources to service centres situated in places where you find qualified
resources at a much lower cost than in your own country. Near-shoring is a
word used for low-cost locations situated not too far away from Luxem-
bourg, like for example Central or Eastern Europe. Off-shoring is the concept
used for low-cost locations situated overseas, typically in India or in China;
– shared service centres: For example all the back offices resources of a Private
Banking Group are centralized into one single service centre. The same could
be imagined among smaller players who decide to pool together their back-
office resources in a joint venture which will address all these services;
– the ‘bank in a box’ business model managed out of a hub: In this case the
private bank is centralizing and pooling all back-office resources for foreign
locations which are very lean, having only client advisors and direct support
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at their disposal and all the back-offices function are exercised within the
hub. This business model is more and more common in Luxembourg as you
can fully leverage the strength of the European passporting.
What are the advantages of these smart operational business models:
– you can effectively reduce costs and create a more flexible expense structure;
– you can fully focus on front activities, the ones generating the revenues paying
the bonuses of the employees, and paying the dividends to the shareholders;
– you have full access to expertise and scale in these defined back office facto-
ries;
– you have enhanced flexibility in order to respond to external changes coming
from the market;
– with the increased scarcity of highly skilled staff, these pooling solutions rep-
resent a very good solution for a post baby-boom environment. But let us be
conscious, this will only work if delivery is of high quality. If not, the business
model will never survive.
What about lean operations:
The principles valid in the manufacturing industry are also valid for the wealth
management cluster. The techniques of lean banking and Six Sigma are easily
implementable in the banking industry in order to create service factories where
enhanced efficiency and straight through processing are in operation at each level.
Technology transformation is therefore required in order to move in such waters.
Infrastructure, new applications, architecture, all this requires a strong dialogue
between the business line (front office) and the IT department and finally it is all
about feeling operational excellence at all levels of the private bank and this can
only be reached via a relentless focus from the senior management of the private
bank.
15.3.4. Conclusion
Let us go back to the very initial question put on the table “How to improve the
productivity in wealth management knowing that the human being plays here
such a critical role?” Action could be envisaged at different levels:
– important is to begin with some quick fixes, which will at an early stage dem-
onstrate substantial short term impacts demonstrating to all the employees
that the cost base has to be managed in a proper way;
– ongoing cost improvement: After the good results of a quick fix we need to
work on the institutionalisation of key principals linked to cost savings. They
have really to penetrate the culture of the private bank over time;
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– fundamental re-design of the cost base: This is definitely a multi-year pro-
gramme where the goal has to be to realize over time world class performance
in cost management.
With the financial crises going on, cost management and cost reduction initiatives
are extremely high on the agenda. I strongly believe that in private banking, a
good and sound cost management has to be a permanent focus, totally independ-
ent from the business cycle we are in. Cost management and operational excel-
lence are not limited to environments where the markets are going down. The
years where the Private Banker had little to no focus on cost are definitely over.
An active management of the cost base will be his permanent focus, independ-
ently of the weather we have outside.
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SUERF – SOCIÉTÉ UNIVERSITAIRE EUROPÉENNE DE 
RECHERCHES FINANCIÈRES
SUERF is incorporated in France as a non-profit-making Association. It was
founded in 1963 as a European-wide forum with the aim of bringing together
professionals from both the practitioner and academic sides of finance who have
an interest in the working of financial markets, institutions and systems, and the
conduct of monetary and regulatory policy.
SUERF is a network association of central bankers, bankers and other practition-
ers in the financial sector, and academics with the purpose of analysing and
understanding European financial markets, institutions and systems, and the con-
duct of regulation and monetary policy. It organises regular Colloquia, lectures
and seminars and each year publishes several analytical studies in the form of
SUERF Studies.
SUERF has its full-time permanent Executive Office and Secretariat located at the
Austrian National Bank in Vienna. It is financed by annual corporate, personal
and academic institution membership fees. Corporate membership currently
includes major European financial institutions and Central Banks. SUERF is
strongly supported by Central Banks in Europe and its membership comprises
most of Europe’s Central Banks (including the Bank for International Settlements




For details of SUERF Studies published prior to 2008 (Nos. 1 to 22 and 2003/1-
2007/4) please consult the SUERF website at www.suerf.org.
2008
2008/1 Monetary Policy Transmission in Poland: A Study of the Impor-
tance of Interest Rate and Credit Channels, by Tomasz ŁYZIAK, Jan
PRZYSTUPA and Ewa WRÓBEL, Vienna, 2008, ISBN 978-3-902109-
41-5
2008/2 Commodities, Energy and Finance, edited by Ernest GNAN and Már
GUDMUNDSSON, Vienna, 2008, ISBN 978-3-902109-42-2
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2008/3 Macroeconomic Differentials and Adjustment in the Euro Area, by
Iulia SIEDSCHLAG, Vienna, 2008, ISBN 978-3-902109-43-9
2008/4 Monetary Policy, Regulation and Volatile Markets (six papers), by
John P. CALVERLEY, Fernando RESTOY, Jesper Ulriksen THUESEN,
Andrea VIVOLI, Sushil WADHWANI and Axel A. WEBER, Vienna,
20008, ISBN 978-3-902109-44-6
2008/5 Asset Management in Volatile Markets (four papers), by Robert C.
MERTON; Martin GARTNER, Otto LOISTL, Danijela MLADINOVIC
and Stephan ZELLNER; Peter HAISS and Bernhard SAMMER and
Kryzsztof RYBINSKI and Ursula SOWA, Vienna, 2008, ISBN 978-3-
902109-45-3
2009
2009/1 Northern Rock: A Multi-Dimensional Case Study, edited by Franco
BRUNI and David T. LLEWELLYN, Vienna, 2009, ISBN  978-3-
902109-46-0
2009/2 Current Trends in the Russian Financial System, edited by Morten
BALLING, Vienna, 2009, ISBN 978-3-902109-47-7
2009/3 Financing of SMEs in Europe (four papers), by Rym AYADI, Beat
BERNET and Simone WESTERFELD, Vítor GASPAR and Nancy HUY-
GHEBAERT, Vienna, 2009, ISBN 978-3-902109-48-4
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BCL – BANQUE CENTRALE DU LUXEMBOURG 
The Banque centrale du Luxembourg (BCL) came into existence on 1 June 1998,
as the successor of the former Institut Monétaire Luxembourgeois (IML). To fulfil
the conditions of participation in Economic and Monetary Union, Luxembourg
established the BCL as an independent central bank in the same year as the Euro-
pean Central Bank was created. The Luxembourg State is the sole shareholder of
the BCL, but the independence of the central bank is provided for by its founding
law and by the Maastricht Treaty.
The BCL helps to implement the missions of the European System of Central
Banks (ESCB). Since Luxembourg was among the first countries that adopted the
euro on 1 January 1999, the BCL participates in the Eurosystem and the Gover-
nor of the BCL is a member of the Governing Council of the ECB, which sets
monetary policy to maintain price stability in the euro area. Subject to this pri-
mary objective, the BCL contributes to a variety of tasks at both the European
and the national level. These include the following: to define and implement the
single monetary policy, to issue banknotes, to monitor financial stability, to pro-
mote the smooth operation of payment systems, and to collect economic statistics
and publish research contributing to these policy objectives.
For details of BCL publications please consult its website at www.bcl.lu
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